VEDANTAPARIBHASA

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

VEDANTAPARIBHASA

The Adyar Library Series—No. 34

VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀṢĀ

VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀṢĀ

BY

DHARMARĀJA ADHVARIN

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI
M.A., B.Sc. (Oxon), Barrister-at-Law
Head of the Department of Indian Philosophy
University of Madras

WITH A FOREWORD BY

SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN
LL.D., D.LITT., F.B.A.

THE ADYAR LIBRARY, ADYAR

1942

Price Rs. 12-0-0

Printed by
C. SUBBARAYUDU,
AT THE VASANTA PRESS,
ADYAR, MADRAS.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

THE *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is a standard treatise on Advaita Epistemology and Ontology, widely used by students appearing for higher examinations in Philosophy in Indian Universities. S'rī Suryanarayana Sastri, the editor of the present publication, is a distinguished Professor who has taught Philosophy to University students for nearly 20 years and knows their needs as only a Professor with his profound scholarship and rich experience can know. It is therefore very fortunate for students of Indian Philosophy that a classical work like *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is edited by a classical writer like Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri who has already enriched our Philosophical Literature by editing such standard works like the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īs'vara Kṛṣṇa, the *S'ivādvaitanirṇaya* of Appaya Dīkṣita, the *Mānameyodaya*, the *Bhāmati-Catussūtri*, the *Vivaraṇapremeyasaṅgraha*, the *Paramārthasāra*, and the *Tattvas'uddhi*.

With characteristic consideration for the Publishers, he proposed that, in these days of paper scarcity and mounting prices, the cost of publication may be kept as low as possible by publishing the English

Translation and notes only, as the Sanskrit Text had already been made available by other publishers. It occurred to me, however, that the interests of scholarship and the convenience of students would be better served if the Sanskrit Text also was edited by Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri himself. I, therefore, suggested to him that the value of the Publication would be greatly enhanced if he himself edited the Text also, along with his own excellent Translation and valuable notes. He readily agreed and the result is the present publication. It would be an impertinence for me to seek to evaluate the worth of a publication edited by such a profound scholar and brilliant writer like Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri. This, I do not at all seek to do ; but, I cannot help recording my conviction that the publication will prove to be of very great help to generations of scholars and students of Indian Philosophy.

The Adyar Library
The Theosophical Society
Adyar, 16-6-42

G. SRINIVASA MURTI,
Honorary Director.

FOREWORD

THERE are many editions of Dharmarāja's *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, the great classic on Advaita Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics, now available to the students of the Vedānta. I have myself sponsored the Calcutta edition by Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍit N. S. Anantakrishna Sastri. I can say however without hesitation that this edition brought out by Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Reader, and Head of the Department of Indian Philosophy in the University of Madras, is the one best suited for use as a text book by our students. The editor is a profound student of philosophy, especially of Advaita Vedānta, and has enriched our philosophical literature by many critical editions and translations of Advaita classics. As a teacher of philosophy for nearly twenty years, he knows the needs of our students. This edition has a useful introduction, the Sanskrit text, a readable and accurate English translation and valuable notes. I am sure that it will continue for long to be the standard edition of this invaluable treatise.

28-5-1942 S. RADHAKRISHNAN

PREFACE

THE increasing use of Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* in our Universities made it appear desirable, to the present editor and some of his friends, to present a fresh edition with an English translation and notes. Many of the students in the Universities do not possess sufficient knowledge of Sanskrit to do without a translation; the only known English translation belongs to the early days of Anglo-Indian scholarship and is not easily accessible; and while Dr. D. M. Datta's excellent book on the *Six Ways of Knowing* is an admirable aid, it cannot take the place of the text. It is hoped, therefore, that the present volume will be found useful by students of Indian thought. Besides an expression of general indebtedness to all scholars that have laboured in this field, the editor would like to take this opportunity of acknowledging his obligations in particular to the following gentlemen, who have helped forward the publication in various ways: Dr. G. Srinivasa Murti, Director, Adyar Library; Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras; Drs. C. Kunhan Raja, T. R. Chintamani and V. Raghavan, Sanskrit Department, Madras University; Paṇḍit S.

Subrahmanya Sastri and Mr. T. Mahadevan, Research Students of the University.

The editor's gratitude in full measure is due to Sir S. Radhakrishnan, LL.D., D.Litt., F.B.A., for his kind foreword.

The Vasanta Press deserves grateful congratulations for the excellent way in which the work has been done in these difficult days.

KODAIKANAL
19th May 1942

S. S. S.

To The Memory Of

VATASSERI KRISHNAN TAMPY, B.A.,

(Formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Maharaja's College of Arts, Trivandrum)

SOUND SCHOLAR, MODEST MAN, FIRM FRIEND

INTRODUCTION

DHARMARĀJA, the author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, was a native of Kaṇḍramāṇikkam Village, Tanjore District, in South India. He appears to have lived and written in the 17th century. In the edition of this work brought out by the Calcutta University, the learned editor says that one Kaḍalaṅguḍi Naṭes'a S'āstrin, a contemporary scholar of some considerable merit in Vedānta and Jyotiṣa, claims to be a lineal descendant of Dharmarāja, removed from him by some 250 years. Whatever may be the worth of this claim, it is clearly established from MSS. colophons that our author belonged to Kaṇḍramāṇikkam village.[1] Dharmarāja appears to have been a scholar of weight in both the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika and the Vedānta. His works on Tarka are yet unpublished. They are the *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi*, a commentary on Gaṅges'a's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the *Yuktisaṅgraha*,[2] and the *Nyāyaratna* or *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpaprakās'a*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Mahāmahopādhyāya S'as'adhara. The first of these has a sub-commentary by Dharmarāja's

[1] See *Tanjore Library MSS. Catalogue*, XI, pp. xxvii, xxviii, 4586, 4756 and 4764.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 4764.

son, Rāmakṛṣṇa.[1] The known Vedānta works are only two, including the *Paribhāṣā*, the other work being the *Padayojanikā* or the *Padadīpikā*, a commentary on the *Pañcapādikā*; the latter is unpublished and even MSS. appear to be rare, only a single, damaged, and incomplete MS. having been noticed by Hultzsch in the archives of the Temple Library at Tiruvidamarudur.

The Paribhāṣā has been published several times.[2] It has several commentaries, the most notable of which is that by the author's son, Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin; this has also a sub-commentary called the *Maṇiprabhā*. The next commentary of note is by the author's pupil and nephew,[3] Peddā Dīkṣita, who wrote also an epitome of the *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakās'a*. The *Bhūṣaṇam*, a commentary by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa Sās'trin, is still in manuscript.[4] A latter-day commentator called S'ivadatta wrote the *Arthadīpikā*.[5] The Calcutta University editor[6] has appended his own commentary under the name of the *Paribhāṣāprakās'ikā*. A compendium under the title *Paribhāṣāsaṅgraha* was compiled by the late Sir Rama Varma, a former Maharaja of Cochin, and published in the *Cochin Sanskrit Series*.

As a compendious yet full treatment of the psychology and epistemology of Advaita Vedānta the

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 4599.

[2] By the Venkatesvara Steam Press, Bombay (three editions), by Calcutta University (two editions) and by the Government of Travancore.

[3] Son of Dharmarāja's elder brother, Trivedi Nārāyaṇa Yajvan.

[4] Madras R 1463.

[5] Published in 1911 at the Venkatesvara Steam Press, Bombay.

[6] Mm. N. S. Anantakṛṣṇa S'ās'trin.

Paribhāṣā is unrivalled; its discussion of the cosmology is not as detailed, but this is only to be expected, since cosmology, concerned with the empirically valid, is relatively negligible, in the view of the advaitin, who has been content to borrow and adapt, so long as there is no conflict with the ultimate metaphysical position.

The most intriguing and the most detailed part of the treatise relates to pratyakṣa. What is fully perceptible and perceptual is but the absolute experience, Brahman, which is *sākṣād aparokṣa*. In spite of its eternal non-dual reality, we seem to perceive a world of fleeting duality, as it were. The diversified content is said to be a projection of māyā or avidyā. But what accounts for its immediacy? And what is the nature of the experience, that should be immediate at least in the same degree, in order that the delusion may be removed? In the empirically valid, finite, everyday world, cognition is not identical with, but distinct from, the content. Hence we have to give an account of the perceptuality of the former and the perceptibility of the latter. In Brahman, that is the supremely immediate, there is non-difference between cogniser and cognised; hence, in finite cognition, wherever there is immediacy, we may expect to find similar non-difference of object from subject. This, however, is not the case; subject and object are such, because they appear distinct and contrasted. If this appearance were ultimate, if the object were wholly other than and independent of the subject, knowledge of it, except, perhaps, in a remote

and mediate fashion, would be impossible. For, the subject would have to be linked to the object by a relation different from both ; and this relation itself would require another pair of relations to link it to subject as well as object ; and so *ad infinitum*. Further, such an external relation, even if possible, would not achieve immediacy, being indistinguishable from what obtains in the case of inferential cognition etc. If the relation be not purely external, then it as well as its relata will share a common nature, at least in part ; and to this extent, the object could not be wholly distinct from the subject. We thus seem to have no basis for maintaining the absolute distinctness of a perceptible object ; if and when perceived, it must share the nature of the subject ; in reality, the two are not different, though they appear to be so. Since experience is indubitable, though the natures of the experient and the experienced be subject to question, we hold that these differents and their differences are superimposed on the sole reality, *viz.*, experience. In cases of perception, it is said, in other words, the object has no reality other than that of the percipient. The non-dual consciousness as defined in terms of object is non-different from the same consciousness as defined in terms of subject ; hence the perceptibility of the former.

In the same manner, the perceptuality of any cognition has to be determined by the revelation of non-difference between consciousness as defined by the cognitive act (vṛtti) and that as defined by the object. This manifestation of non-difference is brought about

by the vṛtti (psychosis) reaching to and pervading the same locality as the object. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), which is of the nature of light, flows out through the sense-channels, reaches the locality of the object and pervades it. In speaking of the apparently limited consciousness, some speak of it as defined, as it were (by the vṛtti, the object, etc.); others use the language of prototype and reflection and speak of consciousness reflected in the vṛtti etc. The objection to the latter usage would appear to be the impossibility of there being any reflection of what is not a coloured substance, an objection which loses a great deal of its force if we remember that what is meant is only the analogy of reflection, not literal reflection, and even the latter may be possible, since colour is reflected, though it is not a coloured substance.

What really matters is the admission of immediacy, in any ultimate sense, for the supreme consciousness alone. Though eternally immediate, it sometimes fails to appear so; this failure is due to obscuration by māyā, whose texture and *modus operandi* are indeterminable. The obscuration can be and is removed in varying degrees by the cognitive functioning of the internal organ (vṛtti-jñāna). It is effectively removed by perceptual vṛtti, the final removal being by the akhaṇḍa-sākṣātkāra, the intuition of the impartite, which, while destroying all lower vṛttis, destroys itself as well, just as the powder of the clearing-nut, while precipitating other impurities suspended in water, precipitates itself as well. From the ultimate view-point,

removal of obscuration is as little intelligible as obscuration itself. The only answer to such questions must take refuge in a 'somehow'. Hence, it will be legitimate to hold that *somehow* there is perceptual cognition when there is sense-contact with an object. Where the object is not external, *e.g.*, pleasure or pain, the manas, which is also a sense-organ, is in contact therewith; hence their immediacy. This is the comparatively simple position of the *Bhāmatī* school.

The rival school of Advaita interpretation associated with the *Vivaraṇa* seeks to effect refinements on this. It is not prepared to admit that manas is a sense-organ (indriya). The texts are inconclusive and are susceptible of being interpreted either way. The final intuition is, it is claimed, the product of s'ruti itself; and distinctive causality (karaṇatva) cannot be assigned to s'ruti, if immediacy be dependent really on the sense-character of manas. We do admit the functioning of manas, but perceptuality depends in the last resort on the manifestation of non-difference of vṛtti-defined consciousness from object-defined consciousness; for this purpose, the presence or absence of a sense-channel, the sense-character of manas, these are irrelevant questions.

Admitting the greater keenness of analysis of the *Vivaraṇa* position, we may yet question the need for treating manas as not an indriya or the ultimate satisfactoriness of the analysis made. Manas is aware of desire, cognition, fear, etc., which are all said to be of

the stuff of manas; and an indriya cannot be aware of itself. Even this is not a fatal objection, since an indriya may be aware of parts or modifications of itself, though not of itself as a whole and as an indriya. Further, the whole subject-object relation in consciousness being unintelligible to the advaitin, where is the propriety of seeking for an apparently satisfactory view of this relation? Is it not more legitimate to confess ignorance under the formula 'somehow,' reserving for practical purposes the broad distinction between sense-generated and not-sense-generated cognition? The objection raised here gains further force, if we look at the peculiar development of the theory of the outgoing psychosis (vṛtti); this, it is said, reaches to the locality of the object, pervades it and *takes on the same form as the object*, triangular, quadrangular, etc. We are straightaway in the meshes of representationism. Why should a psychosis be *like* an object? How can we judge the presence or extent of the likeness? By another psychosis? And does that bear a resemblance to *its* object, and so *ad infinitum*? The moment we are interested in the cognitive mechanism and seek to make adequate our understanding of it psychologically, we find ourselves bogged in a morass of logical absurdities. The *Vivaraṇa* school and its adherents have thus not achieved any substantially valuable result despite their apparently greater acumen.

Nearly the same judgment has to be passed on the *Vivaraṇa* view of the jīva. Supreme, homogeneous

consciousness is non-dual; but of the apparently limited, finite, consciousness, is there a multiplicity or not? Empirically we seem to deal with our selves as jīvas in a context of other jīvas; the 'thou' is not treated as less real than the 'I.' On strictly non-dualist lines of reasoning, however, it is possible to abandon this commonsense position and maintain the empirical reality of but a single jīva, the whole world (inclusive of other jīvas) being his dream-creation; some say that this jīva is Hiraṇyagarbha; others (like the author of the *Vivaraṇa*) maintain that the inquirer himself is this single jīva. A position like this is as intolerable as it is logically unassailable. It is absurd to set out a metaphysical disquisition, wherein the exponent himself figures as a dream of the inquirer. There can be no question of teacher or taught, the already-released and to-be-released; there is only one jīva, who is to be released, cheered by the fictitious example of other self-created jīva-semblances. The author of the *Paribhāṣā* would appear to have not too much sympathy with such a view, despite his loyalties to the author of the *Vivaraṇa*. Hence it is that we have an ungrudging statement of rival views as to release and to the possibility of some finding release and serving as examplars to others yet in bondage. Views of this kind serve to show that Advaita need not fly in the face of commonsense and that it can accommodate itself to a good deal of the requirements of the work-a-day world. It seems a pity, however, that our author was under the spell of the *Vivaraṇa* school in the rest of his treatise on the

Paribhāṣā. But for that spell, we might have had a more balanced exposition. For what we have at present, however, let us be truly grateful; the work has served several generations of scholars and will serve many more such generations, being hard to replace for its pithy, concise, and forceful exposition.

ABBREVIATIONS

Br. Sū.	Brahma Sūtras
Bṛh.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Chānd.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Gītā.	Bhagavad Gītā
Kaṭha.	Kaṭhopaniṣad
Muṇḍ.	Muṇḍakopaniṣad
PM.	Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras
S'vet.	S'vetas'vatara Upaniṣad
TS.	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
Taitt.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TPH.	Theosophical Publishing House

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I—PRATYAKṢA

the phenomenality of the silver etc., which, together with their cognitions, are produced by a combination of nescience, defect (in the sense-organ or manas or both), and residual impression of former experience of silver etc. 85. Distinction between transformation and transfiguration. 86. Location of the phenomenal in the *this*-aspect-defined consciousness. 87. Objection as to apposition of 'this' with what is present in *consciousness*. 88. Reply: of the nescience which is the material cause in any particular delusion, the substrate is not pure consciousness, but consciousness as defined by the this-aspect; hence the apposition with 'this'. 89. Because of the non-difference manifested between such content-defined consciousness and the jīva-sākṣī there is said to be superimposition on the witness, cognisability by the witness and non-cognisability by any other. 90. Objection: if super-imposition be on the witness, why is it not in the form 'I am silver', like 'I am happy'? 91. Reply: apposition with 'I' due not to superimposition on the witness. 92. The form of the residual impression as determined by the form of the original experience accounts for apposition with 'I' or 'This'. 93. Examples. 94. Silver in veridical experience is experienced as 'This' not as 'I'; hence the super-imposition is in the form 'This is silver'. 95. Objection as to the purpose of a psychosis of nescience in the form of a silver-cognition. 96. Reply: that psychosis is for establishing the immediacy of phenomenal silver. 97. Objection: admission of two psychoses, as 'this' and 'silver' with distinct contents would make this indistinguishable from the akhyāti of Prabhākara. 98. Reply: though there are two vṛttis, there is a single consciousness reflected therein, which apprehends the identity of the real and the not-real; hence delusive cognition. 99. Objection: even the empirically real, being super-imposed, cannot be distinguished

from the illusory. 100. Reply: there is difference in the nature of things, similar to what the realists admit to explain the momentariness of some entities and the permanence of others. 101. Alternative reply: of the empirically real, nescience alone is the cause, while, in the case of the barely illusory, there is an adventitious defect as well, like film in the eye, or like sleep (in the case of dream contents). 102. Objection: dream contents are but recollected, not illusorily created. 103. Reply: the experience is as immediate; and śruti declares the creation of chariots etc., in dreams. 104. Objection: the dream-content should be super-imposed on some locality, which cannot itself be super-imposed, as then it could not be the substrate; nor can it be real, as then it would be remote and not perceptible. 105. Reply: the substrate of dream-superimposition is but consciousness, which is self-luminous; as for the locality, that too is superimposed; as also sense-cognisedness. 106. The contingence of the form 'I am elephant' is to be refuted, as before, on the basis of lack of saṃskāras with that form. 107. Evolution of māyā into dream-objects is said to be (*a*) direct, (*b*) through the antaḥkaraṇa. 108. Objection: sublation is by cognition of the true nature of the substrate; but there is no cognition of pure consciousness on waking; how are dreams sublated? 109. Reply: distinction between sublation and removal. 110. Dreams are removed, not sublated. 111. Removal, not sublation, has to be admitted even of nacre-silver etc., on the view that they are products of primal nescience. 112. Objection: admission of phenomenal reality for nacre-silver etc., militates against sublation in all three times. 113. Reply: negation in all three times is possible, since what is negated is the empirical reality of phenomenal silver, not its silver-ness. 114. Objection: when delusive silver is cognised, if empirical reality too is not cognised, there would be no apprehension of the counter-correlate as defined by

CHAPTER VIII—OBJECTS

CHAPTER IX—THE FRUIT

ॐ

वेदान्तपरिभाषा

उपोद्घातः

यदविद्याविलासेन भूतभौतिकसृष्टयः ।
तन्नौमि परमात्मानं सच्चिदानन्दविग्रहम् ॥ १ ॥
यदन्तेवासिपञ्चास्यैर्निरस्ता भेदिवारणाः ।
तं प्रणौमि नृसिंहाख्यं यतीन्द्रं परमं गुरुम् ॥ २ ॥

VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀṢĀ

INTRODUCTORY

That, through an evolution of whose (energy of) nescience (avidyā), there are the creations of the elements and elementals (compounds), to that Supreme Self, figured as reality, consciousness and bliss, I offer obeisance. (1)

That supreme preceptor (of my preceptor), the great ascetic, called Nṛsiṃha, by whose lion(-like) pupils were vanquished the elephant(-like) upholders of difference, to him I offer respectful salutations. (2)

श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथाख्यान् वेलाङ्गुडिनिवासिनः ।
जगद्गुरूनहं वन्दे सर्वतन्त्रप्रवर्तकान् ॥ ३ ॥
येन चिन्तामणौ टीका दशटीकाविभञ्जिनी ।
तर्कचूडामणिर्नाम कृता विद्वन्मनोरमा ॥ ४ ॥
टीका शशधरस्यापि बालव्युत्पत्तिदायिनी ।
पदयोजनया पञ्चपादिका व्याकृता तथा ॥ ५ ॥
तेन बोधाय मन्दानां वेदान्तार्थावलम्बिनी ।
धर्मराजाध्वरीन्द्रेण परिभाषा वितन्यते ॥ ६ ॥

१. इह खलु धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाख्येषु चतुर्विधपुरुषार्थेषु मोक्ष एव परमपुरुषार्थः ; 'न स पुनरावर्तते' इत्यादिश्रुत्या तस्य नित्यत्वाव-

That native of Velāṅguḍi, called Veṅkaṭanātha, that world-preceptor, the propagator of all the sciences, him I salute. (3)

He by whom was written the (work) called *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi*, as a commentary on the (*Tattva-*) *Cintāmaṇi* (of Gaṅges'a), condemning ten (other) commentaries (thereon), (and as) a delight to the learned, (4)

(By whom was written) a commentary on S'as'adhara's (*Siddhāntadīpa*) to instruct the unlearned, (by whom) was explained also the *Pañcapādikā* through (his) *Padayojanā*, (5)

By that Dharmarājādhvarīndra is written this *Paribhāṣā*, based on the content of the Vedānta, for the instruction of the dull-witted. (6)

1. Here, verily, of the four kinds of human goals, called dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, mokṣa (release)

धारणात्; इतरेषां त्रयाणां तु प्रत्यक्षेण 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यादिश्रुत्या च अनित्यत्वावगमाच्च।

२. स च ब्रह्मज्ञानात् इति ब्रह्म तज्ज्ञानं तत्प्रमाणं च सप्रपञ्चं निरूप्यते।

३. तत्र प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम्।

४. तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वं अनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वम्; स्मृतिसाधारणं तु अबाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वम्।

is alone the supreme human goal; for its eternality is ascertained from such s'ruti (texts) as 'He does not return again (Chānd., VIII, xv, 1);' whereas of the other three, non-eternality is understood both through perception and through such s'ruti (texts) as 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment here acquired through deeds (karma) is consumed, even so is the enjoyment in a hereafter acquired by merit, consumed (Chānd., VIII, i, 6).'

2. And since that (release) results from Brahman-knowledge, Brahman, the knowledge thereof, and the pramāṇa (evidence) therefor, are expounded in detail.

3. Of these, the distinctive cause (karaṇa) of valid knowledge is evidence (pramāṇa).

4. Here, the nature of such valid knowledge, as excludes recollection[1], consists in being cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated; whereas, that (nature of valid knowledge) which is common to recollection consists in being cognition having for content an unsublated entity.

५. नीरूपस्यापि कालस्य इन्द्रियवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन धारावाहिकबुद्धेरपि पूर्वपूर्वज्ञानाविषयतत्तत्क्षणविशेषविशिष्टविषयकत्वेन न तत्राव्याप्तिः ।

६. किं च सिद्धान्ते धारावाहिकबुद्धिस्थले न ज्ञानभेदः ; किं तु यावत् घटस्फुरणं तावद् घटाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरेकैव, न तु नाना, वृत्तेः स्वविरोधिवृत्त्युत्पत्तिपर्यन्तं स्थायित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तथा च तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यरूपं घटादिज्ञानमपि तत्र तावत्कालिकमेकमेवेति नाव्याप्तिशङ्काऽपि ।

5. Since sense-cognisedness is admitted (by us) even for time, which is colourless, even for (the second and subsequent cognitions in) a continuous stream of cognition, there is as content what is not the content of earlier cognitions and is qualified by the particulars, the respective (succeeding) instants; hence there is no non-pervasion of that (continuous stream of cognition, by the definition).[2]

6. Further, in (our) final view, there is no difference of (successive) cognitions, on the occasion of a continuous stream of cognition; rather is it that so long as there is presentation of (one entity, say) pot, there is but a single psychosis of the internal organ, having the form of pot, not many (psychoses), since of a psychosis there is admitted (by us) persistence until the rise of (another) psychosis opposed to that (original). And thus, even the cognition of pot etc., which is of the nature of consciousness reflected in that (psychosis), is but single, lasting for that period of time; hence there is not even the suspicion of non-pervasion.

७. ननु सिद्धान्ते घटादेर्मिथ्यात्वेन बाधितत्वात् तज्ज्ञानं कथं प्रमाणम् ?

८. उच्यते—ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारानन्तरं हि घटादीनां बाधः, 'यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत्' इति श्रुतेः। न तु संसार-दशायां बाधः, 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति' इति श्रुतेः। तथा च अबाधितपदेन संसारदशायामबाधितत्वं विवक्षितमिति न घटादिप्रमायामव्याप्तिः।

९. तदुक्तम्—

'देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात्॥' इति।

7. 'Now, since in (our) final view, pot etc., are sublated as illusory, how can their cognition be valid knowledge?'

8. The reply is: there is indeed the sublation of pot, etc., after the intuition of Brahman, because of the s'ruti 'Where, however, for him everything has become the self, there, wherewith and what shall he see?' (Bṛh., IV, v, 15). But there is no sublation in the state of bondage (saṃsāra) because of the s'ruti 'Where indeed there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other' (Bṛh., IV, v, 15). And thus since what is intended by the word 'unsublated' is not being sublated during the state of saṃsāra, there is no non-pervasion of the valid cognition of pot etc.

9. This has been said: 'Just as the cognition of the body as the self is assumed to be valid (for the

'आ आत्मनिश्चयात्' ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तमित्यर्थः । 'लौकिकम्' इति घटादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः ।

१०. तानि प्रमाणानि षट्, प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दार्थापत्त्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ।

purpose of all bodily activities), even so is this wordly (cognition) valid up till the ascertainment of the self'[3]. 'Up till the ascertainment of the self' means till the intuition of Brahman; 'worldly (cognition)' means the cognition of pot etc.

10. These pramāṇas are six, divided into pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison), s'abda (verbal testimony), arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).

प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

प्रत्यक्षम्

१. तत्र प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् ।

२. प्रत्यक्षप्रमा त्वत्र चैतन्यमेव, 'यत् साक्षादपरोक्षात्' इति श्रुतेः । 'अपरोक्षात्' इत्यस्य अपरोक्षमित्यर्थः ।

३. ननु चैतन्यमनादि; तत् कथं चक्षुरादेः तत्करणत्वेन प्रमाणत्वमिति ?

CHAPTER I

PRATYAKṢA

1. Of these, that which is the distinctive cause (karaṇa) of valid perceptual (pratyakṣa) knowledge is the pramāṇa—pratyakṣa.

2. As for valid perceptual knowledge, that here (in our view) is but consciousness, because of the s'ruti 'That (Brahman) which is direct, immediate (Bṛh., III, iv, 1)'. Of the word 'aparokṣāt' (in the fifth case, in the text cited) the meaning is 'aparokṣam (immediate)' (in the first case).

3. 'Now, consciousness is without beginning; how, then, can there be for the sense of sight etc., the

४. उच्यते । चैतन्यस्यानादित्वेऽपि तदभिव्यञ्जकान्तःकरण-वृत्तिरिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिना जायत इति वृत्तिविशिष्टं चैतन्यमादिमदित्युच्यते ; ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वाच्च वृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारः । तदुक्तं विवरणे 'अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात्' इति ।

५. ननु निरवयवस्यान्तःकरणस्य परिणामात्मिका वृत्तिः कथम् ?

६. इत्थम् । न तावदन्तःकरणं निरवयवम्, सादिद्रव्यत्वेन सावयवत्वात् । सादित्वं च 'तन्मनोऽसृजत' इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

nature of pramāṇa, as the distinctive *cause* of that (consciousness)?'

4. It is said (in reply). In spite of consciousness having no beginning, that which manifests it, *viz.*, the psychosis (modification) of the internal organ is originated through sense-contact etc.; hence, consciousness as qualified by the psychosis is said to have a beginning; and because of being a determinant of knowledge (consciousness), there is in respect of the psychosis the figurative designation of being knowledge. This has been stated in the *Vivaraṇa*: 'Because of the figurative designation of being knowledge, in respect of the psychosis of the internal organ'.

5. 'Now, in the case of the partless internal organ, how can there be psychosis, which is of the nature of a modification?'

6. It is thus: the internal organ is not partless, since, as being a substance with beginning, it is with parts. And its having a beginning results from such s'ruti (texts) as 'That created the mind (manas) (Cf. Bṛh., I, ii, 2)'.

७. वृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य मनोधर्मत्वे च 'कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' इति श्रुतिर्मानम्। धीशब्देन वृत्तिरूपज्ञानाभिधानम्। अत एव कामादेरपि मनोधर्मत्वम्।

८. ननु कामादेरन्तःकरणधर्मत्वे 'अहमिच्छामि, अहं जानामि, अहं बिभेमि' इत्याद्यनुभव आत्मधर्मत्वमवगाहमानः कथमुपपद्यते?

९. उच्यते। अयःपिण्डस्य दग्धृत्वाभावेऽपि दग्धृत्वाश्रयवह्नितादात्म्याध्यासात् यथा 'अयो दहति' इति व्यवहारः, तथा सुखाद्याकार-

7. And, in respect of cognition with a psychosis-nature being a property (*dharma*) of the mind (*manas*), the evidence is the s′ruti 'Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind (Bṛh., I, v, 3)'. By the word 'cognition (dhīḥ)' there is denotation of cognition with a psychosis-nature. For the same reason, even for desire etc., there is the nature of properties of the mind.

8. 'Now if for desire, etc., there be the nature of properties of the internal organ, how could experience like "I desire, I cognise, I fear" apprehending (in their case) the nature of properties of the self, be intelligible?'

9. It is said (in reply): just as though for the piece of iron there is no capacity to burn, (yet) because of super-imposition of identity with fire, the locus of the capacity to burn, there is the empirical usage 'iron burns', even so is originated such empirical usage as 'I am pleased, I am miserable', because of

परिणाम्यन्तःकरणैक्याध्यासात् 'अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखी' इत्यादिव्यवहारो जायते।

१०. ननु अन्तःकरणस्य इन्द्रियतया अतीन्द्रियत्वात् कथं प्रत्यक्षविषयतेति?

११. उच्यते। न तावत् 'अन्तःकरणमिन्द्रियम्' इत्यत्र मानमस्ति।

१२. 'मनःषष्ठानीन्द्रियाणि' इति भगवद्गीतावचनं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, न; अनिन्द्रियेणापि मनसा षट्त्वसंख्यापूरणाविरोधात्। न हि इन्द्रियगतसंख्यापूरणमिन्द्रियेणैवेति नियमः; 'यजमानपञ्चमा इडां भक्षयन्ति' इत्यत्र ऋत्विग्गतपञ्चत्वसंख्याया अनृत्विजापि यजमानेन पूरण-

the super-imposition of identity (of the self) with the internal organ that undergoes change in the form of (psychosis such as) pleasure etc. (Cf. *Vivaraṇa*, p. 70).

10. 'Now, since the internal organ, as a sense-organ, is (itself) super-sensuous, how can it be the object of pratyakṣa?'[4]

11. It is said (in reply). There is no evidence for this, that the internal organ is a sense-organ.

12. If it be said that the evidence is this statement of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* 'The sense-organs with the mind as the sixth (XV, 7)', no (we say), since there is no contradiction in the mind making up the number six, even though not (itself) a sense-organ. There is indeed, no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by (another) sense-organ; for in 'Those who are (*i.e.*, make up) five with the yajamāna (master of the sacrifice) eat the iḍā' it is seen that the number five

दर्शनात्; 'वेदानध्यापयामास महाभारतपञ्चमान्' इत्यादौ वेदगतपञ्चत्व-संख्याया अवेदेनापि भारतेन पूरणदर्शनात्; 'इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः' इति श्रुत्या मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वावगमाच्च।

१३. न चैवं मनसोऽनिन्द्रियत्वे सुखादिप्रत्यक्षस्य साक्षात्कारत्वं न स्यात्, इन्द्रियाजन्यत्वात् इति वाच्यम्।

१४. न हि इन्द्रियजन्यत्वेन ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्त्वम्, अनुमित्यादेरपि मनोजन्यतया साक्षात्त्वापत्तेः; ईश्वरज्ञानस्य अनिन्द्रियजन्यस्य साक्षात्त्वानापत्तेश्च।

connected with the ṛtviks is completed by the yajamāna, though (he is) not a ṛtvik; (again) in 'He taught the Vedas together with the Mahābhārata as the fifth' etc., there is seen of the number five connected with the Vedas, completion by the *Bhārata*, though not a Veda; further, because of such s'ruti (texts) as 'Objects are superior to the sense-organs, the mind is superior even to objects (*Kaṭha*, III, 10)', there is deduced of the mind, its not being a sense-organ.

13. Nor may it be said that, if the mind be thus not a sense-organ, there would be no immediacy for the perception of pleasure etc., on account of their (being mind-generated, and hence) not being generated by a sense-organ.

14. For, the immediacy of cognition is not through being sense-generated, because of the contingence of immediacy even for inferential cognition etc., as mind-generated (and hence sense-generated, in the

१५. सिद्धान्ते प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकं किमिति चेत्, किं ज्ञानगतस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वस्य प्रयोजकं पृच्छसि, किं वा विषयगतस्य ?

१६. आद्ये प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभेद इति ब्रूमः ।

१७. तथा हि । त्रिविधं चैतन्यम्—विषयचैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्यं च—इति । तत्र घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं विषयचैतन्यम् । अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्यम् । अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नं प्रमातृचैतन्यम् ।

opponent's view); there is also the contingence of non-immediacy for the Lord's cognition, which (being unoriginated) is not sense-generated.

15. If it be asked 'What (then) in the final view is the determinant of perceptual character?' (we say in reply) 'Do you ask for the determinant of the perceptual character present in the cognition or (that) present in the content?'

16. In the first case, we say it is the non-difference of the cognitive consciousness from the content-defined consciousness.

17. It is thus: Consciousness is of three kinds—content-consciousness, cognitive-consciousness and cogniser-consciousness. Of these, consciousness defined by pot etc., is content-consciousness. Consciousness defined by a psychosis of the internal organ is the cognitive-consciousness. That defined by the internal organ is the cogniser-consciousness.

१८. तत्र यथा तटाकोदकं छिद्रान्निर्गत्य कुल्यात्मना केदारान् प्रविश्य तद्वदेव चतुष्कोणाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तःकरणमपि चक्षुरादिद्वारा निर्गत्य घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादिविषयाकारेण परिणमते । स एव परिणामो वृत्तिरित्युच्यते ।

१९. अनुमित्यादिस्थले तु नान्तःकरणस्य वह्न्यादिदेशगमनम्, वह्न्यादेः चक्षुराद्यसन्निकर्षात् ।

२०. तथाच 'अयं घटः' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्थले घटादेः तदाकारवृत्तेश्च बहिरेकत्र देशे समवधानात्, तदुभयावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यमेकमेव; विभाजकयोरप्यन्तःकरणवृत्तिघटादिविषययोरेकदेशस्थत्वेन भेदाजनकत्वात् ।

18. Here, just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole, and entering fields through channels, comes to have, even like those (fields), a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight etc., and reaching to the locality of contents like pot, is modified in the form of contents like pot. This same modification is called a psychosis (vṛtti).

19. In the case, however, of inferential cognition etc., there is no going-out of the internal organ to the locality of (inferred) fire etc., since the fire etc., are not in contact with the sense of sight etc.

20. And thus, since in the case of perceptions like 'This is a pot', there is, for pot etc., and the psychoses with those forms, existence in the same locality outside, the consciousness defined by both is but single; for, the psychosis of the internal organ and the content

अत एव मठान्तर्वर्तिघटावच्छिन्नाकाशो न मठावच्छिन्नाकाशाद् भिद्यते ।

२१. तथा च 'अयं घटः' इति प्रत्यक्षस्थले घटाकारवृत्तेर्घट-संयोगितया, घटावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य तद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य चाभिन्नतया, तत्र घटज्ञानस्य घटाकारांशे प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

२२. सुखदुःखाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य, तद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य च, नियमेनैकदेशस्थितोपाधिद्वयावच्छिन्नत्वान्नियमेन 'अहं सुखी, दुःखी' इत्यादि-ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

like pot, though capable of differentiating, do not generate difference (here) because of being present in the same locality. It is for the same reason that ether as defined by a pot within a hall (maṭha) is not differentiated from the hall-defined ether.

21. And thus, in the case of the perception 'This is a pot', the psychosis with the form of pot being in conjunction with pot, and pot-defined consciousness being non-different from consciousness defined by that (pot-) psychosis, there is for the pot-cognition perceptual character, in regard to the aspect of the form of the pot.

22. Since in the case of consciousness defined by pleasure, misery, etc., and consciousness defined by those psychoses, there is definition by two adjuncts invariably present in the same locality, there is invariably perceptual character for a cognition like 'I am pleased', 'I am miserable'.

२३. नन्वेवं स्ववृत्तिसुखादिस्मरणस्यापि, सुखाद्यंशे प्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः।

२४. इति चेत्, न। तत्र स्मर्यमाणसुखस्यातीतत्वेन, स्मृतिरूपान्तःकरणवृत्तेर्वर्तमानत्वेन तत्रोपाध्योर्भिन्नकालिकतया तत्तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोर्भेदात्; उपाध्योरेकदेशस्थत्वे सत्येककालिकत्वस्यैवोपधेयाभेदप्रयोजकत्वात्।

२५. यदि चैकदेशस्थत्वमात्रमुपधेयाभेदप्रयोजकम्, तदा 'पूर्वमहं सुखी' इत्यादिस्मृतावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय वर्तमानत्वं विषयविशेषणं देयम्।

23. 'Now, thus, even for the recollection of pleasure etc., present in oneself, there is contingence of perceptual character in regard to the aspect of pleasure, etc.'[5]

24. If this be said, no. For, there, the recollected pleasure being past, and that psychosis of the internal organ, whose form is recollection, being present, the (defining) adjuncts belong to different times; and consequently there is difference of the consciousnesses defined by those respective (adjuncts); because, simultaneity, while the adjuncts occupy the same locality, is alone the determinant of non-difference in that which is defined (by the adjuncts).

25. If (however it be held that) occupation of the same locality is alone the determinant of non-difference in that which is defined, then, in order to avoid over-pervasion in respect of recollections like 'Formerly I was pleased', existence in the present must be introduced as a qualification of the content.

२६. नन्वेवं स्वकीयधर्माधर्मौ वर्तमानौ यदा शब्दादिना ज्ञायेते, तदा तादृशशाब्दज्ञानादावतिव्याप्तिः, तत्र धर्माद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यतद्वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोरेकत्वात् ।

२७. इति चेन्न ; योग्यत्वस्यापि विषयविशेषणत्वात् ।

२८. अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वाविशेषेऽपि किञ्चिद् योग्यं किञ्चिदयोग्यमित्यत्र फलबलकल्प्यः स्वभाव एव शरणम् ; अन्यथा न्यायमतेऽप्यात्मधर्मत्वाविशेषेऽपि सुखादिवद्धर्मादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिर्दुर्वारा ।

26. 'Now, thus, when one's own merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) which are present, are cognised by verbal testimony etc., at that time, there is over-pervasion in respect of that kind of cognition from verbal testimony etc., because of the one-ness there of consciousness defined by merit (dharma) etc., and of the consciousness defined by the psychoses of those (merit etc.).'[6]

27. If this be said, no; for, competency too is a qualification of the content.

28. Though there be non-distinction in respect of being properties of the internal organ, (yet) in respect of some being competent, the only resort is the intrinsic nature (of the things), posited on the strength of the result (*i.e.*, consequences). Else, even on the Nyāya view, for merit (dharma) etc., too, as for pleasure etc., there being but non-distinction in respect of being properties of the self, the contingence of perceptibility would be difficult to avoid.

२९. न चैवमपि सुखस्य वर्तमानतादशायाम् 'त्वं सुखी' इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षता स्यादिति वाच्यम् ।

३०. इष्टत्वात्, 'दशमस्त्वमसि' इत्यादौ सन्निकृष्टविषये शब्दादप्यपरोक्षज्ञानाभ्युपगमात् ।

३१. अत एव 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यादिज्ञानमपि वह्न्यंशे परोक्षम्, पर्वतांशेऽपरोक्षम् । पर्वताद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य बहिर्निःसृतान्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य च परस्परं भेदाभावात्; वह्न्यंशे त्वन्तःकरणवृत्तिनिर्गमनाभावेन वह्न्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य च परस्परं भेदात् ।

29. Nor may it be said 'Even thus, at the stage when pleasure is present, there would be perceptual character for such sentence-generated cognition as "you are happy".'

30. For, that is acceptable, since in respect of a content in contact, immediate cognition is admitted even from verbal testimony, in 'Thou art the tenth' etc.

31. Hence it is that even such cognition as 'The hill is fiery' is mediate in respect of the fire-aspect, (but) immediate in respect of the hill-aspect, since there is no reciprocal difference between the consciousness defined by hill etc., and the consciousness defined by the out-gone psychosis of the internal organ; in respect of the fire-aspect, however, since there is no out-going of the psychosis of the internal organ, there is reciprocal difference between fire-defined consciousness and pramāṇa-(defined) consciousness. And thus

तथा चानुभवः 'पर्वतं पश्यामि, वह्निमनुमिनोमि' इति । न्यायमते 'पर्वतमनुमिनोमि' इत्यनुव्यवसायापत्तिः ।

३२. असन्निकृष्टपक्षकानुमितौ तु सर्वांशेऽपि ज्ञानं परोक्षम् ।

३३. 'सुरभि चन्दनम्' इत्यादिज्ञानमपि चन्दनखण्डांशे अपरोक्षम्, सौरभांशे परोक्षम्; सौरभस्य चक्षुरिन्द्रियायोग्यतया योग्यत्वघटितस्य निरुक्तलक्षणस्याभावात् ।

३४. न च 'एवमेकत्र ज्ञाने परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोरभ्युपगमे तयोर्जातित्वं न स्यात्' इति वाच्यम् ।

there is the experience 'The hill I see, the fire I infer'. And on the Nyāya view there is the contingence of the reflective cognition 'The hill I infer.'

32. In the case, however, of inferential cognition whose subject is not in (sense-) contact, the cognition is mediate in all aspects whatsoever.

33. Even such cognition as 'the sandal is fragrant' is immediate in respect of the sandal-piece aspect, (but) mediate in respect of the fragrance aspect; for, fragrance not being competent in respect of (being cognised by) the sense of sight, there is not (in this case) the stated definition (of perceptuality) comprising competency.

34. Nor may it be said 'if thus in a single cognition there be admitted mediacy and immediacy, there would be generic nature for neither of them.'[7]

३५. इष्टत्वात्, जातित्वोपाधित्वपरिभाषायाः सकलप्रमाणागोचरतयाप्रामाणिकत्वात् ।

३६. 'घटोऽयम्' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं हि घटत्वादिसद्भावे मानम्, न तु तस्य जातित्वेऽपि ।

३७. जातित्वरूपसाध्याप्रसिद्धौ तत्साधकानुमानस्याप्यनवकाशात् ।

३८. समवायासिद्ध्या ब्रह्मभिन्नसकलप्रपञ्चस्यानित्यतया च नित्यत्वसमवेतत्वघटितजातित्वस्य घटत्वादावसिद्धेश्च । एवमेवोपाधित्वं निरसनीयम् ।

35. For that (contingence) is acceptable, since the nomenclature of generic nature (jātitva) and general nature (upādhitva), not being the object of any means of valid knowledge, is not supported by evidence.

36. The perception 'This is a pot' is evidence indeed in respect of the existence of potness etc., but not in respect of its generic nature.

37. The *probandum*, viz., generic nature, not being established, there is no room even for an inference for establishing that.[8]

38. And inherence (samavāya) being non-established, and the whole world other than Brahman not being eternal, there is not established in respect of potness etc., generic nature comprising (the characteristics of) being eternal and being inherent. General nature (upādhitva) is to be refuted in this same way.

३९. 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इत्यादौ पर्वतांशे वह्न्यंशे चान्तःकरण-वृत्तिभेदाङ्गीकारेण तत्तदवच्छेदकभेदेन परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयोरेकत्र चैतन्ये वृत्तौ न कश्चिद् विरोधः ।

४०. तथा च तत्तदिन्द्रिययोग्यवर्तमानविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्या-भिन्नत्वं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नज्ञानस्य तत्तदंशे प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

४१. द्वितीये घटादेर्विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वन्तु प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वम् ।

४२. ननु कथं घटादेरन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभेदः, 'अहमिदं पश्यामि' इति भेदानुभवविरोधात् ?

39. In cases like 'the hill is fiery' since there is admitted difference of the psychoses of the internal organ in respect of the hill-aspect and of the fire-aspect, there is no contradiction whatever in there being mediacy and immediacy in one consciousness through difference in the respective defining psychoses.

40. And thus the non-difference from consciousness defined by a content, that is competent for any particular sense and is present, constitutes, for cognition defined by psychosis with that form, perceptuality in respect of that particular aspect.

41. On the second, however, the perceptuality of of the content, pot etc., consists in non-difference from the cogniser.

42. 'Now, how is there non-difference of pot etc., from consciousness defined by the internal organ, since this conflicts with the experience of difference in "I see this?"'

४३. इति चेत्, उच्यते; प्रमात्रभेदो नाम न तावदैक्यम्, किन्तु प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वाभावः।

४४. तथाच घटादेः स्वावच्छिन्नचैतन्याध्यस्ततया विषयचैतन्यसत्तैव घटादिसत्ता; अधिष्ठानसत्तातिरिक्ताया आरोपितसत्ताया अनङ्गीकारात्। विषयचैतन्यञ्च पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण प्रमातृचैतन्यमेवेति प्रमातृचैतन्यस्यैव घटाद्यधिष्ठानतया प्रमातृसत्तैव घटादिसत्ता नान्येति सिद्धं घटादेरपरोक्षत्वम्।

४५. अनुमित्यादिस्थले त्वन्तःकरणस्य वह्न्यादिदेशनिर्गमनाभावेन

43. If this be asked, it is said in reply: what is called non-difference from the cogniser is not oneness, but rather the non-possession of reality over and above the reality of the cogniser.

44. And thus, pot etc., being superimposed on consciousness defined by themselves, the reality of content (-defined) consciousness is itself the reality of pot etc.; for, there is not admitted, over and above the reality of the substrate, the reality of the super-imposed. And since, in the manner aforementioned, the content (-defined) consciousness is but the cogniser (-defined) consciousness, the cogniser (-defined) consciousness alone is the substrate of pot etc. Hence the reality of the cogniser is itself the reality of pot etc., not any other; hence is established the immediacy of pot etc.

45. In the case of inferential cognition etc., since for the internal organ there is no going out to the locality of the fire etc., the fire-defined consciousness is not one in nature with the cogniser (-defined)

वह्न्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य प्रमातृचैतन्यानात्मकतया वह्न्यादिसत्ता प्रमातृसत्तातो भिन्नेति नातिव्याप्तिः ।

४६. नन्वेवमपि धर्माधर्मादिगोचरानुमित्यादिस्थले धर्माधर्मयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः, धर्माद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नतया धर्मादिसत्तायाः प्रमातृसत्तानतिरेकात् ।

४७. इति चेन्न; योग्यत्वस्यापि विषयविशेषणत्वात् ।

४८. नन्वेवमपि 'रूपी घटः' इति प्रत्यक्षस्थले घटगतपरिमाणादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः; रूपावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य परिमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य

consciousness; hence the reality of fire etc., being other than the reality of the cogniser, there is no overpervasion[9] (of inferential cognition etc.).

46. 'Now, even thus in the case of inferential cognition etc., whose objects are merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and the like, there is contingence of perceptibility for merit and demerit, since the consciousness defined by merit etc., being non-different from the cogniser (-defined) consciousness, the reality of merit etc., does not fall outside the reality of the cogniser.'

47. If this be said, no; for, competence too is a qualification of the content.

48. 'Now, even thus in the case of the perception "The pot has colour" there is contingence of perceptibility for the size etc., present in the pot; for, the colour-defined consciousness and the consciousness defined by size etc., being one, when for the

चैकतया रूपावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदे परिमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्यापि प्रमात्रभिन्नतया परिमाणादिसत्तायाः प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तत्वाभावात् ।

४९. इति चेन्न; तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपहितत्वस्यापि प्रमातृविशेषणत्वात् । रूपाकारवृत्तिदशायां परिमाणाद्याकारवृत्त्यभावेन परिमाणाद्याकारवृत्त्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नसत्ताकत्वाभावेनातिव्याप्त्यभावात् ।

५०. ननु एवं वृत्तावव्याप्तिः, अनवस्थाभिया वृत्तिगोचरवृत्त्यनङ्गीकारेण तत्र स्वाकारवृत्त्युपहितत्वघटितोक्तलक्षणाभावात् ।

colour-defined consciousness there is non-difference from the cogniser-defined consciousness, there is non-difference from the cogniser even for the consciousness defined by size etc.; hence for the reality of size etc., there is no going beyond the reality of the cogniser.'

49. If this be said, no; for, being qualified *per accidens* by psychoses with the respective forms is also a qualification of the cogniser. At the stage of a psychosis with the form of colour, there being no psychosis with the form of size etc., there is not the possession of reality non-different from the cogniser (-defined) consciousness, as qualified *per accidens* by psychosis with the form of size etc.; hence there is no over-pervasion.

50. 'Now, thus, there is non-pervasion of psychosis, for, a psychosis whose object is (another) psychosis not being admitted, for fear of infinite regress, there is not in that case the said definition, comprising the qualification *per accidens* by a psychosis having the form of itself.'

५१. इति चेत्, न; अनवस्थाभिया वृत्तेर्वृत्त्यन्तराविषयत्वेऽपि स्वविषयत्वाभ्युपगमेन स्वविषयवृत्त्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्यसत्ताभिन्नसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्रापि सम्भवात्।

५२. एवञ्चान्तःकरणतद्धर्मादीनां केवलसाक्षिविषयत्वेऽपि तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यभ्युपगमेनोक्तलक्षणस्य तत्रापि सत्त्वात् नाव्याप्तिः।

५३. नच अन्तःकरणतद्धर्मादीनां वृत्तिविषयत्वाभ्युपगमे केवलसाक्षिवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमविरोध इति वाच्यम्।

५४. न हि वृत्तिं विना साक्षिविषयत्वं केवलसाक्षि-

51. If this be said, no; for, though for fear of infinite regress a psychosis is not the content of (another) psychosis,[10] being its own content is admitted; hence, there too is possible the possession of reality non-different from the reality of cogniser (-defined) consciousness, qualified *per accidens* by psychosis having itself for content.

52. And thus, though the internal organ, its attributes, etc., are contents of the pure witness, yet because of the admission of psychoses with those respective forms, the afore-said definition exists there too; hence there is no non-pervasion.

53. Nor may it be said that if the internal organ, its attributes, etc., be admitted to be contents of psychoses, there would be conflict with the admission of their being known by the pure witness.

54. For, being known by the pure witness does not consist in being the content for the witness in the absence of psychosis; rather does it consist in being

वेद्यत्वम्; किन्तु इन्द्रियानुमानादिप्रमाणव्यापारमन्तरेण साक्षिविषयत्वम्।

५५. अत एव अहङ्कारटीकायामाचार्य्यैरहमाकारान्तःकरणवृत्तिरङ्गीकृता। अत एव च प्रातिभासिकरजतस्थले रजताकाराविद्यावृत्तिः साम्प्रदायिकैरङ्गीकृता। तथाच अन्तःकरणतद्धर्मादिषु केवलसाक्षिवेद्येषु वृत्त्युपहितत्वघटितलक्षणस्य सत्त्वात् नाव्याप्तिः।

५६. तदयं निर्गलितोऽर्थः। स्वाकारवृत्त्युपहितप्रमातृचैतन्यसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वशून्यत्वे सति, योग्यत्वं विषयस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम्।

the content for the witness without the functioning of means of valid knowledge, like sense-organs, inference, etc.

55. Hence it is that, in the explanation of egoity, there is admitted by the Ācārya (the author of the *Vivaraṇa*) a psychosis of the internal organ having the form 'I'. Hence too it is that in the case of the barely phenomenal silver there is admitted by the followers of tradition[11] a psychosis (transformation) of nescience with the form of silver. And thus, since the definition comprising qualification *per accidens* by psychosis exists in the case of what are known by the pure witness, *viz.*, the internal organ, its attributes, etc., there is not non-pervasion.

56. This is the sense that emerges. The perceptibility of a content consists in its (sense-) competence, when it is devoid of reality other than the reality of the cogniser (-defined) consciousness, qualified *per accidens* by a psychosis with the form of that (content) itself.

५७. तत्र संयोगसंयुक्ततादात्म्यादीनां सन्निकर्षाणां चैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकवृत्तिजनने विनियोगः ।

५८. सा च वृत्तिश्चतुर्विधा—संशयः, निश्चयः, गर्वः, स्मरण मिति । एवं सति वृत्तिभेदेन एकमपि अन्तःकरणं मन इति बुद्धिरिति अहङ्कार इति चित्तमिति चाख्यायते । तदुक्तम्—

'मनो बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चित्तं करणमान्तरम् ।
संशयो निश्चयो गर्वः स्मरणं विषया इमे ॥'

५९. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं, सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभेदात् । तत्र सविकल्पकं वैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानम्, यथा 'घटमहं जानामि' इत्यादि-

57. This being the case, the application of modes of sense-contact, *viz.*, conjunction, identity with what is in conjunction, (and identity with what is non-different from what is in conjunction), is in respect of generating the psychosis that manifests consciousness.[12]

58. And the psychosis is of four kinds: doubt, certitude, pride, and recollection. This being the case, the internal organ, though one, is, because of difference of psychoses, called manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and citta. This has been said: 'The internal organ comprises manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and citta; the contents (*i.e.*, functions) of these are doubt, certitude, pride and recollection.'

59. And this perception is two-fold, because of the difference as determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). Of these, the determinate is a cognition apprehending relatedness, *e.g.*, the

ज्ञानम् । निर्विकल्पकं तु संसर्गानवगाहि ज्ञानम्, यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः,' 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानम् ।

६०. ननु शाब्दमिदं ज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षम्, इन्द्रियाजन्यत्वात् ।

६१. इति चेत्, न; नहीन्द्रियजन्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वे तन्त्रम्, दूषितत्वात्; किन्तु योग्यवर्तमानविषयकत्वे सति प्रमाणचैतन्यस्य विषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वमित्युक्तम् । तथाच 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य सन्निकृष्टविषयतया बहिर्निःसृतान्तःकरणवृत्त्यभ्युपगमेन देवदत्तावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्याभेदेन 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इति वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य प्रत्य-

cognition 'I cognise the pot'. The indeterminate, however, is a cognition not apprehending relation, *e.g.*, the cognition generated by statements like 'This is that Devadatta', 'That thou art'.

60. 'Now, this cognition due to words is not perception, since it is not sense-generated'.

61. If this be said, no; for, sense-generatedness is not the determinant of perceptibility, since it has been rejected; rather has it been said to be the non-difference of pramāṇa (-defined) consciousness from content (-defined) consciousness, when there is the possession (by the former) of a content that is competent and present. And thus, in the case of the cognition generated by the sentence 'This is that Devadatta', there being admitted an out-going psychosis of the internal organ, since it has a content in sense-contact, there is non-difference of Devadatta-defined consciousness from the psychosis-defined conciousness. Hence there is perceptuality for the

क्षत्वम्। एवं 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्यापि; तत्र प्रमातुरेव विषयतया, तदुभयाभेदस्य सत्त्वात्।

६२. ननु वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य पदार्थसंसर्गावगाहितया, कथं निर्विकल्पकत्वम्?

६३. उच्यते; वाक्यजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वे हि न पदार्थसंसर्गत्वं तन्त्रम्; अनभिमतसंसर्गस्यापि वाक्यजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वापत्तेः। किंतु तात्पर्यविषयत्वम्।

६४. प्रकृते च 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्युपक्रम्य 'तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' इत्युपसंहारेण विशुद्धे

cognition generated by the sentence 'This is that Devadatta'. Similarly, even in the case of the cognition generated by sentences like 'That thou art'; for, the cogniser himself being in that case the content, there exists the non-difference of those two.

62. 'Now, since the sentence-generated cognition apprehends the relation between word-senses, how is there indeterminateness?'

63. It is said in reply: in respect of being the content of sentence-generated cognition, being a relation of word-senses is not indeed the determinant; for there is the contingence even of an unintended relation being the content of sentence-generated cognition.[13] Rather is it being the content of purport.

64. And, in the present case of the Vedānta texts, because they begin with 'Reality alone, dear one, this was in the beginning' (*Chānd.*, VI, ii, 1) and end with 'That is the real, that is the Self; that thou art,

ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यमवसितमिति कथं तात्पर्याविषयं संसर्गमवबोधयेत्?

६५. इदमेव 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिवाक्यानामखण्डार्थत्वं यत्संसर्गानवगाहियथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वमिति । तदुक्तम्—

'संसर्गासङ्गिसम्यग्धीहेतुता या गिरामियम् ।
उक्ताखण्डार्थता यद्वा तत्प्रातिपदिकार्थता ॥'

प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रपरत्वं अखण्डार्थत्वमिति चतुर्थपादार्थः ।

६६. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं पुनर्द्विविधम्—जीवसाक्षी, ईश्वरसाक्षी चेति ।

६७. तत्र जीवो नाम अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्; तत्साक्षी

O S'vetaketu,' (*Chānd.*, VI, viii, 7) the purport is ascertained to be the pure Brahman; hence how could it (a sentence like 'That thou art') make known a relation, which is not the content of purport?

65. This itself constitutes the impartite sense of statements like 'That thou art' *viz.*, the generation of the cognition, non-apprehensive of relation. That has been said: 'This production by words of a valid cognition untainted by relation is what is said to be impartite sense; or, in other words, it is the stem-sense (of words without reference to suffixes)'[14]. The meaning of the fourth quarter (in the above couplet) is that to have impartite sense is to have for purport the sense of the stem alone.

66. And this perception is again two-fold: jīva-sākṣī and Īs'vara-sākṣī.

67. Of these, what is called the jīva is internal-organ-defined consciousness; the witness (sākṣī) of

तु अन्तःकरणोपहितचैतन्यम्। अन्तःकरणस्य विशेषणत्वोपाधित्वाभ्यामनयोर्भेदः।

६८. विशेषणञ्च कार्यान्वयि व्यावर्तकम्; उपाधिश्च कार्यानन्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानश्च; यथा 'रूपविशिष्टो घटोऽनित्यः' इत्यत्र रूपं विशेषणम्; 'कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नं नभः श्रोत्रम्' इत्यत्र कर्णशष्कुल्युपाधिः। अयमेवोपाधिर्नैयायिकैः परिचायक इत्युच्यते। प्रकृते चान्तःकरणस्य जडतया, विषयभासकत्वायोगेन विषयभासकचैतन्योपाधित्वम्।

that, however, is consciousness qualified *per accidens* by the internal organ. The difference between these two is through the internal organ being a qualification *per proprium* or a qualification *per accidens*.

68. A qualification *per proprium* is a distinctive mark which is syntactically related to the predicate; and the qualification *per accidens* (upādhi) is that which, while present, distinguishes without syntactical relation to the predicate; for example, in 'the pot qualified by colour is non-eternal', colour is a qualification *per proprium*; in 'ether as defined by the ear-cavity is the sense of hearing' the ear-cavity is a qualification *per accidens*.[15] This same upādhi (qualification *per accidens*) is called paricāyaka by the Naiyāyikas. And in the present case, since for the internal organ, which is inert, there is no possibility of manifesting content, there is (for it) the character of qualification *per accidens* in respect of consciousness that does manifest content.

६९. अयञ्च जीवसाक्षी प्रत्यात्मं नाना; एकत्वे चैत्रावगते मैत्रस्याप्यनुसन्धानप्रसङ्गः ।

७०. ईश्वरसाक्षी तु मायोपहितं चैतन्यम् ।

७१. तच्चैकम्; तदुपाधिभूतमायाया एकत्वात् ।

७२. "इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयत" इत्यादिश्रुतौ 'मायाभिः' इति बहुवचनस्य मायागतशक्तिविशेषाभिप्रायतया मायागतसत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपगुणाभिप्रायतया वोपपत्तेः ।

'मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ॥'

69. And this jīva-sākṣī is different for each individual; if it were one, in respect of what is cognised by Caitra there would be the contingence of recollection even for Maitra.

70. As for the Īs'vara-sākṣī, it is consciousness qualified *per accidens* by māyā.

71. And that is one, because of the oneness of māyā, which is its qualification *per accidens*.

72. For, in s'ruti texts like 'Indra, through māyās, takes on many forms' (*Ṛgveda*, VI, xlvii, 18), the plural 'through māyās' is intelligible either on the view of the diverse capacities (s'aktis) present in māyā, or on the view of the guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tamas, present in māyā. The oneness of māyā is ascertained on (a consideration of) the strength of the singular, (a consideration) supported by parsimony, in s'ruti and smṛti texts like 'Know māyā to be prakṛti and the wielder of māyā to be the supreme Lord (*S'vet.*, IV, 10)';

'तरत्यविद्यां विततां हृदि यस्मिन्निवेशिते ।
योगी मायाममेयाय तस्मै विद्यात्मने नमः ॥'
'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥'

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिषु एकवचनबलेन लाघवानुगृहीतेन मायाया एकत्वं निश्चीयते ।

७३. ततश्च तदुपहितं चैतन्यमीश्वरसाक्षी; तच्च अनादि, तदुपाधेर्मायाया अनादित्वात् ।

७४. मायावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं परमेश्वरः; मायाया विशेषणत्वे ईश्वरत्वम्, उपाधित्वे साक्षित्वम्; इति ईश्वरत्वसाक्षित्वयोर्भेदः, नतु धर्मिणोरीश्वरसाक्षिणोर्भेदः ।

'On whose entry into the heart the yogin crosses the extensive nescience, māyā, to that immeasurable knowledge-self, obeisance'; 'The one, unborn, red, white and black, who produces manifold offspring similar in form to herself, with her lies the one male, unborn, delighting; another male, unborn, leaves her off, having had his enjoyment' (*S'vet.*, IV, 5).

73. And thus consciousness qualified *per accidens* by that (māyā) is Īs'vara-sākṣī; and this sākṣī is beginningless, since its *accidens*, māyā, is beginningless.

74. Consciousness defined by māyā is the supreme Lord (Parames'vara); when māyā is a qualification *per proprium*, there is Īs'varatva, and when it is a qualification *per accidens*, there is sākṣitva (witness-nature); thus there is difference between Īs'varatva and sākṣitva, but not difference between the substrates, Īs'vara and sākṣī.

७५. स च परमेश्वर एकोऽपि स्वोपाधिभूतमायानिष्ठसत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणभेदेन ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वरादिशब्दवाच्यतां भजते ।

७६. ननु ईश्वरसाक्षिणोऽनादित्वे 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' इत्यादिना सृष्टिपूर्वसमये परमेश्वरस्यागन्तुकमीक्षणमुच्यमानं कथमुपपद्यते ?

७७. उच्यते ; यथा विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिकारणवशेन जीवोपाध्यन्तःकरणस्य वृत्तिभेदा जायन्ते, तथा सृज्यमानप्राणिकर्मवशेन परमेश्वरोपाधिभूतमायाया वृत्तिविशेषाः 'इदमिदानीं स्रष्टव्यम्, इदमिदानीं

75. And this Parames'vara, though one, is subject to denotation by words like Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Mahes'vara, because of the difference of the guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tamas, present in māyā which is the *accidens* of that (Parames'vara).

76. 'Now, if the Īs'vara-sākṣin be beginningless, how could it be intelligible that, as declared in "That thought: may I create many" (*Chānd.*, VI, ii, 3), Parames'vara's thought (to create) came into being at the time prior to creation?'

77. It is said in reply: just as for the jīva's *accidens*, the internal organ, there arise differences of psychoses because of (differences in) the cause, *viz.*, contact between object and sense etc., similarly there are differences of psychoses for mayā, the *accidens* of Parames'vara, because of the karma of creatures to be created; these arise in the form 'This is now to be created, this is now to be protected, this is now to be destroyed;' and because of these psychoses having a

पालयितव्यम्, इदमिदानीं संहर्तव्यम्' इत्याद्याकारा जायन्ते; तासाञ्च वृत्तीनां सादित्वात् तत्प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यमपि सादीत्युच्यते।

७८. एवं साक्षिद्वैविध्येन प्रत्यक्षज्ञानद्वैविध्यम्। प्रत्यक्षत्वञ्च ज्ञेयगतं ज्ञप्तिगतञ्च निरूपितम्। तत्र ज्ञप्तिगतप्रत्यक्षत्वस्य सामान्यलक्षणं चित्त्वमेव; 'पर्वतोवह्निमान्' इत्यादावपि वह्न्याद्याकारवृत्त्युपहितचैतन्यस्य स्वात्मांशे स्वप्रकाशतया प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। तत्तद्विषयांशे प्रत्यक्षत्वन्तु पूर्वोक्तमेव।

७९. तस्य च भ्रान्तिरूपप्रत्यक्षे नातिव्याप्तिः; भ्रमप्रमासाधारण-प्रत्यक्षत्वसामान्यनिर्वचनेन तस्यापि लक्ष्यत्वात्।

beginning, the consciousness reflected therein is also said to have a beginning.

78. Thus, because of the twofoldness of the witness, there is twofoldness of perceptual cognition. And perceptual nature has been demonstrated both as present in the object cognised and as present in the cognition. Of these, for the perceptuality present in the cognition the general definition is but consciousness; for, even in 'The hill is fiery' etc., the consciousness qualified *per accidens* by the psychosis having the form of fire etc., being self-luminous in respect of its own nature (as cognition), is perceptual. In respect, however, of the respective contents, perceptual nature is only as stated above.

79. And of this (definition) there is no over-pervasion in respect of delusive cognition; for, the definition being of generic perceptual character common to delusion and valid cognition, that (delusion) too is part of the defined.

८०. यदा तु प्रत्यक्षप्रमाया एव लक्षणं वक्तव्यम्, तदा पूर्वोक्त-लक्षणेऽबाधितत्वं विषयविशेषणं देयम्। शुक्तिरूप्यादिभ्रमस्य संसारकालीन-बाधविषयप्रातिभासिकरजतादिविषयकत्वेनोक्तलक्षणाभावात् नातिव्याप्तिः।

८१. ननु विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्या भ्रान्तिज्ञानसिद्धावपि, तस्य प्राति-भासिकतत्कालोत्पन्नरजतादिविषयकत्वे न प्रमाणम्, देशान्तरीयरजतस्य क्लृप्त-स्यैव तद्विषयत्वसंभवात्।

८२. इति चेत्, न; तस्यासन्निकृष्टतया प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वायोगात्।

80. When, however, the definition has to be stated of perceptual valid cognition alone, then, in the aforesaid definition, there should be introduced 'unsublatedness' as a qualification of the content. In the case of a delusion, as of nacre-silver, since it has a content like phenomenal silver, which is the object of sublation (even) during the time of migration (saṃsāra), there is not the said definition; hence there is no over-pervasion.

81. 'Now, though delusive cognition be established by ill-adapted appetition, there is no evidence for its possession of a content, *viz.*, silver etc., which is phenomenal and produced at that time, since it is possible even for the silver present in some other place and established (to be the cause in prior experience of cognition with the form of silver) to be the content of that (cognition).'

82. If this be said, no; because that, not being in sense-contact, is not capable of being the content of perception. Nor is the cognition in that case a pratyāsatti (a mode of supernormal contact);[16] for, if

न च ज्ञानं तत्र प्रत्यासत्तिः; ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यासत्तित्वे तत एव वह्न्यादेः प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तौ, अनुमानाद्युच्छेदापत्तेः ।

८३. ननु रजतोत्पादकानां रजतावयवादीनामभावे शुक्तौ कथं तवापि रजतमुत्पद्यते ।

८४. इति चेत्, उच्यते । न हि लोकसिद्धसामग्री प्रातिभासिकरजतोत्पादिका, किन्तु विलक्षणैव । तथाहि । काचादिदोषदूषितलोचनस्य पुरोवर्तिद्रव्यसंयोगात्, इदमाकारा चाकचक्याकारा च काचिदन्तःकरणवृत्तिरुदेति । तस्याञ्च वृत्तौ इदमंशावच्छिन्नं चैतन्यं प्रतिबिम्बते । तत्र पूर्वोक्तरीत्या वृत्तेर्बहिर्निर्गमनेन इदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं वृत्त्यवच्छिन्न-

cognition could be pratyāsatti, there being a contingence of perceptuality, even thence, for the inferred fire etc., there is the contingence of the excision of inference etc. (as pramāṇas).

83. 'Now, in the absence of the silver-particles etc., which produce silver, how, even according to you, is silver produced in nacre?' [17]

84. If this be asked, it is said in reply. What produces the (merely) phenomenal silver is not, indeed, the causal complex established in ordinary experience, but certainly different. It is thus. In the case of one whose eyes are affected by such defects, as kāca (film), there arises, because of conjunction with the substance in front, a certain psychosis of the internal organ which has the form of 'this' and the form of glitter. And in this psychosis, consciousness defined by the this-aspect (of the content) is reflected. That being the case, in

चैतन्यं प्रमातृचैतन्यं चाभिन्नं भवति । ततश्च प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नविषयचैतन्य-निष्ठा शुक्तित्वप्रकारिकाविद्या चाकचिक्यादिसादृश्यसन्दर्शनसमुद्बोधितरजतसंस्कारसध्रीचीना काचादिदोषसमवहिता रजतरूपार्थाकारेण रजतज्ञानाभासाकारेण च परिणमते ।

८५. परिणामो नाम उपादानसमसत्ताककार्यापत्तिः । विवर्तो नाम उपादानविषमसत्ताककार्यापत्तिः । प्रातिभासिकं रजतं च अविद्यापेक्षया परिणामः, चैतन्यापेक्षया विवर्तः, इति च उच्यते ।

the manner afore-mentioned, because of the outgoing of the psychosis, the consciousness defined by the this-aspect, consciousness defined by the psychosis and cogniser (-defined) consciousness become non-different. And thence nescience, which is present in content (-defined) consciousness non-different from cogniser (-defined) consciousness, which has nacreity for its mode, which is aided by the residual impression of silver called up by the sight of similarity in respect of glitter etc., and which is associated with defects like kāca, transforms itself into an object with the form of silver and into an apparent cognition of silver.

85. What is called (pariṇāma) transformation is the resulting in an effect having equal reality with the material cause. What is called transfiguration (vivarta)[18] is the resulting in an effect whose reality is not equal to that of the material cause. The (merely) phenomenal silver is said to be a *transformation* in relation to nescience, and a *transfiguration* in relation to consciousness.

८६. अविद्यापरिणामरूपञ्च तद्रजतमविद्याधिष्ठान इदमवच्छिन्न-चैतन्ये वर्तते। अस्मन्मते सर्वस्यापि कार्यस्य स्वोपादानाविद्याधिष्ठानाश्रितत्व-नियमात्।

८७. ननु चैतन्यनिष्ठरजतस्य कथमिदं रजतमिति पुरोवर्तिना तादात्म्यम्?

८८. उच्यते, यथा न्यायमते आत्मनिष्ठस्य सुखादेः शरीर-निष्ठत्वेन उपलम्भः, शरीरस्य सुखाद्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्वात्, तथा चैतन्य-मात्रस्य रजतं प्रत्यनधिष्ठानतया इदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य तदधिष्ठानत्वेनेदमः अवच्छेदकतया, रजतस्य पुरोवर्तिसंसर्गप्रत्यय उपपद्यते।

86. And this silver, which is of the form of a transformation of nescience, exists in the substrate of nescience, *i.e.*, the this (-aspect) defined consciousness. For, in our system, for all effects the rule is location in the substrate of the nescience which is their material cause.

87. ‘Now, for silver present in consciousness how is there identity with what is in front, in the form “This is silver”?’

88. It is said in reply: just as in the Nyāya system, for pleasure etc., present in the self[19] there is cognition as present in the body, since the body is what defines (its) being the location of pleasure etc., similarly, since on account of bare consciousness not being the substrate in respect of silver, and the this (-aspect) defined consciousness being the substrate thereof, the ‘this’ is what defines, the cognition of the relation[20] of silver with what is in front is intelligible.

८९. तस्य च विषयचैतन्यस्य तदन्तःकरणोपहितचैतन्याभिन्नतया विषयचैतन्याध्यस्तमपि रजतं साक्षिणि अध्यस्तं केवलसाक्षिवेद्यम्, सुखादिवत् अनन्यवेद्यमिति चोच्यते ।

९०. ननु साक्षिणि अध्यस्तत्वे 'अहं रजतम्' इति प्रत्ययः स्यात्, 'अहं सुखी' इतिवत् ।

९१. इति चेत्, उच्यते ; न हि सुखादीनामन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठाविद्याकार्यत्वप्रयुक्तम् 'अहं सुखी' इति ज्ञानम्; सुखादीनां घटादिवत् शुद्धचैतन्य एव अध्यासात् ।

89. And of this content-defined consciousness there being non-difference from consciousness qualified *per accidens* by the respective internal organ, silver, though superimposed on the content (-defined) consciousness, is (yet) said to be superimposed on the witness, to be cognisable by the pure witness, and, like pleasure etc., not to be cognisable by any other.

90. 'Now, if there be superimposition on the witness, the cognition would be of the form "I am silver" like "I am happy".'

91. If this be said, it is said in reply: the cognition 'I am happy' is not indeed determined by pleasure, etc., being the products of nescience present in the internal-organ-defined consciousness; for, of pleasure etc., there is superimposition as for pot etc., on pure consciousness itself.[21]

९२. किन्तु यस्य यदाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहकृताविद्याकार्यत्वं तस्य तदाकारानुभवविषयत्वमित्येवानुगतं नियामकम् ।

९३. तथाच इदमाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहकृताविद्याकार्यत्वात्, घटादेः इदमाकारानुभवविषयत्वम् ; अहमाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहकृताविद्याकार्यत्वादन्तःकरणादेः अहमनुभवविषयत्वम् ; शरीरेन्द्रियादेः उभयविधानुभवाहितसंस्कारसहिताविद्याकार्यत्वादुभयविधानुभवविषयत्वम् । तथाच उभयविधोऽनुभवः, 'इदं शरीरम्,' 'अयं देहः,' 'अहं मनुष्यः,' 'अहं

92. Rather is this the constant determinant, that when for something there is production by nescience associated with the residual impression generated by an experience with a particular form, then for that there is contentness in respect of the experience with that form.

93. And thus, for pot etc., since they are products of nescience associated with the residual impressions generated by experience with the form 'this', there is contentness in respect of experience with the form 'this'; for the internal organ etc., since they are products of nescience associated with the residual impression generated by experience with the form 'I', there is contentness in respect of the experience 'I'; for, the body, indriyas, etc., since they are products of nescience associated with the residual impression generated by both kinds of experience, there is contentness in respect of both kinds of experience. And thus there is the two-fold experience 'Here is a body', 'This is a body', 'I am a human being', 'I

ब्राह्मणः,' 'इदं चक्षुः,' 'अहं काणः,' 'इदं श्रोत्रम्,' 'अहं बधिरः' इति ।

९४. प्रकृते च प्रातिभासिकरजतस्य प्रमातृचैतन्याभिन्नेदमवच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठाविद्याकार्यत्वेऽपि 'इदं रजतम्' इति सत्यस्थलीयेदमाकारानुभवाहितसंस्कारजन्यत्वात् इदमाकारानुभवविषयता, न तु 'अहं रजतम्' इति अहमाकारानुभवविषयतेति अनुसन्धेयम् ।

९५. ननु एवमपि मिथ्यारजतस्य साक्षात् साक्षिसम्बन्धितया भानसम्भवे रजतगोचरज्ञानाभासरूपाविद्यावृत्तेरभ्युपगमः किमर्थः ?

am a brāhmaṇa', 'This is the sense of sight', 'I am one-eyed', 'This is the sense of hearing', 'I am deaf'.

94. And in the present case, it is to be understood that though the (merely) phenomenal silver is the product of nescience present in the this-defined consciousness non-different from the cogniser (-defined) consciousness, yet since it is produced by residual impression generated by experience with the form 'this' on the occasion of the true (experience) 'This is silver', there is for it contentness in respect of experience with the form 'this', but not contentness in respect of experience with the form 'I' as 'I am silver'.

95. 'Now, even thus, for the illusory silver, manifestation being possible as directly related to the witness, for what purpose is there the admission of a psychosis of nescience which is of the nature of an apparent cognition having silver as object?'[22]

९६. इति चेत्, उच्यते; स्वगोचरवृत्त्युपहितचैतन्यभिन्नसत्ताकत्वाभावस्य विषयापरोक्षत्वरूपतया रजतस्य अपरोक्षत्वसिद्धये तदभ्युपगमात्।

९७. ननु इदंवृत्तेः रजताकारवृत्तेश्च प्रत्येकमेकैकविषयत्वे गुरुमतवद्विशिष्टज्ञानानभ्युपगमे कुतो भ्रमज्ञानसिद्धिः?

९८. इति चेत्, न; वृत्तिद्वयप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्यैकस्य सत्यमिथ्यावस्तुतादात्म्यावगाहित्वेन भ्रमत्वस्वीकारात्। अत एव साक्षिज्ञानस्य सत्यासत्यविषयतया प्रामाण्यानियमादप्रामाण्योक्तिः साम्प्रदायिकानाम्।

96. If this be asked, it is said in reply: that is admitted for the sake of the establishment of the immediacy of silver, since the immediacy of a content consists in the non-possession of reality different from the consciousness qualified *per accidens* by the psychosis whose object is that (content) itself.

97. 'Now, if the psychosis "this" and the psychosis with the form of silver each has a separate content, there being no admission of a cognition (of one as) qualified (by the other) as in the system of the Guru,[23] whence is there the establishment of delusive cognition?'

98. If this be asked, no; for, delusiveness is admitted of the single consciousness reflected in the two psychoses, because of (its) apprehending the identity of real and illusory objects. Hence it is that among the followers of tradition there is the statement of the non-authoritativeness of witness-cognition, since as having the real as well as the non-real for content, authoritativeness is not invariable.

९९. ननु सिद्धान्ते देशान्तरीयरजतमपि अविद्याकार्यमध्यस्तं चेति कथं शुक्तिरूप्यस्य ततो वैलक्षण्यम् ?

१००. इति चेत्, न। त्वन्मते सत्यत्वाविशेषेऽपि केषाञ्चित् क्षणिकत्वं केषाञ्चित् स्थायित्वमित्यत्र यदेव नियामकं तदेव स्वभावविशेषादिकं ममापि।

१०१. यद्वा घटाद्यध्यासे अविद्यैव दोषत्वेन हेतुः; शुक्तिरूप्याध्यासे तु काचादयोऽपि दोषाः। तथाच आगन्तुकदोषजन्यत्वं प्रातिभासिकत्वे प्रयोजकम्। अत एव स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादीनामागन्तुकनिद्रादोषजन्यत्वात् प्रातिभासिकत्वम्।

99. 'Now, in the final position even the silver present in some other place is a product of nescience and is superimposed; hence, for nacre-silver how is there difference from that?'

100. If this be asked, no. In your system, though there is no difference in respect of reality, that which is the regulating principle in respect of momentariness for some and permanence for others, that itself, *i.e.*, difference in nature etc., (is the regulating principle) for me too.[21]

101. Or else, in the superimposition of pot etc., nescience as the sole defect is the cause; in the superimposition of nacre-silver etc., however, there are even (other) defects like film in the eye etc. And thus generation by adventitious defect is the determinant in respect of (bare) phenomenality. Hence it is that for the dream-cognised chariot etc., there is bare phenomenality because of being generated by the defect of sleep which is adventitious.

१०२. ननु स्वप्नस्थले पूर्वानुभूतरथादेः स्मरणमात्रेणैव व्यवहारोपपत्तौ न रथादिसृष्टिकल्पनम्, गौरवात्।

१०३. इति चेत्, न। रथादेः स्मृतिमात्राभ्युपगमे 'रथं पश्यामि, स्वप्ने रथमद्राक्षम्' इत्याद्यनुभवविरोधापत्तेः, 'अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते' इति रथादिसृष्टिप्रतिपादकश्रुतिविरोधापत्तेश्च। तस्मात् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोऽपि प्रातिभासिका यावत् प्रतिभासमवतिष्ठन्ते।

१०४. ननु स्वप्नरथाद्यधिष्ठानतयोपलभ्यमानदेशविशेषस्यापि तदा

102. 'Now, in the case of dreams the empirical usage, in respect of formerly experienced chariot etc., being intelligible even with mere recollection, there need be no assumption of the creation of chariot etc., because of prolixity.'

103. If this be said, no. If of chariot etc. there be admitted recollection alone, there is the contingence of conflict with experiences like 'I see the chariot, I saw the chariot in the dream' etc.; further there is the contingence of conflict with s'ruti texts declaring the creation of chariot etc., in 'Then he creates chariots, (the horses) yoked to chariots and roads (*Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 10)'. Therefore even the dream-cognised chariot etc., which are, like nacre-silver, illusory, persist so long as they appear.

104. 'Now, since even the particular locality, cognised as the substrate of the dream-chariot etc., is not at that time in sense-contact, there has to be

असन्निकृष्टतयानिर्वचनीयप्रातिभासिकदेशोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ; तथाच अध्यासः कुत्र ?

१०५. इति चेत्, न; चैतन्यस्य स्वयंप्रकाशस्य रथाद्यधिष्ठानत्वात्। प्रतीयमानो रथादिः अस्तीत्येव प्रतीयत इति सद्रूपेण प्रकाशमानं चैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठानम्। देशविशेषोऽपि चिदध्यस्तः प्रातिभासिकः। रथादौ इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वमपि प्रातिभासिकम्, तदा सर्वेन्द्रियाणामुपरमात्।

१०६. 'अहं गजः' इत्यादिप्रतीत्यापादनन्तु पूर्ववत् निरसनीयम्।

१०७. स्वाप्नगजादयः साक्षात् मायापरिणामा इति केचित्। अन्तःकरणद्वारा तत्परिणामा इत्यन्ये।

admitted an indeterminable phenomenal locality; and thus where is the (dream) superimposition (made)?'

105. If this be asked, no; for self-luminous consciousness is the substrate of chariot etc.[25] Inasmuch as the chariot etc., that are cognised, are cognised certainly as existent, the substrate is but consciousness manifest as reality. Even the particular locality is superimposed on consciousness and is phenomenal. Sense-cognisedness (as) also (this-ness), in the case of the chariot etc., is phenomenal, since there is quiescence of all indriyas at that time.

106. As for the deduced contingence of the cognition 'I am an elephant' that is to be refuted as before.

107. Some say that the dream-elephant etc. are the direct evolutes of māyā. Others say that they are the evolutes thereof through the channel of the internal organ.

१०८. ननु गजादेः शुद्धचैतन्याध्यस्तत्वे इदानीं तत्साक्षात्कारा-भावेन जागरणेऽपि स्वप्नोपलब्धगजादयोऽनुवर्तेरन्?

१०९. उच्यते। कार्यविनाशो हि द्विविधः। कश्चिदुपादानेन सह, कश्चित्तु विद्यमान एव उपादाने। आद्यो बाधः। द्वितीयस्तु निवृत्तिः। आद्यस्य कारणमधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारः, तेन विना उपादान-भूताया अविद्याया अनिवृत्तेः। द्वितीये विरोधिवृत्त्युत्पत्तिः दोषनिवृत्तिश्च।

११०. तदिह ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराभावात् स्वाप्नप्रपञ्चो मा बाधिष्ट।

108. 'Now, if elephant etc. be superimposed on pure consciousness, there being no intuition of that (consciousness) now (in waking), the dream-cognised elephant etc. should persist even in waking.'

109. It is said in reply. The destruction of a product is, indeed, twofold. (While) one (is destruction) along with the material cause, another, however, (is destruction) even when the material cause exists. The first is sublation. The second, however, is removal. The cause of the first is the intuition of the real nature of the substrate, since, in the absence of that, there is non-removal of nescience which is the material cause. In the second case, (the causes are) the origination of an opposed psychosis and the removal of defect.

110. Of these (two modes of destruction), let it be here that the dream-world is not sublated, because of the non-existence of Brahman-intuition. What (however) is the contradiction in the removal

मुसलप्रहारेण घटादेरिव विरोधिप्रत्ययान्तरोदयेन स्वजनकीभूतनिद्रादिदोषनाशेन वा गजादिनिवृत्तौ को विरोधः ?

१११. एवञ्च शुक्तिरूप्यस्य शुक्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यनिष्ठतूलाविद्याकार्यत्वपक्षे शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानेन तदज्ञानेन सह रजतस्य बाधः। मूलाविद्याकार्यत्वपक्षे तु मूलाविद्याया ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारमात्रनिवर्त्यतया शुक्तित्वज्ञानेनानिवर्त्यतया तत्र शुक्तिज्ञानात् निवृत्तिमात्रं मुद्गरप्रहारेण घटस्येव।

११२. ननु शुक्तौ रजतस्य प्रातिभाससमये प्रातिभासिक-

of elephant etc., either because of the origination of an opposed cognition as in the case of (the destruction of) pot etc., by the blows of a pestle, or because of the destruction of defects like sleep which cause them (the dream-cognitions)?

111. And thus, on the view that nacre-silver is a product of tūlāvidyā (modal nescience) present in nacre-defined consciousness, there is sublation of silver along with the nescience about that (nacre) by the knowledge that it is nacre. On the view that it is a product of mūlāvidyā (primal nescience), since primal nescience is removable solely by Brahman-intuition, and not removable by the cognition of nacreity, in this case there results only removal (not sublation) from the cognition of nacre, as of pot by the blows of a pestle.

112. 'Now, if at the time of the appearance of silver in nacre there be admitted a phenomenal reality, there could not be the cognition of negation in all

सत्ताभ्युपगमे 'नेदं रजतम्' इति त्रैकालिकनिषेधज्ञानं न स्यात्, किन्तु 'इदानीं इदं न रजतम्' इति, 'इदानीं घटः श्यामो न' इतिवत्।

११३. इति चेत्, न। न हि तत्र रजतत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकाभावो निषेधधीविषयः; किन्तु लौकिकपारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्नप्रातिभासिकरजतप्रतियोगिताकः; व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावाभ्युपगमात्।

११४. ननु प्रातिभासिके रजते पारमार्थिकत्वमवगतं न वा? अनवगते प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नज्ञानाभावादभावप्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तिः; अवगते अपरोक्षावभासस्य तात्कालिकविषयसत्तानियतत्वात् रजते पारमार्थि-

three times in the form "This is not silver"; rather would it be in the form "Now this is not silver", like (the cognition) "Now (*i.e.* after baking) the pot is not black".'

113. If this be said, no. For, the content of the negative cognition in that case is not a non-existence whose counter-correlate is defined by silverness; rather is it that whose counter-correlate is (merely) phenomenal silver as defined by empirical reality; for, there is admitted non-existence having for counter-correlate what is defined (even) by an (incompatible) adjunct, present in a different locus.[26]

114. 'Now, in the case of the phenomenal silver, is reality cognised or not? If not cognised, then because of the non-existence of cognition of what is defined by that which defines counter-correlateness, there is non-intelligibility of the perception of non-existence; if cognised, then, since in the case of immediate presentation the contemporaneous existence of the content is

कत्वमपि अनिर्वचनीयं रजतवदेवोत्पन्नमिति तदवच्छिन्नरजतसत्त्वे तदवच्छिन्नाभावस्तत्र कथं वर्तते ?

११५. इति चेत्, न ; पारमार्थिकत्वस्याधिष्ठाननिष्ठस्य रजते प्रतिभाससम्भवेन रजतनिष्ठपारमार्थिकत्वोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपगमात् ; यत्रारोप्यमसन्निकृष्टं तत्रैव प्रातिभासिकवस्तूत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारात् ।

११६. अत एव इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टतया जपाकुसुमगतलौहित्यस्य स्फटिके भानसम्भवात् न स्फटिकेऽनिर्वचनीयलौहित्योत्पत्तिः ।

११७. ननु एवं यत्र जपाकुसुमं द्रव्यान्तरव्यवधानात् अस-

invariable, there is in the silver, reality too, which is indeterminable and produced even like silver; hence, the silver defined thereby being real, how can there be non-existence defined by that?'

115. If this be asked, no; for, there being the possibility of the manifestation in silver of the reality present in the substrate (*i.e.*, nacre) there is not admitted the origination of a reality present in the silver; for the origination of a (merely) phenomenal object is admitted only where the superimposed is not in sense-contact.[27]

116. Hence it is that, there being the possibility of the manifestation in the crystal for the redness present in the China-rose because of its being in contact with the sense-organ, there is not in the crystal the origination of an indeterminable redness.

117. 'Now thus, where the China-rose is not in sense-contact because of the interposition of some other

न्निकृष्टम्, तत्र लौहित्यप्रतीत्या प्रातिभासिकं लौहित्यं स्वीक्रियताम्।

११८. इति चेत्, न; इष्टत्वात्।

११९. एवं प्रत्यक्षभ्रमान्तरेष्वपि प्रत्यक्षसामान्यलक्षणानुगमो यथार्थप्रत्यक्षलक्षणासद्भावश्च दर्शनीयः।

१२०. उक्तं प्रत्यक्षं प्रकारान्तरेण द्विविधम्, इन्द्रियजन्यं तदजन्यं चेति।

१२१. तत्र इन्द्रियाजन्यं सुखादिप्रत्यक्षम्, मनस इन्द्रियत्व-निराकरणात्।

१२२. इन्द्रियाणि पञ्च, घ्राणरसनचक्षुःश्रोत्रत्वगात्मकानि। सर्वाणि चेन्द्रियाणि स्वस्वविषयसंयुक्तान्येव प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं जनयन्ति।

object, in that case, because of the cognition of redness, let us admit a (merely) phenomenal redness.'

118. If this be said, (that is) no (objection); for it is acceptable.

119. Similarly is to be exhibited, even in other perceptual delusions, the recurrence of the general definition of perception as well as the non-existence of the definition of true perception.

120. The aforesaid perception is in (yet) another way twofold, sense-generated and not-so-generated.

121. Of these, the not-sense-generated is the perception of pleasure etc., since the indriya-nature of manas is refuted.

122. The senses are five, of the nature of smell, taste, sight, hearing and touch. And all the senses generate perceptual cognition, only as in contact with their respective contents.

१२३. तत्र घ्राणरसनत्वगात्मकानीन्द्रियाणि स्वस्थानस्थितान्येव गन्धरसस्पर्शोपलम्भान् जनयन्ति । चक्षुःश्रोत्रे तु स्वत एव विषयदेशं गत्वा स्वस्वविषयं गृह्णीतः ।

१२४. श्रोत्रस्यापि चक्षुरादिवत् परिच्छिन्नतया भेर्यादिदेश-गमनसम्भवात् । अत एवानुभवो 'भेरीशब्दो मया श्रुतः' इति । अन्यथा वीचीतरङ्गादिन्यायेन कर्णशष्कुलीप्रदेशेऽनन्तशब्दोत्पत्तिकल्पनागौरवम् 'भेरी-शब्दो मया श्रुतः' इति प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वकल्पनागौरवञ्च स्यात् ।

१२५. तदेवं व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

इति प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः ॥

123. Of these, the senses of the nature of smell, taste and touch generate the cognitions of smell, taste and touch, only as abiding in their own locations. Sight and hearing, however, go forth of themselves to the locality of the contents and apprehend their respective contents.

124. For, the sense of hearing too being, like the sense of sight, finite, there is the possibility of going out to the locality of the drum etc.[28] Hence it is that there is the experience 'The drum-sound is heard by me.' Otherwise, there would be the prolixity of positing, on the analogy of ripples and waves etc., the origination of innumerable sounds in the locality of the ear-cavity, and the (further) prolixity of the assumption of delusiveness for the perception 'The drum-sound is heard by me'.

125. Thus, perception has been explained.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON PRATYAKṢA

द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

अनुमानम्

१. अथ अनुमानं निरूप्यते । अनुमितिकरणम् अनुमानम् ।

२. अनुमितिश्च व्याप्तिज्ञानत्वेन व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्या । व्याप्तिज्ञानानुव्यवसायादेस्तत्त्वेन तज्जन्यत्वाभावात् नानुमितित्वम् ।

३. अनुमितिकरणञ्च व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । तत्संस्कारोऽवान्तरव्यापारः ।

CHAPTER II

ANUMĀNA

1. Now inference is explained. Inference is the distinctive cause of inferential cognition.

2. And inferential cognition is that which is generated by cognition of pervasion, (functioning) *as* cognition of pervasion. In the case of the reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya) of the cognition of pervasion, there is not the generation by that, (functioning) *as* that (cognition of pervasion); hence there is not the nature of inferential cognition.

3. And the distinctive cause of inferential cognition is the cognition of pervasion. The residual impression of this (latter) is an intermediate operation.

४. न तु तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमितौ करणम्; तस्यानुमितिहेतुत्वासिद्धया तत्करणत्वस्य दूरनिरस्तत्वात् ।

५. न च संस्कारजन्यत्वेनानुमितेः स्मृतित्वापत्तिः । स्मृतिप्रागभावजन्यत्वस्य संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वस्य वा स्मृतित्वप्रयोजकतया संस्कारध्वंससाधारणसंस्कारजन्यत्वस्य तदप्रयोजकत्वात् ।

६. न च यत्र व्याप्तिस्मरणादनुमितिः तत्र कथं संस्कारो हेतुरिति वाच्यम्; व्याप्तिस्मृतिस्थलेऽपि तत्संस्कारस्यैवानुमितिहेतुत्वात् । न हि स्मृतेः संस्कारनाशकत्वनियमः, स्मृतिधारादर्शनात् ।

4. But the consideration of the *probans* for the third time (synthetically in relation to the *probandum* and the subject) is not the distinctive cause; for its causality in respect of inferential cognition not being established, its distinctive causality is far removed.[29]

5. Nor because of generation by a residual impression is there the contingence of the nature of recollection for inferential cognition. For, the determinant of the nature-of-recollection being either generation by the prior non-existence of recollection or generation by residual impression *alone*, generation by residual impression (as such), which is common (even) to the destruction of residual impression, is not the determinant of that (nature of recollection).

6. Nor may it be asked how, when there is inferential cognition because of the recollection of pervasion, the residual impression can be the cause; for, even where there is the recollection of the pervasion, only the residual impression thereof is the cause of

७. न चानुद्बुद्धसंस्कारादप्यनुमित्यापत्तिः, तदुद्बोधस्यापि सहकारित्वात् ।

८. एवञ्च 'अयं धूमवान्' इति पक्षधर्मताज्ञाने 'धूमो वह्निव्याप्यः' इत्यनुभवाहितसंस्कारोद्बोधे च सति 'वह्निमान्' इत्यनुमितिर्भवति । न तु मध्ये व्याप्तिस्मरणं तज्जन्यं 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं' इत्यादि विशेषणविशिष्टज्ञानं वा हेतुत्वेन कल्पनीयम्; गौरवात्, मानाभावाच्च ।

९. तच्च व्याप्तिज्ञानं वह्निविषयकज्ञानांशे एव करणम्, न तु

inferential cognition. There is not indeed a rule that recollection destroys residual impression, since there is seen a stream of recollection.

7. Nor is there the contingence of inferential cognition from a non-awakened residual impression, since the awakening of that is also an auxiliary.

8. And thus when there is the cognition of characterisation of the subject (by the *probans*) in the form 'This has smoke', and when there is awakening of the residual impression generated by the experience 'Smoke is fire-pervaded', there results the inferential cognition 'This is fiery'. There is not, however, to be interpolated, as a cause, either the recollection of pervasion or what is generated by that, *viz.*, a cognition of what is qualified by a qualification (*i.e.*, a complex cognition) like 'This possesses fire-pervaded smoke'; because there is prolixity and lack of evidence.[30]

9. And this cognition of pervasion is a distinctive cause only in respect of that aspect of cognition, whose content is fire, but not in respect of that aspect

पर्वतविषयज्ञानांशे; इति 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इति ज्ञानस्य वह्न्यंश एवानुमितित्वम्, न पर्वतांशे; तदंशे प्रत्यक्षत्वस्योपपादितत्वात्।

१०. व्याप्तिश्च अशेषसाधनाश्रयाश्रितसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यरूपा।

११. सा च व्यभिचाराज्ञाने सति सहचारदर्शनेन गृह्यते। तच्च सहचारदर्शनं भूयोदर्शनं सकृद्दर्शनं वेति विशेषो नादरणीयः, सहचारदर्शनस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात्।

१२. तच्चानुमानमन्वयिरूपमेव, न तु केवलान्वयि। सर्वस्यापि

of cognition whose content is the hill; hence in the case of the cognition 'the hill possesses fire', the nature of inferential cognition is only in respect of the fire-aspect, not in respect of the hill-aspect; for in respect of this (latter) aspect, perceptual nature has been explained.

10. And pervasion is of the nature of an apposition (of the *probans*) with a *probandum* located in all locations of the *probans* without exception.

11. And it is apprehended by perception of concomitance, when there is no cognition of inconstancy. Whether this perception of concomitance is a repeated perception or a single perception is a distinction that has not to be considered, since what is determinative is only the perception of the concomitance.[31]

12. And this inference is of the nature of co-presence alone, but not (of the nature of) bare-co-presence. For, in our system, all existents whatsoever being counter-correlates of absolute non-existence

धर्मस्यास्मन्मते ब्रह्मनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेनात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकत्वरूपकेवलान्वयित्वस्यासिद्धेः ।

१३. नाप्यनुमानस्य व्यतिरेकिरूपत्वम् ; साध्याभावे साधनाभावनिरूपितव्याप्तिज्ञानस्य साधनेन साध्यानुमितावनुपयोगात् । कथं तर्हि धूमादावन्वयव्याप्तिमविदुषोऽपि व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानादनुमितिः ? अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणादिति वक्ष्यामः ।

१४. अत एवानुमानस्य नान्वयिव्यतिरेकिरूपत्वम् ; व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानस्यानुमित्यहेतुत्वात् ।

located in Brahman, there is not established the nature of bare-co-presence, which consists in having for *probandum* what is not a counter-correlate of absolute non-existence.

13. Nor is there the form of co-absence for inference; for, in the inference of *probandum* through *probans*, there is no use for a cognition of pervasion determined by the non-existence of *probans* where the *probandum* is non-existent. How, then, is there inferential cognition through the cognition of the pervasion of co-absence, even for him who has no cognition of pervasion of co-presence, in respect of smoke etc.? We shall say it is because of the pramāṇa of arthāpatti (postulation).

14. For the same reason (as above stated) there is not for inference the form of co-presence *cum* co-absence; for, cognition of the pervasion of co-absence is not a cause of inferential cognition.

१५. तच्चानुमानं स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेन द्विविधम् । तत्र स्वार्थं तूक्तमेव । परार्थन्तु न्यायसाध्यम् ।

१६. न्यायो नामावयवसमुदायः । अवयवाश्च त्रय एव प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणरूपाः, उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनरूपा वा; न तु पञ्चावयवरूपाः; अवयवत्रयेणैव व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोरुपदर्शनसम्भवेनाधिकावयवद्वयस्य व्यर्थत्वात्।

१७. एवमनुमाने निरूपिते तस्मात् ब्रह्मभिन्ननिखिलप्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः । तथा हि । ब्रह्मभिन्नं सर्वं मिथ्या ; ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वात् ; यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा शुक्तिरूप्यम् ।

15. And this inference is two-fold, divided into that for oneself and that for another. Of these, that for oneself has been already stated. As for that for another, it is established by a syllogism.

16. What is called a syllogism is a combination of members. And the members are but three, either as pratijñā, hetu and udāharaṇa, or as udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana; but it is not of the form of five members; for, the exhibition of pervasion and the characterisation of the subject (by the *probans*) being possible even with three members, the two extra members are futile.[32]

17. Inference having thus been demonstrated, therefrom results the illusoriness of the entire universe other than Brahman. It is thus. Everything other than Brahman is illusory; because of otherness from Brahman; what is thus (other than Brahman) is so (illusory), like nacre-silver.

१८. न च दृष्टान्तासिद्धिः, तस्य साधितत्वात् । न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्; शुक्तिरूप्यरज्जुसर्पादीनां मिथ्यात्वे ब्रह्मभिन्नत्वस्यैव लाघवेन प्रयोजकत्वात् ।

१९. मिथ्यात्वञ्च स्वाश्रयत्वेनाभिमतयावन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । अभिमतपदमसम्भववारणाय । यावत्पदमर्थान्तरवारणाय । तदुक्तम्—

"सर्वेषामपि भावानां स्वाश्रयत्वेन सम्मते ।
प्रतियोगित्वमत्यन्ताभावं प्रति मृषात्मता" इति ।

18. Nor is there non-establishment of the example, since that has been established. Nor is there the failure (of the *probans*) to be the determinant;[33] for, in the case of the illusoriness of nacre-silver, rope-snake, etc., otherness from Brahman is alone the determinant, because of parsimony.

19. And illusoriness consists in being the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence, located in whatever is considered to be the locus of (the presentation) itself. The word 'What-is-considered-to-be' is for the sake of avoiding inapplicability (asambhava, of the definition). The word 'whatever' is for the sake of avoiding a different conclusion (arthāntara). This has been said (*Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 39): "In the case of all existents, illusoriness consists in their being counter-correlates in respect of absolute non-existence in what are admitted to be their own loci."

२०. यद्वा 'अयं पटः एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी; पटत्वात्; पटान्तरवत्'; इत्याद्यनुमानं मिथ्यात्वे प्रमाणम्। तदुक्तम्—'अंशिनः स्वांशगात्यन्ताभावस्य प्रतियोगिनः। अंशित्वादितरांशीव दिगेषैव गुणादिषु॥' इति।

२१. न च घटादेर्मिथ्यात्वे 'सन् घटः' इति प्रत्यक्षबाधः।

२२. अधिष्ठानब्रह्मसत्ताया एव तत्र विषयतया घटादेः सत्यत्वासिद्धेः।

२३. न च नीरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः कथं चाक्षुषादिज्ञानविषयतेति वाच्यम्।

20. Or else, 'This cloth is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in this thread; because of cloth-ness; like another cloth'; an inference like the above is the pramāṇa for illusoriness. This has been said (*Ibid.*, p. 40): "Wholes are counter-correlates of absolute non-existence located in their own parts, because of their wholeness, like other wholes; this alone is the line (of criticism) even in respect of guṇas (qualities) etc."[34]

21. Nor if pot etc., be illusory is there the sublation of the perception 'Pot is sat (exists).'

22. For, the content there being but the reality of the substrate, Brahman, the reality of pot etc., is not established.

23. Nor may it be asked how for the colourless Brahman there can be contentness in respect of visual and other cognitions.

२४. नीरूपस्यापि रूपादेः प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् ।

२५. न च नीरूपस्य द्रव्यस्य चक्षुराद्ययोग्यत्वमिति नियमः; मन्मते ब्रह्मणो द्रव्यत्वासिद्धेः । गुणाश्रयत्वं समवायिकारणत्वं वा द्रव्यत्वमिति तेऽभिमतम् । न हि निर्गुणस्य ब्रह्मणो गुणाश्रयता; नापि समवायिकारणता, समवायासिद्धेः ।

२६. अस्तु वा द्रव्यत्वं ब्रह्मणः; तथापि नीरूपस्य कालस्येव चाक्षुषादिज्ञानविषयत्वे न विरोधः ।

२७. यद्वा त्रिविधं सत्त्वम्—पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं ब्रह्मणः, व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमाकाशादेः, प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं शुक्तिरजतादेः ।

24. For, there is perceptibility even for the colourless, namely, colour etc.

25. Nor is this the rule (to be urged against me), that for a colourless *substance* there is no competence in respect of sight etc.; for, in my system it is not established of Brahman that it is a substance. Substanceness is admitted by you to consist in being the locus of quality or in being the inherent cause. The qualityless Brahman cannot indeed be the locus of qualities; nor can it be the inherent cause, since inherence has not been established.

26. Or let it be that there is substanceness for Brahman; even thus there is no conflict in its being the content of visual and other cognitions, just like time which is colourless.

27. Or else,[35] reality is three-fold—the absolute reality of Brahman, the empirical reality of ether etc., and the phenomenal reality of nacre-silver etc.

२८. तथा च 'घटः सन्' इति प्रत्यक्षस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वविषयत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्। अस्मिन् पक्षे च घटादेर्ब्रह्मणि निषेधो न स्वरूपेण, किन्तु पारमार्थिकत्वेनैव; इति न विरोधः।

२९. अस्मिन् पक्षे च मिथ्यात्वलक्षणे पारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वमत्यन्ताभावविशेषणं द्रष्टव्यम्। तस्मात् उपपन्नं मिथ्यात्वानुमानमिति।

इति अनुमानपरिच्छेदः॥

28. And thus for the perception 'Pot is sat' there is validity as having empirical reality for content. And on this view, the negation of pot etc., in (relation to) Brahman, is not in respect of their own existence, but only in respect of their absolute reality; hence there is no contradiction.

29. And in the definition of illusoriness, on this view, there should be understood, as the qualification of absolute non-existence, the possession, as counter correlate, of what is defined by absolute reality. Therefore, the inference of illusoriness is intelligible.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON ANUMĀNA

तृतीयः परिच्छेदः

उपमानम्

१. अथ उपमानं निरूप्यते । तत्र सादृश्यप्रमाकरणम् उपमानम् ।

२. तथाहि । प्राङ्गणेषु दृष्टगोपिण्डस्य पुरुषस्य वनगतस्य गवयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे सति भवति प्रतीतिः 'अयं पिण्डो गोसदृशः' इति । तदनन्तरञ्च भवति निश्चयः 'अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौः' इति । तत्र

CHAPTER III

UPAMĀNA

1. Now upamāna (comparison) is explained. Comparison is the distinctive cause of the valid cognition of similarity.

2. It is thus. When, for a person who has seen the figure of a cow in (his) courtyard, there is, on reaching the forest, sense-contact with a gavaya, there results the cognition 'This figure is similar to a cow'. And subsequent to that results the certitude 'Similar to this is my cow'. Of these (two cognitions), the cognition of

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गवयनिष्ठगोसादृश्यज्ञानं करणम्; गोनिष्ठगवयसादृश्य-ज्ञानं फलम्।

३. न चेदं प्रत्यक्षेण सम्भवति, गोपिण्डस्य तदा इन्द्रियासन्निकर्षात्; नापि अनुमानेन, गवयनिष्ठगोसादृश्यस्य अतल्लिङ्गत्वात्।

४. नापि 'मदीया गौः एतद्गवयसदृशी; एतन्निष्ठसादृश्यप्रतियोगित्वात्; यो यद्गतसादृश्यप्रतियोगी स तत्सदृशः, यथा मैत्रनिष्ठसादृश्यप्रतियोगी चैत्रो मैत्रसदृशः' इत्यनुमानात् तत्सम्भव इति वाच्यम्।

५. एवंविधानुमानानवतारेऽपि, 'अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौः'

similarity to the cow present in the gavaya, is (seen) through co-presence and co-absence, (to be) the distinctive cause; the cognition of similarity to the gavaya present in the cow is the fruit.

3. And this is not possible through perception, since for the figure of the cow there is no sense-contact at that time; nor through inference, since the similarity present in the gavaya is not the *probans* for that.

4. Nor may it be said that there is the possibility of that (cognition) because of the (following) inference: 'My cow is similar to this gavaya; since it is the counter-correlate of similarity present in this; when something is the counter-correlate of similarity present in another, the former is similar to the latter, *e.g.*, Caitra, the counter-correlate of similarity present in Maitra, is similar to Maitra'.

5. For, even when such a kind of inference does not make its appearance, the cognition 'Similar to this

इति प्रतीतेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । उपमिनोमीत्यनुव्यवसायाच्च । तस्मात् उपमानं मानान्तरम् ।

इति उपमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

is my cow' is established in experience. Further, the reflective cognition is in the form 'I compare' (not 'I infer'). Therefore, comparison (upamāna) is a distinct means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa).

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON UPAMĀNA

चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः

आगमः

१. अथागमो निरूप्यते । यस्य वाक्यस्य तात्पर्यविषयीभूत-संसर्गो मानान्तरेण न बाध्यते, तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणम् ।

२. वाक्यजन्ये च ज्ञाने आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासत्तयस्तात्पर्यज्ञानं चेति चत्वारि कारणानि ।

३. तत्र पदार्थानां परस्परजिज्ञासाविषयत्वयोग्यत्वम् आकाङ्क्षा ;

CHAPTER IV

ĀGAMA

1. Now, verbal testimony is explained. When for a statement its syntactical relation that is purportful is not sublated by other evidence, that statement is a pramāṇa (authoritative).

2. And in respect of statement-generated cognition the causes are four, *viz.*, expectancy, competency, proximity and cognition of purport.

3. Of these, the capacity of word-senses, each to be the content of a desire to know on the part of the

क्रियाश्रवणे कारकस्य तस्य श्रवणे क्रियायाः करणश्रवणे इतिकर्त्तव्यतायाश्च जिज्ञासाविषयत्वात् ।

४. अजिज्ञासोरपि वाक्यार्थबोधात् योग्यत्वमुपात्तम् । तदवच्छेदकञ्च क्रियात्वकारकत्वादिकमिति नातिव्याप्तिः 'गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती' इत्यादौ । अभेदान्वये च समानविभक्तिकपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वं तदवच्छेदकमिति तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येषु नाव्याप्तिः ।

५. एतादृशाकाङ्क्षाभिप्रायेणैव बलाबलाधिकरणे "सा वैश्व-

other, is expectancy; for, on hearing of an act, the causal correlate is the content of a desire to know; (similarly) on hearing of the latter, for the act (there is contentness in respect of desire to know); and on hearing of a distinctive cause, there is for the *modus operandi* (contentness in respect of a desire to know).

4. 'Capacity' (in respect of contentness) comes in, since there is cognition of the sentence-sense even for those who have no desire to know. And since what defines that (capacity) is the being-an-act, being-a-causal-correlate, etc., there is no overpervasion of (statements like) 'cow, horse, man, elephant' etc. And when the syntactical relation is one of non-difference, since what defines that (capacity) is the being in words having the same suffixes, there is no non-pervasion of such statements as "That thou art".

5. It is only in consideration of expectancy of this kind that in the section treating of the (relative) strength and weakness (of scriptural texts) there is the rule, that, in the text 'The cream belongs to the

दैव्यामिक्षा वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम्" इत्यत्र वैश्वदेवयागस्य आमिक्षान्वितत्वेन न वाजिनाकांक्षेत्यादिव्यवहारः ।

६. ननु तत्रापि वाजिनस्य जिज्ञासाविषयत्वेऽपि तद्योग्यत्वमस्त्येव ; प्रदेयद्रव्यत्वस्य यागनिरूपितजिज्ञासाविषयतायोग्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् ।

७. इति चेत्, न; स्वसमानजातीयपदार्थान्वयबोधविरहसहकृतप्रदेयद्रव्यत्वस्यैव तदवच्छेदकत्वेन वाजिनद्रव्यस्य स्वसमानजातीयान्वयबोधसहकृतत्वेन तादृशावच्छेदकत्वाभावात् ; आमिक्षायान्तु नैवम्, वाजि-

Vis'vedevas; the whey is for the Vājins,[36] since the sacrifice to the Vis'vedevas is syntactically related to the cream, there is no expectancy of (the relation to) the whey, and so on.

6. 'Now, there too, for the whey, though not the content of the desire to know, capacity therefor exists; for, what defines capacity to be the content of a desire to know in connection with the sacrifice is being-a-substance-that-is-to-be-offered.'

7. If this be said, no; for what defines that (capacity) is the being-a-substance-that-is-to-be-offered, accompanied by the absence of cognition of a syntactical relation (of the rite) with what is of the same class (as a thing-to-be-offered), whereas in the case of the whey-substance, there being (already) present the cognition of a syntactical relation (of the rite) with what is of the same class, that kind of *definiens* does not exist; in the case of the cream, however, it is not thus, since there is not cognised at that time a syntactical relation (of the Vais'vadeva rite) to the whey. In the case

नान्वयस्य तदा अनुपस्थानात् । उदाहरणान्तरेष्वपि दुर्बलत्वप्रयोजक आकाङ्क्षाविरह एव द्रष्टव्यः ।

८. योग्यता च तात्पर्य्यविषयसंसर्गाबाधः ।

९. 'वह्निना सिञ्चेत्' इत्यादौ तादृशसंसर्गबाधान्न अतिव्याप्तिः । "स प्रजापतिरात्मनो वपामुदखिदत्" इत्यादावपि तात्पर्य्यविषयीभूतपशुवपायागप्राशस्त्याबाधाद् योग्यता । "तत्त्वमसि" आदिवाक्येष्वपि वाच्याभेदबाधेऽपि लक्ष्यस्वरूपाभेदे बाधाभावाद् योग्यता ।

१०. आसत्तिश्चाव्यवधानेन पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिः । मानान्तरेणोपस्थापितपदार्थस्यान्वयबोधाभावात् पदजन्येति ।

of other examples too[37] the determinant of the weakness (of the text) should be understood to be only the absence of expectancy.

8. And competency consists in the non-sublation of a relation that is the content of purport.

9. Since in 'Moisten with fire' etc., that kind of relation is sublated, there is no overpervasion. Even in "That Prajāpati plucked out his own omentum (vapā)" etc., since there is no sublation of the content of purport, *viz.*, the greatness of the sacrifice of the omentum of the sacrificial animal, there is competency. Even in texts like "That thou art", though there is sublation of the expressed non-difference, yet since there is no sublation in respect of the non-difference of the secondarily implied substrate, there is competency.

10. Proximity consists in the cognition of the word-senses generated by words without any interval. Since among word-senses cognised through some other

११. अत एव अश्रुतपदार्थस्थले तत्तत्पदाध्याहारः, 'द्वारम्' इत्यादौ 'पिधेहि' इति । अत एव "इषे त्वा" इत्यादौ 'छिनद्मि' इति पदाध्याहारः ; अत एव विकृतिषु 'सूर्याय जुष्टं निर्वपामि' इति पदप्रयोगः ।

१२. पदार्थश्च द्विविधः, शक्यो लक्ष्यश्चेति ।

१३. तत्र शक्तिर्नाम पदानामर्थेषु मुख्या वृत्तिः, यथा घटपदस्य पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकृतिविशिष्टे वस्तुविशेषे वृत्तिः ।

evidence there is no cognition of syntactical relation, it is said 'generated by words'.

11. Hence it is that in the case of the sense of a word not heard there is the importation of the appropriate word, as for instance (the importation of) (a word like) 'close' in the case of the use of words like 'door'. For the same reason in texts like "Thee, O Iṣā (grass) (iṣe tvā)" there is the importation of words like 'I cut'; for the same reason in modelled rites there is the use of the words like 'I make the offering propitious to Sūrya.'[38]

12. And word-sense is two-fold, express and implied.

13. Of these, what is called the express sense (s'akti) is the primary denotation of words in respect of objects, *e.g.*, the denotation of the word 'pot' in respect of a particular thing qualified by a shape with a large-bottomed cavity.

१४. सा च शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरम्, सिद्धान्ते कारणेषु कार्यानुकूलशक्तिमात्रस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वात् ।

१५. सा च तत्तत्पदजन्यपदार्थज्ञानरूपकार्यानुमेया ।

१६. तादृशशक्तिविषयत्वं शक्यत्वम् । तच्च जातेरेव, न व्यक्तेः, व्यक्तीनामानन्त्येन गुरुत्वात् ।

१७. कथं तर्हि गवादिपदाद्व्यक्तिभानम्? इति चेत्, 'जातेर्व्यक्तिसमानसंवित्संवेद्यतया' इति ब्रूमः ।

१८. यद्वा गवादिपदानां व्यक्तौ शक्तिः स्वरूपसती, न तु

14. And this express sense (s'akti) is an independent category, since in the final view (of the Advaitin) whatever capacity exists in causes favourable to (the production of) the effect has the nature of an independent category.

15. And this (s'akti) is to be inferred from the effect, consisting in the cognition of the word-senses generated by the respective words.

16. To be the expressed denotation (s'akyatva) is to be the content of this kind of s'akti. And this belongs only to the generic, not to the particular, since particulars being infinite there is prolixity.

17. How then is there the manifestation of the particular from words like 'cow'? If this be asked, we say: 'It is because of the generic being cognised by the same cognition as the particular'.

18. Or else, the express capacity of words like 'cow' in respect of the particular is as itself existent,

ज्ञाता ; जातौ तु सा ज्ञाता हेतुः । न तु व्यक्त्यंशे शक्तिज्ञानमपि कारणम्, गौरवात्; जातिशक्तिमत्वज्ञाने सति व्यक्तिशक्तिज्ञानं विना व्यक्तिधीविलम्बाभावाच्च । अत एव न्यायमतेऽपि अन्वये शक्तिः स्वरूपसतीति सिद्धान्तः । ज्ञायमानशक्तिविषयत्वमेव वाच्यत्वमिति जातिरेव वाच्या ।

१९. अथ वा व्यक्तेर्लक्षणयावगमः । यथा 'नीलो घटः' इत्यत्र नीलशब्दस्य नीलगुणविशिष्टे लक्षणा, तथा जातिवाचकस्य तद्विशिष्टे लक्षणा। तदुक्तम् 'अनन्यलभ्यः शब्दार्थः' इति । एवं शक्यार्थो निरूपितः ।

but not as cognised; in the case of the generic, however, it is the cause as cognised. And in respect of the particular aspect, the cognition too of s'akti is not the cause, because of prolixity; further, when there is the cognition of possessing s'akti in the generic, there is no delay in the cognition of the particular, because of the absence of the cognition of s'akti in the particular. Hence it is that, even in the Nyāya system, the final position is that s'akti (functions only) through its own existence, in respect of anvaya. Since to be the express sense (vācyatva) is to be the content of only such s'akti as is cognised (not merely exists), the generic alone is the express sense.[39]

19. Or else, of the particular there is cognition by secondary implication. Just as in 'The pot is blue' there is for the word 'blue' secondary implication in respect of what is qualified by the quality 'blue', similarly for what is expressive of the generic there is secondary implication in respect of what is qualified by that (jāti). This has been stated: 'The word-sense

२०. अथ लक्ष्यपदार्थो निरूप्यते । तत्र लक्षणाविषयो लक्ष्यः । लक्षणा द्विविधा केवललक्षणा लक्षितलक्षणा चेति ।

२१. तत्र शक्यसाक्षात्सम्बन्धः केवललक्षणा; यथा 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इत्यत्र प्रवाहसाक्षात्सम्बन्धिनि तीरे गङ्गापदस्य केवललक्षणा ।

२२. यत्र शक्यपरम्परासम्बन्धेन अर्थान्तरप्रतीतिस्तत्र लक्षितलक्षणा; यथा द्विरेफपदस्य रेफद्वयशक्तस्य भ्रमरपदघटितपरम्परासम्बन्धेन मधुकरे वृत्तिः । गौण्यपि लक्षितलक्षणैव; यथा 'सिंहो माणवकः' इत्यत्र सिंहशब्दवाच्यसम्बन्धिक्रौर्यादिसम्बन्धेन माणवकस्य प्रतीतिः ।

is not otherwise obtained (than by s'akti or lakṣaṇā)'. The express sense has thus been explained.

20. The implied word-sense is now explained. Here the implied sense is the content of implication. Implication is two-fold, as bare implication and implication by the implied.

21. Of these, bare implication is direct relation to the express sense; *e.g.*, in 'the hamlet on the Gaṅgā' for the word 'Gaṅgā' there is bare implication of the bank which is in direct relation to the stream.

22. Where there is cognition of another sense through indirect relation with the express sense, there is implication of the implied; *e.g.*, for the word 'dvirepha' meaning two *r's* there is denotation in respect of the bee by an indirect relation through the word 'bhramara' (containing two *r's*). The figurative too is only an implication by the implied; *e.g.*, in 'the pupil is a lion' there is cognition of the pupil as in relation to the ferocity etc., related to the express sense of the word 'lion'.

२३. प्रकारान्तरेण लक्षणा त्रिविधा; जहल्लक्षणा अजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति ।

२४. शक्यार्थमनन्तर्भाव्य यत्र अर्थान्तप्रतीतिः तत्र जहल्लक्षणा; यथा 'विषं भुङ्क्ष्व' इत्यत्र स्वार्थं विहाय शत्रुगृहे भोजननिवृत्तिर्लक्षिता ।

२५. यत्र शक्यार्थमन्तर्भाव्यैव अर्थान्तरप्रतीतिः, तत्र अजहल्लक्षणा; यथा 'शुक्लो घटः' इत्यत्र हि शुक्लशब्दः स्वार्थं शुक्लगुणमन्तर्भाव्यैव तद्वति द्रव्ये लक्षणया वर्त्तते ।

२६. यत्र हि विशिष्टवाचकशब्दः स्वार्थैकदेशं विहाय एकदेशे वर्त्तते, तत्र जहदजहल्लक्षणा; यथा 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यत्र हि पदद्वय-

23. In another way, implication is three-fold; exclusive implication, non-exclusive implication, and exclusive-non-exclusive implication.

24. Where there is cognition of another sense without including the express sense, there is exclusive implication; *e.g.*, in 'Eat poison' abandoning the proper sense (of the words), there is implied the avoidance of eating in the enemy's house.

25. Where there is cognition of another sense even while including the express sense, there is non-exclusive implication; *e.g.*, in 'The pot is white' the word 'white' even while inclusive of the quality of whiteness denotes by implication the substance possessing that (quality).

26. Where a word expressive of the qualified abandons part of its sense and denotes another part, there is exclusive-non-exclusive implication; *e.g.* in 'This is that Devadatta' because of the unintelligibility

वाच्ययोर्विशिष्टयोरैक्यानुपपत्त्या पदद्वयस्य विशेष्यमात्रपरत्वम्; यथा वा "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यादौ तत्पदवाच्यस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशिष्टस्य त्वम्पदवाच्येन अन्तःकरणविशिष्टेनैक्यायोगात् ऐक्यसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वरूपे लक्षणेति साम्प्रदायिकाः।

२७. वयन्तु ब्रूमः। 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादौ विशिष्टवाचकानां पदानां एकदेशपरत्वेऽपि न लक्षणा; शक्त्युपस्थितविशिष्टयोरभेदान्वयानुपपत्तौ विशेष्ययोः शक्त्युपस्थितयोरेवान्वयबोधा-

of oneness between the two qualified, the denotations of the two words, for both words the substrate alone is (taken to be) the purport; or else, in "That thou art" etc., since between the denotation of the word 'that', *viz.*, what is qualified by omniscience etc., and the denotation of the word 'thou', *viz.*, what is qualified by the internal organ, oneness is impossible, the followers of tradition say that, for the sake of establishing oneness, there is secondary implication in respect of the substrate (svarūpa).

27. We, however, say (thus). In 'This is that Devadatta', 'That thou art', etc., though for words denotative of the qualified the purport is a part (only of the denotation), there is no secondary implication; for, when there is unintelligibility of the relation of non-difference between the qualified, which are cognised through the express capacity (s'akti), there is no contradiction in the cognition of relation between the substrates which (too) are cognised only through the

विरोधात् । यथा 'घटोऽनित्यः' इत्यत्र घटपदवाच्यैकदेशघटत्वस्य अयोग्यत्वेऽपि, योग्यघटव्यक्त्या सह अनित्यत्वान्वयः । यत्र पदार्थैकदेशस्य विशेषणतया उपस्थितिः तत्रैव स्वातन्त्र्येण उपस्थितये लक्षणाभ्युपगमः । यथा 'नित्यो घटः' इत्यत्र घटपदात् घटत्वस्य शक्त्या स्वातन्त्र्येण अनुपस्थित्या तादृशोपस्थित्यर्थं घटपदस्य घटत्वे लक्षणा । एवमेव 'तत्वमसि' इत्यादिवाक्येऽपि न लक्षणा; शक्त्या स्वातन्त्र्येण उपस्थितयोः तत्त्वम्पदार्थयोरभेदान्वये बाधकाभावात्; अन्यथा 'गेहे घटः,' 'घटे रूपम्,'

express capacity. For example, in 'The pot is non-eternal', though for potness, which is part of the express sense of the word 'pot', there is non-competence (for relation with non-eternality), there is syntactical relation of non-eternality with what is competent, *i.e.*, the pot-particular. Where (however) for part of the word-sense there is cognition as a qualification (not as the substrate), there alone is the admission of secondary implication for the sake of the cognition (of that) as independent (and expectant of a relation). For example, in 'Pot is eternal', since potness is cognised from the word 'pot' through express capacity (only as related to the particular, and) not as independent (expectant of a relation), for the sake of such cognition there is secondary implication, in respect of potness, for the word 'pot'. In this same way, even in a statement like 'That thou art' there is no secondary implication; for, there is no sublation in respect of a relation of non-difference between the denotations of the words 'that' and 'thou' independently cognised

'घटमानय,' इत्यादौ घटत्वगेहत्वादेरभिमतान्वयबोधायोग्यतया तत्रापि घटादिपदानां विशेष्यमात्रपरत्वं लक्षणयैव स्यात् ।

२८. तस्मात् "तत्वमसि" इति वाक्ये आचार्याणां लक्षणोक्तिरभ्युपगमवादेन बोध्या ।

२९. जहदजहल्लक्षणोदाहरणं तु 'काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्' इत्यादिकमेव; तत्र शक्यकाकपरित्यागेन अशक्यदध्युपघातकत्वपुरस्कारेण काकेऽकाकेऽपि काकशब्दस्य प्रवृत्तेः ।

through express capacity; otherwise, in 'Pot is in the house', 'Colour is in the pot', 'Bring the pot', etc., since in the case of the nature-of-pot, the nature-of-house, etc., there is no possibility for the cognition of the relation intended, there too the fact of the purport of words like 'pot' being the substrate alone would be due only to secondary implication; (and that is unacceptable).[40]

28. Therefore, the Ācārya's (S'aṅkara's) statement of secondary implication in respect of the text "That thou art" should be understood to be an argument by way of concession (of a position not finally acceptable to oneself).

29. The (proper) example of exclusive-non-exclusive implication, however, is 'Let the curds be protected from the crows' and so on; for, here, by abandoning the crow which is the express sense and by accepting what is not expressed, *viz.*, having an adverse interest in the curds, the word 'crow' applies both to the crow and what is not a crow.

३०. लक्षणाबीजन्तु तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिरेव, न तु अन्वयानुपपत्तिः ; 'काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्' इत्यत्रान्वयानुपपत्त्यभावात्, 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इत्यादौ तात्पर्यानुपपत्तेरपि सम्भवात् ।

३१. लक्षणा च न पदमात्रवृत्तिः, किन्तु वाक्यवृत्तिरपि ; यथा 'गम्भीरायां नद्यां घोषः' इत्यत्र 'गम्भीरायाम्' 'नद्याम्' इति पदद्वय-समुदायस्य तीरे लक्षणा ।

३२. ननु वाक्यस्याशक्ततया कथं शक्यसम्बन्धरूपा लक्षणा ?

३३. उच्यते—शक्त्या यत् पदसम्बन्धेन ज्ञाप्यते तत्सम्बन्धो

30. The cause of secondary implication is only non-intelligibility of purport, but not non-intelligibility of syntactical relation; for, in 'Let the curds be protected from the crows' there is no non-intelligibility of syntactical relation, while in 'The hamlet on the Gaṅgā' etc., non-intelligibility of purport too does exist.

31. And secondary implication exists not merely in words but also in sentences; *e.g.*, in 'The hamlet on the deep river' there is secondary implication in respect of the bank for the combination of the two words 'deep' and 'river'.

32. Now, since there is no express capacity (s'akti) in the case of the sentence, how can there be (for it) secondary implication consisting in relation to the expressed?

33. It is said in reply: what is made known by the relation of express capacity of the word, (whether directly or indirectly), the relation to this is secondary

लक्षणा; शक्तिज्ञाप्यश्च यथा पदार्थः तथा वाक्यार्थोपि; इति न काचिद् अनुपपत्तिः ।

३४. एवमर्थवादवाक्यानां प्रशंसारूपाणां प्राशस्त्ये लक्षणा । "सोऽरोदीत्" इत्यादिनिन्दार्थवाक्यानां निन्दितत्वे लक्षणा । अर्थवादगतपदानां प्राशस्त्ये लक्षणाभ्युपगमे एकेन पदेन लक्षणया तदुपस्थितिसम्भवे पदान्तरवैयर्थ्यं स्यात् ।

३५. एवञ्च विध्यपेक्षितप्राशस्त्यरूपपदार्थप्रत्यायकतया अर्थवादपदसमुदायस्य पदस्थानीयतया विधिपदेनैकवाक्यत्वं भवति; इति अर्थवादवाक्यानां पदैकवाक्यता ।

implication; and what is made known by express capacity, just as it is a word-sense, may also be a sentence-sense (indirectly, through the cognition of word-sense);[41] hence there is no unintelligibility whatsoever.

34. Thus, for arthavāda sentences which are eulogistic there is secondary implication in respect of eulogy. For condemnatory sentences like 'He howled' (*TS*, I, v, 1) there is secondary implication in respect of condemnation.[42] If, for the words present in the arthavāda secondary implication in respect of eulogy be admitted, then the cognition thereof being possible by secondary implication through that one word, there would be futility of the other words.

35. And thus, since for the aggregate of words in the arthavāda there is the position of a (single) word, as making known the word-sense of eulogy, needed by the injunction, there is syntactical unity (in that way) with the injunctive statement; hence, for the arthavāda sentences there is syntactical unity as of a word.[43]

३६. क्व तर्हि वाक्यैकवाक्यता? यत्र प्रत्येकं भिन्नभिन्नसंसर्गप्रतिपादकयोः वाक्ययोः आकाङ्क्षावशेन महावाक्यार्थबोधकत्वम्, तत्र वाक्यैकवाक्यता। यथा "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यादिवाक्यानां "समिधो यजति" इत्यादिवाक्यानाञ्च परस्परापेक्षिताङ्गाङ्गिभावबोधकतया एकवाक्यता। तदुक्तं भट्टपादैः—

"स्वार्थबोधे समाप्तानामङ्गाङ्गित्वाद्यपेक्षया।
वाक्यानामेकवाक्यत्वं पुनः संहत्य जायते॥" इति।

एवं द्विविधोऽपि पदार्थो निरूपितः।

36. 'Where, then, is there syntactical unity as of a sentence?' Where, in the case of two sentences, each declaring separately a different relation (of word-senses), there is, because of expectancy, the making known of the sense of a major (complex) sentence, the syntactical unity is as of a sentence. For example, between texts like "He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the dars'a-pūrṇamāsa" and texts like "He offers the samit sacrifice" there is syntactical unity, as making known the reciprocally needed relation of principal and subsidiary. This has been said by the Bhaṭṭapāda: "For sentences, which have terminated in the cognition of their own sense, there arises again in combination a syntactical unity, because of the need of (establishing among those senses a relation of) principal, subsidiary, etc." Thus have been explained both kinds of word-sense.

३७. तदुपस्थितिश्च आसत्तिः। सा च शाब्दबोधे हेतुः, तथैवान्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात्। एवं महावाक्यार्थबोधे अवान्तरवाक्यर्थबोधो हेतुः, तथैवान्वयाद्यवधारणात्।

३८. क्रमप्राप्तं तात्पर्यं निरूप्यते। तत्र तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं न तात्पर्यम्, अर्थज्ञानशून्येन पुरुषेणोच्चरितात् वेदात् अर्थाभानप्रसङ्गात्। 'अयमध्यापकोऽव्युत्पन्नः' इति विशेषदर्शनेन तात्पर्यभ्रमस्याप्यभावात्। न चैश्वरतात्पर्यज्ञानात् तत्र शाब्दबोध इति वाच्यम्; ईश्वरानङ्गीकर्तुरपि तद्वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्।

37. And the cognition (through recall) of that (word-sense) (without interval) is āsatti.[44] And this is a cause in respect of verbal knowledge (of sentence-sense), since co-presence and co-absence are seen in this very way (as indicating causality). Similarly, in the cognition of the sense of a major text the cognition of the sense of a minor (subordinate) text is a cause, since in this very way is there ascertained co-presence etc. (of the cognitions of the sense of minor texts and the sense of major texts).[45]

38. Purport, which comes next in sequence, is explained. Here, purport does not consist in being uttered with the desire of that cognition, because of the contingence of the non-manifestation of the sense from the Veda uttered by a person devoid of knowledge of the sense. There is not even a delusive cognition of purport, since there is (in us) the particular (conflicting) cognition 'This teacher has no knowledge of the sense'. Nor may it be said that, because of Īs′vara's

३९. उच्यते । तत्प्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं तात्पर्यम् । 'गेहे घटः' इति वाक्यं गेहेघटसंसर्गप्रतीतिजननयोग्यं न तु पटसंसर्गप्रतीतिजननयोग्यम्; इति तद्वाक्यं घटसंसर्गपरम्, न तु पटसंसर्गपरमिति व्यपदिश्यते ।

४०. ननु 'सैन्धवमानय' इत्यादिवाक्यं यदा लवणानयनप्रतीतीच्छया प्रयुक्तम्, तदापि अश्वसंसर्गप्रतीतिजनने स्वरूपयोग्यतासत्त्वात्, लवणपरत्वदशायामप्यश्वादिसंसर्गज्ञानापत्तिः ।

४१. इति चेत्, न; तदितरप्रतीतीच्छयानुच्चरितत्वस्यापि तात्पर्यं प्रति विशेषणत्वात् । तथा च यत् वाक्यं यत्प्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वे

cognition of purport, there is verbal cognition in that case; for there is seen the cognition of the sense of that text even for him who does not recognise Īs'vara.

39. It is said (as the final view). Purport consists in the competency to generate that cognition. The sentence 'Pot in the house' is competent to generate the cognition of relation to pot in the house, but not competent to generate the cognition of relation to cloth; hence that sentence is said to have relation to pot for purport, but not to have relation to cloth for purport.

40. 'Now, when a statement like "Bring saindhava" is used with the desire for the cognition of bringing salt, there is, because of the existence of natural competency to produce the cognition of relation to a horse, the contingence of cognition of relation to horse etc., even at the time when the purport is salt'.

41. If this be said, no; for non-utterance with the desire for a cognition of what is other than that,

सति यदन्यप्रतीतीच्छयानुच्चरितं तद्वाक्यं तत्संसर्गपरमित्युच्यते । शुकादिवाक्येऽव्युत्पन्नोच्चारितवेदवाक्यादौ च तत्प्रतीतीच्छाया एवाभावेन तदन्यप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वाभावेन लक्षणसत्त्वात् नाव्याप्तिः । नचोभयप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितेऽव्याप्तिः ; तदन्यमात्रप्रतीतीच्छयानुच्चरितत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ।

४२. उक्तप्रतीतिमात्रजननयोग्यतायाश्चावच्छेदिका शक्तिः ; अस्माकं तु मते सर्वत्र कारणतायाः शक्तेरेवावच्छेदकत्वात् ; इति न कोऽपि दोषः ।

this too is a qualification in respect of purport. And thus, when a sentence, while being competent to generate a particular cognition, is not uttered with the desire for another cognition, that sentence is said to have that (former) relation for purport. In the statements uttered by parrots etc., and in the Vedic texts etc., uttered by the unlearned, the very desire for that cognition being non-existent, utterance with a desire for a different cognition (is also) non-existent; the definition (of purport) being (thus) present, there is no non-pervasion. Nor is there non-pervasion in respect of what is uttered with the desire for the cognition of both; for what is intended to be declared is non-utterance with the desire for the cognition of only what is other than that (not of both).

42. And the *definiens* of the competency to generate the said cognition alone is potency (s'akti); for in our system the *definiens* of causality in every case is only potency (s'akti);[46] thus there is no defect whatever.

४३. एवं तात्पर्यस्य तत्प्रतीतिजनकत्वरूपस्य शाब्दज्ञानजनकत्वे सिद्धे, चतुर्थवर्णके तात्पर्यस्य शब्दज्ञानहेतुत्वनिराकरणवाक्यं तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वरूपतात्पर्यनिराकरणपरम्; अन्यथा तात्पर्यनिश्चयफलकवेदान्तविचारवैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्।

४४. केचित्तु—शाब्दज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन न तात्पर्यज्ञानं हेतुरित्येवं परं चतुर्थवर्णकवाक्यम्; तात्पर्यसंशयविपर्ययोत्तरशाब्दज्ञानविशेषे च तात्पर्यज्ञानं हेतुरेव; 'इदं वाक्यं एतत्परम्, उत अन्यपरम्' इति संशये तद्विपर्यये च तदुत्तरवाक्यार्थनिश्चयस्य तात्पर्यनिश्चयं विनानुपपत्तेः—इत्याहुः।

43. It being thus established of purport, consisting in being the generator of the cognition of that, that it is the generator of verbal cognition, the statement about purport, in the fourth varṇaka (of the *Vivaraṇa*, pp. 181, 182), refuting its causality of verbal cognition, is directed to the refutation of such (sense of) purport as consists in *being uttered with the desire* for the cognition of that; otherwise there is the contingence of futility for the Vedānta inquiry, which has ascertainment of purport for its fruit.

44. Some however, say thus: the statement in the fourth varṇaka has this for purport, *viz.*, that cognition of purport is not the cause of verbal cognition, as defined by the nature of verbal cognition *as such*; in respect of the particular cases of verbal cognition subsequent to doubt or error about purport, cognition of purport is certainly the cause; for where there is doubt as to purport in the form 'Does this sentence have this purport or another purport?' and where there

४५. तच्च तात्पर्यं वेदे मीमांसापरिशोधितन्यायादेवावधार्यते। लोके तु प्रकरणादिना। तत्र लौकिकवाक्यानां मानान्तरावगतार्थतया अनुवादकत्वम्; वेदे तु वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वतया नानुवादकत्वम्।

४६. तत्र लोके वेदे च कार्यपराणामिव सिद्धार्थानामप्यपूर्वतया प्राणाण्यम्; 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' 'कन्या ते गर्भिणी' इत्यादिषु सिद्धार्थेष्वपि पदानां सामर्थ्यावधारणात्। अत एव वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यम्। यथाचैतत् तथा विषयपरिच्छेदे वक्ष्यते।

is error (as to that purport), the subsequent ascertainment of the sentence-sense is unintelligible in the absence of the ascertainment of the purport.

45. And this purport is determined in the Veda only on the basis of principles clearly laid down by the Mīmāṃsā.[47] In ordinary experience, however, it is (determined) by the context (prakaraṇa) etc. Of these (two), in the case of statements in worldly experience, because of their sense being known by other evidence, there is repetitive character; in the Veda, however, the sentence-sense being novel, there is no repetitive character.

46. Here, both in ordinary experience and in the Veda, there is authoritativeness because of novelty, even for those whose sense is what is existent, just as for those whose purport is what is to be accomplished; for in 'A son is born to you', 'Your maiden girl is pregnant', etc., capacity is ascertained for words even in respect of a sense that is existent.[48] For the same reason there is authoritativeness for Vedānta texts in respect of Brahman. How this is so, will be stated in the chapter on the objects (of knowledge).

४७. तत्र वेदान्तानां नित्यसर्वज्ञपरमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति नैयायिकाः ।

४८. वेदानां नित्यत्वेन निरस्तसमस्तपुंदूषणतया प्रामाण्यमिति मीमांसकाः ।

४९. अस्माकं तु मते वेदो न नित्यः, उत्पत्तिमत्वात् । उत्पत्तिमत्वञ्च "अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतत् यत् ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः सामवेदोऽथर्ववेदः" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

५०. नापि वेदानां त्रिक्षणावस्थायित्वम्, 'य एव वेदो देवदत्तेनाधीतः, स एव मयापि' इत्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधात् । अत एव गकारादिवर्णानामपि न क्षणिकत्वम्, 'सोऽयं गकारः' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा-

47. Here the Naiyāyikas say that the authority of the Vedāntas is because of production by the eternal omniscient Parames'vara.

48. The Mīmāṃsakas say that the authoritativeness is because of the Vedas being eternal and thus free from all personal defects whatsoever.

49. In our system, however, the Veda is not eternal, since it has an origin.[49] And originatedness results from such s'ruti as 'Of this Great Being the breath is what is the Ṛg Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda, the Atharva Veda' (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 10).

50. Nor is there the persistence of the Vedas for three instants (alone), because of conflict with such recognition as 'The same Veda that was studied by Devadatta is (studied) by me too'. For the same reason there is not momentariness even for letters like '*ga*', because of conflict with recognition 'this is that *ga*'.

विरोधात् । तथा च वर्णपदवाक्यसमुदायस्य वेदस्य वियदादिवत् सृष्टिकालिकोत्पत्तिकत्वं प्रलयकालिकध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वञ्च ; न तु मध्ये वर्णानामुत्पत्तिविनाशौ, अनन्तगकारकल्पनायां गौरवात् ।

५१. अनुच्चारणदशायां वर्णानामनभिव्यक्तिः तदुच्चारणरूपव्यञ्जकाभावात् न विरुद्ध्यते, अन्धकारस्थघटानुपलम्भवत् ।

५२. 'उत्पन्नो गकारः' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं तु 'सोऽयं गकारः' इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधादप्रमाणम् ; वर्णाभिव्यञ्जिकध्वनिगतोत्पत्तिनिरूपितपरम्परासम्बन्धविषयत्वेन प्रमाणं वा । तस्मात् न वेदानां क्षणिकत्वम् ।

And thus, for the Veda which is an aggregate of letters, words and sentences, there is, as for ether etc., createdness at the time of creation, and counter-correlateness in respect of destruction at the time of destruction; but there are not origination and destruction for letters, in the middle, because of prolixity in assuming an infinite number of '*ga-s*.'

51. The non-manifestation of letters at the time of non-utterance, because there is not (then) the manifestor consisting in their utterance, is not contradicted, like the non-cognition of a pot present in darkness.

52. As for the perception 'The *ga* is originated' it is not valid, because of conflict with such recognition as 'This is that *ga*'; or it is valid as having for content an indirect relation,[50] established by the origination present in the audible sound (dhvani) manifesting the letter. Therefore, there is not momentariness for the Vedas.

५३. ननु क्षणिकत्वाभावेऽपि वियदादिप्रपञ्चवत् उत्पत्तिमत्त्वेन परमेश्वरकर्तृकतया पौरुषेयत्वसिद्धावपौरुषेयत्वं वेदानामिपि तवापि सिद्धान्तो भज्येत ।

५४. इति चेत्, न । न हि तावत् पुरुषेण उच्चार्यमाणत्वं पौरुषेयत्वम्; गुरुमतेऽपि अध्यापकपरम्परया पौरुषेयत्वापत्तेः । नापि पुरुषाधीनोत्पत्तिकत्वम्; नैयायिकाभिमतपौरुषेयत्वानुमाने अस्मदादिना सिद्धसाधनत्वापत्तेः । किन्तु सजातीयोच्चारणानपेक्षोच्चारणविषयत्वं पौरुषेयत्वम् ।

५५. तथा च सर्गाद्यकाले परमेश्वरः पूर्वसर्गसिद्धवेदानुपूर्वीसमा-

53. 'Now, though there is no momentariness, yet because of originatedness, as of the world of ether etc., they have Parames'vara as the creator; personal origin being thus established, what is the final position according to you too, that for the Vedas there is impersonal origin, would fail.'

54. If this be said, no. For, having a personal origin does not consist (merely) in being uttered by a person; because even in the system of the Guru [51] there is the contingence of personal origin through the succession of teachers. Nor does it consist in having an origin dependent on a person; for, in the inference of personal origin affected by the Naiyāyikas there is contingence of establishing the established,[52] with regard to those like ourselves. Rather does personal origin consist in being the content of utterance not dependent on other utterance of the same kind.

55. And thus in the initial period of creation Parames'vara created the Veda with the same sequence

नानुपूर्वीकं वेदं विरचितवान्, न तु तद्विजातीयं वेदम्; इति न सजातीयोच्चारणानपेक्षोच्चारणविषयत्वं पौरुषेयत्वम्। भारतादीनान्तु सजातीयोच्चारणमनपेक्ष्यैवोच्चारणमिति तेषां पौरुषेयत्वम्। एवं पौरुषेयापौरुषेयभेदेन आगमो द्विविधो निरूपितः।

इति आगमपरिच्छेदः ॥

as the sequence of the Veda existent in earlier creation, but not a Veda of a kind different from that; hence there is not that personal origin which consists in being the content of utterance not dependent on other utterance of the same kind. In the case of the *Bhārata* etc., however, since there is utterance only as not dependent on other utterances of the same kind, there is personal origin for them. Thus verbal testimony, which is twofold as divided into that of personal origin and that of impersonal origin, has been explained.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON VERBAL TESTIMONY

पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः

अर्थापत्तिः

१. इदानीमर्थापत्तिर्निरूप्यते । तत्र उपपाद्यज्ञानेन उपपादक कल्पनमर्थापत्तिः ।

२. तत्र उपपाद्यज्ञानं करणम्; उपपादकज्ञानं फलम्। येन विना यत् अनुपपन्नं तत् तत्र उपपाद्यम्; यस्य अभावे यस्य अनुपपत्तिः तत्तत्र उपपादकम्; यथा रात्रिभोजनेन विना दिवा अभुञ्जानस्य पीनत्वमनुपपन्न-

CHAPTER V

ARTHĀPATTI (POSTULATION)

1. Now, arthāpatti (postulation) is explained. Arthāpatti consists in the postulation, by a cognition which has to be made intelligible, of what will make (that) intelligible.

2. Of these, the cognition of what is to be made intelligible is the distinctive cause; the cognition of what makes intelligible is the fruit. That which is unintelligible in the absence of something, that is what is to be made intelligible; that, in whose absence,

मिति तादृशपीनत्वमुपपाद्यम्; यथा वा रात्रिभोजनस्य अभावे तादृशपीनत्वस्यानुपपत्तिरिति रात्रिभोजनमुपपादकम् ।

३. रात्रिभोजनकल्पनारूपायां प्रमितौ 'अर्थस्यापत्तिः कल्पना' इति षष्ठीसमासेन अर्थापत्तिशब्दो वर्तते; कल्पनाकरणपीनत्वादिज्ञाने 'अर्थस्यापत्तिः, कल्पना, यस्मात्' इति बहुव्रीहिसमासेन वर्तते; इति फलकरणयोः उभयोः तत्पदप्रयोगः ।

४. सा च अर्थापत्तिः द्विविधा, दृष्टार्थापत्तिः श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्चेति ।

something (else) is unintelligible, that is what makes intelligible; *e.g.*, since in the absence of eating at night, the fatness of one who does not eat by day is unintelligible, that kind of fatness is what is to be made intelligible; or else, since in the absence of eating by night there is unintelligibility of that kind of fatness, eating by night is what makes intelligible.

3. To that valid cognition which consists in the postulation of eating by night, the word 'arthāpatti' applies as possessive compound in the form 'āpatti, *i.e.*, postulation, of something (artha);' to the cognition of fatness etc., the distinctive cause of postulation, it applies, however, as a bahuvrīhi compound in the form 'that because of which there is āpatti, *i.e.*, postulation, of something (artha);' thus there is the application of that word both to the fruit and to the distinctive cause.

4. And this arthāpatti is of two kinds: postulation from the perceived and postulation from the verbally cognised.

५. तत्र दृष्टार्थापत्तिः यथा—'इदं रजतम्' इति पुरोवर्तिनि प्रतिपन्नस्य रजतस्य 'नेदं रजतम्' इति तत्रैव निषिध्यमानत्वं सत्यत्वेऽनुपपन्नमिति रजतस्य सद्भिन्नत्वं सत्यत्वात्यन्ताभाववत्त्वं मिथ्यात्वं कल्पयति।

६. श्रुतार्थापत्तिः यथा—श्रूयमाणवाक्यस्य स्वार्थानुपपत्तिमुखेन अर्थान्तरकल्पनम्; यथा "तरति शोकमात्मवित्" इत्यत्र श्रुतस्य शोकशब्दवाच्यबन्धजातस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वस्यानुपपत्त्या बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वं कल्प्यत इति; यथा वा 'शतवर्षजीवी देवदत्तो गृहे न' इति वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं जीविनो गृहासत्त्वं बहिःसत्त्वं कल्पयतीति।

5. Of these, postulation from the perceived is as follows: since, in the case of the silver cognised in the form 'This is silver' in respect of what is present before one, negation in respect of the same (locus) in the form 'this is not silver' would be unintelligible if (the silver be) real, (that negation) postulates of the silver illusoriness consisting in being other than real or having the absolute non-existence of reality.

6. Postulation from the verbally cognised is as follows: in the case of a sentence that is heard, because of the unintelligibility of its own sense, there is the postulation of another sense; *e.g.*, in 'He who knows the self crosses sorrow', (*Chānd.*, VII, i, 3) since in the case of what is heard, *viz.*, the host of bonds denoted by the word 'sorrow', removability by knowledge is unintelligible, the illusoriness of bondage is postulated; or else, immediately on hearing the sentence 'Devadatta who will live to be a hundred is not at home', the non-existence at home of a living person postulates his existence outside.

७. श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्च द्विविधा, अभिधानानुपपत्तिः अभिहितानुपपत्तिश्च ।

८. तत्र यत्र वाक्यैकदेशश्रवणेऽन्वयाभिधानानुपपत्त्या अन्वयाभिधानोपयोगिपदान्तरं कल्प्यते, तत्र अभिधानानुपपत्तिः, यथा 'द्वारम्' इत्यत्र 'पिधेहि' इत्यध्याहारः; यथा वा 'विश्वजिता यजेत' इत्यत्र स्वर्गकामपदाध्याहारः ।

९. ननु 'द्वारम्' इत्यादौ अन्वयाभिधानात् पूर्वमिदमन्वयाभिधानं पिधानोपस्थापकपदं विना अनुपपन्नमिति कथं ज्ञानम्?

7. And the postulation from the verbally cognised is of two kinds: the non-intelligibility of the expression and the non-intelligibility of the expressed.

8. Of these, when, on hearing a part of a sentence, because of the unintelligibility of expressing syntactical relation, there is postulated another word serviceable in expressing syntactical relation, in that case there is non-intelligibility of the expression, *e.g.*, in (the expression) 'door' there is the importation 'close'; or else, in 'He is to sacrifice with the Vis'vajit' there is the importation of the word 'He who desires heaven'[53]

9. 'Now, in (saying) "door" etc., prior to the statement of a syntactical relation, how is there the cognition that this expression of a syntactical relation is unintelligible, in the absence of a word making known the act of closing?'

१०. इति चेत्, न; अभिधानपदेन करणव्युत्पत्त्या तात्पर्यस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। तथा च द्वारकर्मकपिधानक्रियासंसर्गपरत्वं पिधानोपस्थापकपदं विनानुपपन्नमिति ज्ञानं तत्रापि सम्भाव्यते।

११. अभिहितानुपपत्तिस्तु यत्र वाक्यावगतोऽर्थोऽनुपपन्नत्वेन ज्ञातः सन् अर्थान्तरं कल्पयति, तत्र द्रष्टव्या; यथा 'स्वर्गकामो ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेत' इत्यत्र स्वर्गसाधनत्वस्य क्षणिकज्योतिष्टोमयागगततयावगतस्यानुपपत्त्या मध्यवर्त्यपूर्वं कल्प्यते।

१२. न चेयमर्थापत्तिरनुमानेऽन्तर्भवितुमर्हति; अन्वयव्याप्त्यज्ञानेनान्वयिनि अनन्तर्भावात्; व्यतिरेकिणश्चानुमानत्वं प्रागेव निरस्तम्;

10. If this be asked, no; for what is intended by the word 'expression (abhidhāna)' is (not statement, but) purport, on an instrumental derivation (abhidīyate anena, expressed by this). And thus there too the cognition is possible that having for purport relation to an act of closing, whose object is the door, is unintelligible in the absence of a word making known the act of closing.

11. As for the non-intelligibility of the expressed, that is to be understood where a sense cognised from a sentence, being known to be unintelligible, postulates another sense; *e.g.*, in 'He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with the Jyotiṣṭoma', since instrumentality to heaven, which is cognised as present in the momentary Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, is un-intelligible, there is postulated an apūrva as intermediary.

12. And this arthāpatti should not be included under inference (anumāna); for, there being no cognition

अत एव अर्थापत्तिस्थले 'अनुमिनोमि' इति नानुव्यवसायः, किन्तु 'अनेन इदं कल्पयामि' इति ।

१३. ननु अर्थापत्तिस्थले 'इदमनेन विनानुपपन्नम्' इति ज्ञानं करणमित्युक्तम्; तत्र किमिदं तेन विनानुपपन्नत्वम्?

१४. तदभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वमिति ब्रूमः ।

१५. एवमर्थापत्तेर्मानान्तरत्वसिद्धौ व्यतिरेके नानुमानान्तरम्; 'पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते' इत्यादौ गन्धवत्त्वमितरभेदं विनानुपपन्न-

of the pervasion of co-presence, there is no inclusion in the anvayi form; and of the vyatireki form inferential character has already been refuted; hence it is that in a case of arthāpatti, the reflective cognition is not of the form 'I infer' but of the form 'because of that I postulate this'.

13. 'Now, in a case of arthāpatti, it was said, the distinctive cause is the cognition "This is unintelligible in the absence of that"; here, what is this unintelligibility in the absence of that?'

14. We say, it consists in being the counter-correlate of a non-existence which is the pervader of the non-existence of that (which is postulated).

15. It being thus established of arthāpatti that it is a distinct pramāṇa, the vyatireki is not another form of inference; for, in 'Earth is different from others' etc.,[54] (inferences offered as vyatireki in type), the distinctive cause is such cognition as that possession

मित्यादिज्ञानस्य करणत्वात् । अत एवानुव्यवसायः 'पृथिव्यामितरभेदं कल्पयामि' इति ।

इति अर्थापत्तिपरिच्छेदः ॥

of odour is unintelligible in the absence of difference from the others (elements). For the same reason there is the reflective cognition 'In the earth I postulate difference from the others.'[55]

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON ARTHĀPATTI

षष्ठः परिच्छेदः

अनुपलब्धिः

१. इदानीम् षष्ठं प्रमाणं निरूप्यते । ज्ञानकरणाजन्याभावानुभवासाधारणकारणमनुपलब्धिरूपं प्रमाणम् ।

२. अनुमानादिजन्यातीन्द्रियाभावानुभवहेतावनुमानादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायाजन्यान्तेति पदम् । अदृष्टादौ साधारणकारणेऽतिव्याप्ति-

CHAPTER VI

ANUPALABDHI

1. Now, the sixth pramāṇa, (non-cognition, anupalabdhi) is explained. The pramāṇa, which consists in non-cognition, is the distinctive cause of that experience of non-existence which is not generated by an instrument (karaṇa) of cognition.

2. The words, 'which is not generated' etc., are for the purpose of excluding overpervasion in respect of that inference etc., the cause of an experience generated by inference etc., in respect of supersensuous non-existence[56]. The word 'distinctive' is for the purpose of

वारणाय असाधारणेति पदम् । अभावस्मृत्यसाधारणहेतुसंस्कारेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय अनुभवेति विशेषणम् ।

३. न चाभावानुमितिस्थलेऽपि अनुपलब्ध्यैवाभावो गृह्यतां विशेषाभावादिति वाच्म्; धर्माद्यनुपलब्धिसत्त्वेऽपि तदभावानिश्चयेन, योग्यानुपलब्धेरेवाभावग्राहकत्वात् ।

४. ननु केयं योग्यानुपलब्धिः? किं योग्यस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽनुपलब्धिः? उत योग्येऽधिकरणे प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धिः? नाद्यः, स्तम्भे पिशाचादिभेदस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तेः । नान्त्यः, आत्मनि धर्माद्यभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तेः ।

excluding overpervasion in respect of common causes like adṛṣṭa (unseen potency) etc.[57] The qualification 'experience' is for the sake of avoiding overpervasion in respect of residual impression, which is the distinctive cause of the recollection of non-existence.

3. Nor may it be said that, even where non-existence is inferred, that non-existence may be apprehended by non-cognition alone, since there is no difference (in respect of being non-cognition); for, in as much as, though there is non-cognition of dharma (merit) etc., their non-existence is not ascertained, that which apprehends non-existence is only competent non-cognition.

4. 'Now what is this competent non-cognition? Is it non-cognition of the competent counter-correlate? Or is it non-cognition of the counter-correlate in the competent substrate? Not the first, because of the contingence of the non-perceptibility in the post even of the difference from demon etc., (the demon being non-competent in respect of perception). Not the latter, because of the contingence of perceptibility for the non-existence of dharma (merit) etc., in the self.'

५. इति चेत्, न; 'योग्या चासौ अनुपलब्धिश्च' इति कर्मधारयाश्रयणात्।

६. अनुपलब्धेः योग्यता च तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वप्रसञ्जितप्रतियोगिकत्वम्।

७. यस्याभावो गृह्यते तस्य यः प्रतियोगी तस्य सत्त्वेन अधिकरणे तर्कितेन प्रसञ्जितमापादनयोग्यं प्रतियोग्युपलब्धिस्वरूपं यस्य अनुपलम्भस्य, तत्त्वं तदनुपलब्धियोग्यत्वम्—इत्यर्थः।

८. तथा हि—स्फीतालोकवति भूतले यदि घटः स्यात्, तदा घटोपलम्भः स्यादिति आपादनसम्भवात् तादृशभूतले घटाभावोऽनुपलब्धि-

5. If this be said, no; for what is used is the karmadhāraya (compound), in the form 'this is competent and this is non-cognition.'

6. And the competency of the non-cognition consists in the possession of a counter-correlate (cognition) contingent on the existence of the posited counter-correlate (content).

7. This is the meaning: the competency of non-cognition consists in the possession by that non-cognition of this (form), *viz.*, when some non-existence is apprehended, if a *reductio ad absurdum* be set up by positing the existence of its counter-correlate in that locus, the cognition of that (counter-correlate) should be contingent thereon, be capable of being deduced therefrom (by the reduction).

8. It is thus: if on the brightly lit ground there were a pot, then there should be the cognition of pot; this deduction being possible, the non-existence of pot

गम्यः । अन्धकारे तु तादृशापादनाभावात् नानुपलब्धिगम्यता । अत एव स्तम्भे तादात्म्येन पिशाचसत्त्वे स्तम्भवत् प्रत्यक्षतापत्त्या तदभावोऽनुपलब्धिगम्यः । आत्मनि धर्माधर्मादिसत्त्वेऽपि तस्यातीन्द्रियतया निरुक्तोपलम्भापादनासम्भवात्, न धर्माद्यभावस्यानुपलब्धिगम्यत्वम् ।

९. ननु उक्तरीत्या अधिकरणेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्थले अभावस्य अनुपलब्धिगम्यत्वं त्वदनुमतम्; तत्र क्लृप्तेन्द्रियमेव अभावाकारवृत्तावपि करणम्, इन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् ।

on that kind of ground is apprehendable through non-cognition. That kind of deduction, however, being impossible in darkness, there is no possibility of apprehension by non-cognition. For the same reason, since, if a demon exist in a relation of identity with a post, there is the contingence of the perceptibility of that, as of the post, its non-existence is apprehendable by non-cognition. Though merit and demerit exist in the self, yet since they are supersensuous, it is not possible to make the aforesaid deduction; hence it is not possible to apprehend non-existence of dharma (merit) etc., by non-cognition.

9. 'Now, in the said manner, it is admitted by you that, where there is contact between the substrate and the sense-organ, non-existence is apprehendable by non-cognition; hence the sense-organ itself which is settled (to be a pramāṇa) is the distinctive cause (karaṇa) even in respect of the psychosis with the form of non-existence, since this is in conformity with the co-presence and co-absence of the sense-organ.'

१०. इति चेत्, न; तत्प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धेरप्यभावग्रहहेतुत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वेन करणत्वमात्रस्य कल्पनात्। इन्द्रियस्य चाभावेन सह सन्निकर्षाभावेन अभावग्रहाहेतुत्वात्। इन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकयोरधिकरणज्ञानाद्युपक्षीणत्वेनान्यथासिद्धेः।

११. ननु 'भूतले घटो न' इत्याद्यभावानुभवस्थले भूतलांशे प्रत्यक्षत्वमुभयसिद्धमिति तत्र वृत्तिनिर्गमनस्यावश्यकत्वेन भूतलावच्छिन्नचैतन्यवत् तन्निष्ठघटाभावावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्यापि प्रमात्रभिन्नतया, घटाभावस्य प्रत्यक्षतैव सिद्धान्तेऽपि।

10. If this be said, no; for, even the non-cognition of its counter-correlate being settled to be a cause in the apprehension of non-existence, what is assumed is only its being the *distinctive* cause. Further, there being no contact for the sense-organ with non-existence, that is not the cause for the apprehension of non-existence. The co-presence and the co-absence of the sense-organ are otherwise explained, (their function) being exhausted with the cognition of the substrate etc.

11. 'Now, where there is such experience as "there is no pot on the ground", in respect of the ground-aspect, perceptual character is established for both of us; the outgoing of a psychosis being necessary in that case, like consciousness defined by the ground, even consciousness defined by the non-existence of pot there is non-different from the cogniser; hence even in (your) final position there is certainly perceptibility for the non-existence of pot.'

१२. इति चेत्, सत्यम्; अभावप्रतीतेः प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि तत्करणस्यानुपलब्धेर्मानान्तरत्वात्। न हि फलीभूतज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे तत्करणस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणतानियतत्वमस्ति; 'दशमस्त्वमसि' इत्यादिवाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि तत्करणस्य वाक्यस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणभिन्नप्रमाणत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

१३. ननु फलवैजात्यं विना कथं प्रमाणभेदः?

१४. इति चेत्, न; वृत्तिवैजात्यमात्रेण प्रमाणवैजात्योपपत्तेः। तथा च घटाभावाकारवृत्तिर्नेन्द्रियजन्या, इन्द्रियस्य विषयेणासन्निकर्षात्; किन्तु घटानुपलब्धिरूपमानान्तरजन्या; इति भवत्यनुपलब्धेर्मानान्तरत्वम्।

12. If this be said, true; (but) though the cognition of non-existence has the character of perception, its instrument, non-cognition, is a distinct pramāṇa. There is indeed, no rule that when the resultant cognition is perceptual, its distinctive cause is the pramāṇa of perception; for though the cognition generated by a statement like 'Thou art the tenth' is perceptual, the sentence which is its distinctive cause is admitted to be a pramāṇa other than the pramāṇa of perception.

13. 'Now, without a difference of nature in the result, how is there a difference of pramāṇa?'

14. If this be asked, no; for, difference of nature in the pramāṇa is intelligible even with difference of nature in the psychosis. And thus the psychosis whose form is the non-existence of pot is not sense-generated, since there is no contact of the sense-organ with the content; rather is it generated by another pramāṇa consisting in the non-cognition of pot; hence there results for non-cognition the character of a distinct pramāṇa.

१५. ननु अनुपलब्धिरूपमानान्तरपक्षेऽप्यभावप्रतीतेः प्रत्यक्षत्वे घटवति घटाभावभ्रमस्यापि प्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तौ, तत्राप्यनिर्वचनीयघटाभावोऽभ्युपगम्येत। न चेष्टापत्तिः; तस्य मायोपादानकत्वेऽभावत्वानुपपत्तेः; मायोपादानकत्वाभावे मायायाः सकलकार्योपादानत्वानुपपत्तिः।

१६. इति चेत्, न; घटवति घटाभावभ्रमो न तत्कालोत्पन्न-घटाभावविषयकः; किन्तु भूतलरूपादौ विद्यमानो लौकिको घटाभावो भूतल आरोप्यते; इति अन्यथाख्यातिरेव; आरोप्यसन्निकर्षस्थले सर्वत्रान्यथाख्यातेरेव व्यवस्थापनात्।

15. 'Now, if, even in the view of a distinct pramāṇa consisting in non-cognition, the cognition of non-existence is perceptual, there being the contingence of perceptibility even for the delusion of the non-existence of pot where there is pot, there should be admitted in that case too an indeterminable non-existence of pot. Nor is this a contingence of the acceptable; for, if that has māyā for its material cause, there is unintelligibility of non-existential character; if it does not have māyā for material cause, there is unintelligibility of māyā being the material cause in respect of all products[58].'

16. If this be said, no; the delusion of non-existence of pot where there is pot does not have for content a pot-non-existence originated at that time (by māyā); rather is there imposed on the surface of the ground an empirical pot-non-existence present in the colour of the ground etc.; thus there is but apprehension otherwise (anyathā-khyāti) (not apprehension of the indeterminable); for, wherever there is sense-contact for what is imposed (together with its support), anyathā-khyāti alone is established.

१७. अस्तु वा प्रतियोगिमति तदभावभ्रमस्थले तदभावस्या-निर्वचनीयत्वम्; तथापि तदुपादानं मायैव। न हि उपादानोपा-देययोरत्यन्तसाजात्यम्, तन्तुपटयोरपि तन्तुत्वपटत्वादिना वैजात्यात्। यत्किञ्चित्साजात्यस्य मायाया अनिर्वचनीयस्य घटाभावस्य मिथ्यात्वधर्मस्य विद्यमानत्वात्; अन्यथा व्यावहारिकं घटाभावं प्रति कथं मायोपादानमिति कुतो न शङ्केथाः?

१८. न च विजातीययोरपि उपादानोपादेयभावे ब्रह्मैव जगदुपादानं स्यादिति वाच्यम्।

१९. प्रपञ्चविभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वरूपस्य तस्येष्टत्वात्।

17. Or let it even be that, where there is delusion of non-existence in that which has the counter-correlate, there is indeterminability for that non-existence; even thus its material cause is but māyā. There is not, indeed, absolute oneness of nature between the material cause and its product, since even between thread and cloth there is difference of nature in respect of threadness and clothness. Some degree of similarity by nature between māyā and the indeterminable pot-non-existence does exist, *viz.*, the attribute of illusoriness; otherwise, why do you not object how māyā is the material cause in respect of the empirically valid pot-non-existence?

18. Nor may it be said that if there be the relation of material cause and effect even as between what are different in nature, Brahman itself could be the material cause of the world.

19. For that (material causality) is acceptable as consisting in being the substrate of the world-delusion.

२०. परिणामित्वरूपस्योपादानत्वस्य निरवयवे ब्रह्मणि अनुपपत्तेः। तथा च प्रपञ्चस्य परिणाम्युपादानं माया न ब्रह्मेति सिद्धान्तः। इति अलमतिप्रसङ्गेन।

२१. स चाभावश्चतुर्विधः—प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति।

२२. तत्र मृत्पिण्डादौ कारणे कार्यस्य घटादेरुत्पत्तेः पूर्वं योऽभावः स प्रागभावः; स च 'भविष्यति' इति प्रतीतिविषयः।

२३. तत्रैव घटस्य मुद्गरपातानन्तरं योऽभावः स प्रध्वंसाभावः। ध्वंसस्यापि स्वाधिकरणकपालनाशे नाश एव। न च

20. Material causality consisting in undergoing transformation is not intelligible in the case of the partless Brahman. And thus there is the final position that that material cause of the world which undergoes transformation is māyā, not Brahman. Hence enough of this over-elaboration.

21. And this non-existence is of four kinds[59]: prior non-existence, annihilative non-existence, absolute non-existence and reciprocal non-existence.

22. Of these, the non-existence prior to origination of the effect, pot etc., in the cause, lump of clay etc., this is prior non-existence; and this is the content of the cognition 'will come into being.'

23. In that same (lump of clay etc.), the non-existence of the pot after the fall of a pestle, that is annihilative non-existence. Of annihilation too there is but destruction on the destruction of the pot-sherd that is its locus. Nor is there the contingence of the

घटोन्मज्जनापत्तिः, घटध्वंसध्वंसस्यापि घटप्रतियोगिकध्वंसत्वात्। अन्यथा प्रागभावध्वंसात्मकघटस्य नाशे प्रागभावोन्मज्जनापत्तिः।

२४. न च 'एवमपि यत्र ध्वंसाधिकरणं नित्यं तत्र कथं ध्वंसनाशः?' इति वाच्यम्।

२५. तादृशमधिकरणं यदि चैतन्यव्यतिरिक्तम्, तदा तस्य नित्यत्वमसिद्धम्, ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मज्ञाननिवर्त्यताया वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्; यदि च ध्वंसाधिकरणं चैतन्यम्, तदासिद्धिः, आरोपितप्रतियोगिकध्वंसस्याधिष्ठाने प्रतीयमानस्याधिष्ठानमात्रत्वात्। तदुक्तम् 'अधिष्ठानावशेषो

resurrection of the pot, since even the annihilation of the annihilation of pot is an annihilation with pot as counter-correlate. Otherwise, on the annihilation of pot, which is of the nature of the annihilation of (its) prior non-existence, there would be the contingence of the resurrection of the prior non-existence.

24. Nor may it be asked 'even thus, where the locus of annihilation is eternal, how can there be the destruction of annihilation?'

25. For, if that kind of locus be other than consciousness, then its eternality is non-established, since there will be stated the removability, by Brahman-knowledge, of everything other than Brahman; and if the locus of annihilation be consciousness, then there is asiddhi (that is, non-establishment of being the locus of annihilation), since the annihilation, whose counter-correlate is the super-imposed and which is cognised in the substrate, is of the nature of the substrate itself. That has been said. 'The destruction of posited things

हि नाशः कल्पितवस्तुनः ' इति । एवं शुक्तिरूप्यविनाशोऽपि इद-मवच्छिन्नचैतन्यमेव ।

२६. यत्राधिकरणे यस्य कालत्रयेऽप्यभावः सोऽत्यन्ताभावः, यथा वायौ रूपात्यन्ताभावः । सोऽपि वियदादिवत् ध्वंसप्रतियोग्येव ।

२७. 'इदमिदं न ' इति प्रतीतिविषयोऽन्योन्याभावः । अयमेव विभागो भेदः पृथक्त्वं चेति व्यवह्रियते, भेदातिरिक्तविभागादौ प्रमाणा-भावात् । अयं चान्योन्याभावोऽधिकरणस्य सादित्वे सादिः, यथा घटे पटभेदः । अधिकरणस्यानादित्वे अनादिरेव, यथा जीवे ब्रह्मभेदः ब्रह्मणि

leaves as residue the substrate[60].' Similarly, even the annihilation of nacre-silver is but the this-defined consciousness.

26. When in a locus there is non-existence of something in all three times, that is absolute non-existence, *e.g.* the absolute non-existence of colour in air. This too, like ether etc., is certainly a counter-correlate of annihilation.

27. Reciprocal non-existence is the content of the cognition 'This is not that.' This same distinction is spoken of as difference and separateness, since there is not any evidence in respect of a distinction etc., other than difference. And this reciprocal non-existence has a beginning, where the locus has a beginning, *e.g.*, the difference from cloth in pot. Where the locus is beginningless, this (too) is certainly beginningless, *e.g.*, the difference from Brahman in the jīva or the difference from the jīva in Brahman. Either kind of

वा जीवभेदः । द्विविधोऽपि भेदो ध्वंसततियोग्येव, अविद्यानिवृत्तौ तत्पर-तन्त्राणां विवृत्त्यवश्यम्भावात् ।

२८. पुनरपि भेदो द्विविधः, सोपाधिको निरुपाधिकश्चेति । तत्र उपाधिसत्ताव्याप्यसत्ताकत्वं सोपाधिकत्वम् । तच्छून्यत्वं निरुपाधिकत्वम् ।

२९. तत्राद्यो यथा—एकस्यैवाकाशस्य घटाद्युपाधिभेदेन भेदः ; यथा च एकस्य सूर्यस्य जलभाजनभेदेन भेदः ; तथा चैकस्य ब्रह्मणोऽन्तःकरणभेदात् भेदः ।

३०. निरुपाधिकभेदो यथा घटे पटभेदः ।

३१. न च ब्रह्मण्यपि प्रपञ्चभेदाभ्युपगमेऽद्वैतविरोधः ; तात्त्विक-

difference is certainly the counter-correlate of annihilation, since on the removal of nescience there is of necessity the removal of what are dependent thereon.

28. Difference is yet again two-fold, as adjunct-conditioned and non-adjunct-conditioned. Of these, to be adjunct-conditioned is to possess reality pervaded by the reality of the adjunct. To be devoid of this is to be non-adjunct-conditioned.

29. The first of these is thus: the difference of the ether, which is but one, through differences of adjuncts like pot; also the difference of the one sun through differences in the receptacles of water; also the difference of the one Brahman because of differences of the internal organ.

30. Non-adjunct-conditioned difference is like the difference from cloth in pot.

31. Nor is there conflict with non-dualism on the admission of difference from the world even in Brahman; for, real difference not being admitted, this

भेदानभ्युपगमेन वियदादिवत् अद्वैताव्याघातात्; प्रपञ्चस्य अद्वैते ब्रह्मणि कल्पितत्वाङ्गीकारात्। तदुक्तं सुरेश्वराचार्यैः—

"अक्षमा भवतः केयं साधकत्वप्रकल्पने?
किं न पश्यसि संसारं तत्रैवाज्ञानकल्पितम्?" इति।

३२. अत एव विवरणे अविद्यानुमाने प्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तत्वं विशेषणम्, तत्त्वप्रदीपिकायाम् अविद्यालक्षणे भावत्वविशेषणं च सङ्गच्छते।

३३. एवं चतुर्विधानामभावानां योग्यानुपलब्ध्या प्रतीतिः। तत्रानुपलब्धिर्मानान्तरम्।

इति अनुपलब्धिपरिच्छेदः॥

does not militate against non-dualism any more than ether etc.; for, the world is admitted to be posited on the non-dual Brahman. This has been said by Sures'varācārya "Why this impatience of yours in the assumption of instrumentality?[61] Do you uot see that the migratory world is posited even there by nescience?"

32. Hence it is that there are intelligible the qualification of difference from prior non-existence (introduced) in the *Vivaraṇa* in the inference of nescience, and the qualification of positiveness (bhāvatva) (introduced) in the *Tattvapradīpikā* (p. 57) in the definition of nescience.[62]

33. Of the non-existences which are thus fourfold the apprehension is through competent non-cognition. Therefore, non-cognition is a distinct pramāṇa.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON NON-COGNITION

सप्तमः परिच्छेदः

स्वतःप्रामाण्यवादः

१. एवमुक्तानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवोत्पद्यते ज्ञायते च । तथा हि—स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणं संवादिप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीप्रयोज्यम्, न तु अधिकगुणमपेक्षते, प्रमामात्रे अनुगतगुणाभावात् ।

CHAPTER VII

SVATAḤPRAMĀṆYA-VĀDAḤ

VALIDITY AS INTRINSIC

1. Of the pramāṇas thus stated, the validity is intrinsically generated and cognised. It is thus: validity is that which is common to recollection and experience, is favourable to successful appetition and consists in being cognition of a predicate in respect of what has that (predicate). And this is determined by the entire causal complex of cognition as such, but does not require an extra excellence, since there is no excellence common to all valid cognition.

२. नापि प्रत्यक्षप्रमायां भूयोऽवयवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः, रूपादिप्रत्यक्षे आत्मप्रत्यक्षे च तदभावात्; सत्यपि तस्मिन् 'पीतः शङ्खः' इति प्रत्यक्षस्य भ्रमत्वात्।

३. अत एव सल्लिङ्गपरामर्शादिकमपि अनुमित्यादिप्रमायां न गुणः; असल्लिङ्गपरामर्शादिस्थलेऽपि विषयाबाधेन अनुमित्यादेः प्रमात्वात्।

४. न चैवम् 'अप्रमापि प्रमा स्यात्, ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्र्या अविशेषात्' इति वाच्यम्; दोषाभावस्यापि हेतुत्वाङ्गीकारात्। न चैवं परतस्त्वम्, आगन्तुकभावकारणापेक्षायामेव परतस्त्वात्।

2. Nor is there in perceptual valid cognition contact between the sense-organ and a multitude of parts, since this does not exist in the perception of colour and in the perception of the self; further, even where there is that (contact with a multitude of parts), there is delusiveness of the perception, 'The conch shell is yellow'.

3. For the same reason, even consideration of a sound *probans* is not the excellence, in valid inferential cognition etc.; for even where the consideration is of a *probans* that is not sound, there is validity for the inferred cognition etc., because of non-sublation.

4. Nor may it be said that thus even invalid cognition would be valid cognition, there being no distinction in respect of (the presence of) the causal-complex of cognition as such; for, absence of defect too is admitted to be a cause. Nor is there thus extrinsic nature (for validity), since there is extrinsic nature only when there is dependence on *positive* extraneous causes.

५. ज्ञायते च प्राणाण्यं स्वतः । स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वञ्च दोषाभावे सति यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वम् । स्वाश्रयो वृत्तिज्ञानम्; तद्ग्राहकं साक्षिज्ञानम्; तेनापि वृत्तिज्ञाने गृह्यमाणे तद्गतप्रामाण्यमपि गृह्यते ।

६. नचैवं प्रामाण्यसंशयानुपपत्तिः; तत्र संशयानुरोधेन दोषस्यापि सत्त्वेन दोषाभावघटितस्वाश्रयग्राहकाभावेन तत्र प्रामाण्यस्यैवाग्रहात् ।

७. यद्वा यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यत्वयोग्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वम् । संशयस्थले प्रामाण्यस्य उक्तयोग्यतासत्त्वेऽपि दोषवशेनाग्रहात् न संशयानुपपत्तिः ।

5. And validity is cognised too intrinsically. To be intrinsically apprehended is to be apprehended, when there is no defect, wherever there is the causal-complex for apprehending the locus of that (validity) itself. The locus of that itself is the cognitive psychosis; the apprehender of that is the witness-cognition; when by this the cognitive psychosis is apprehended, the validity present therein is also apprehended.

6. Nor thus is there unintelligibility of doubt as to validity; for, in conformity with the doubt as to that (validity), defect too exists; hence, since there is not the apprehender of its own locus as linked up with the absence of defect, validity is not apprehended at all in respect of that (cognition).

7. Or else, intrinsic nature (in respect of cognition) consists in competency to be apprehended wherever there is the apprehender of its own locus. In a case of doubt, though there is for validity the said competency, since it is yet not apprehended because of defect, there is no unintelligibility of doubt.

८. अप्रामाण्यन्तु न ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीप्रयोज्यम्, प्रमायामपि अप्रामाण्यापत्तेः; किन्तु दोषप्रयोज्यम्।

९. नाप्यप्रामाण्यं यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यम्; अप्रामाण्यघटक-तदभाववत्त्वादेर्वृत्तिज्ञानानुपनीतत्वेन साक्षिणा ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्।

१०. किन्तु विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्यादिलिङ्गकानुमित्यादिविषय इति परत एव अप्रामाण्यमुत्पद्यते ज्ञायते च।

इति स्वतःप्रामाण्यवादः ॥

8. Invalidity, however, is not determined by the causal complex of cognition as such, because of the contingence of invalidity even in valid cognition; rather is it defect-determined.

9. Nor is invalidity apprehendable wherever there is the apprehender of its own locus; for, the non-existence of that (predicate) etc., which accounts for invalidity, not being brought in by the cognitive psychosis, is not capable of being apprehended by the witness.

10. But it (invalidity) is the content of inferred cognition etc., whose *probans* is unsuccessful appetition etc.; hence invalidity is both generated and cognised only extrinsically.[63]

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON VALIDITY AS INTRINSIC

अष्टमः परिच्छेदः

विषयाः

१. एवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम्, व्यावहारिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं पारमार्थिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वञ्च इति। तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपावगाहिप्रमाणव्यतिरिक्तानां सर्वप्रमाणानामाद्यं प्रामाण्यम्, तद्विषयाणां व्यवहारदशायां बाधाभावात्।

२. द्वितीयन्तु जीवब्रह्मैक्यपराणाम् "सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्"

CHAPTER VIII

OBJECTS

1. Of the pramāṇas thus explained, the validity is twofold, as making known empirical reality or making known absolute reality. Of these the first kind of validity belongs to all pramāṇas other than the pramāṇa apprehending the nature of Brahman, since, of their objects (contents), there is no sublation at the stage of empirical usage.

2. The second (kind of validity), however, belongs to (texts) having the oneness of the jīva and Brahman for purport, beginning with 'Reality alone, dear one,

8

इत्यादीनाम् "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यन्तानाम्, तद्विषयस्य जीवपरैक्यस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वात् ।

३. तच्च ऐक्यं तत्त्वंपदार्थज्ञानधीनज्ञानमिति प्रथमं तत्पदार्थो लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां निरूप्यते ।

४. तत्र लक्षणं द्विविधम्, स्वरूपलक्षणं तटस्थलक्षणञ्च इति ।

५. तत्र स्वरूपमेव लक्षणं स्वरूपलक्षणम्; यथा सत्यादिकं ब्रह्मस्वरूपलक्षणम्, "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म", "आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

६. ननु स्वरूपस्य स्ववृत्तित्वाभावेन कथं लक्षणत्वम् ?

this was in the beginning' and ending with 'That thou art', since, of its content, the oneness of the jīva and Brahman, there is non-sublation in all three times.

3. And since that oneness is a knowledge dependent on the cognitions of the senses of the words 'that' and 'thou', the sense of the word 'that' is first explained through (statement) of definition and pramāṇa.

4. Of these, definition is of two kinds, definition by essential nature and definition *per accidens*.

5. Of these, definition by essential nature is (that where) the essential nature is itself (offered as) the definition; *e.g.*, 'reality' etc. are the definition by essential nature of Brahman, because of such s'ruti as 'Reality, knowledge, infinitude is Brahman', 'He knew bliss to be Brahman' etc.

6. 'Now, since of essential nature there is not existence *in* itself (as of an attribute in a substance), how can it have the character of a definition?'

७. इति चेत्, न; स्वस्यैव स्वापेक्षया धर्मधर्मिभावकल्पनया लक्ष्यलक्षणत्वसम्भवात्। तदुक्तम्—"आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नितयत्वञ्च इति सन्ति धर्माः, अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते"।

८. तटस्थलक्षणं नाम यावल्लक्ष्यकालमनवस्थितत्वे सति यत् व्यावर्त्तकं तदेव; यथा गन्धवत्वं पृथिवीलक्षणम्, महाप्रलये परमाणुषु उत्पत्तिकाले घटादिषु च गन्धाभावात्।

९. प्रकृते च जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वम्।

१०. अत्र जगत्पदेन कार्य्यजातं विवक्षितम्; कारणत्वञ्च कर्तृत्वम्; अतोऽविद्यादौ नातिव्याप्तिः।

7. If this be asked, no; for, by the *assumption* of a relation of itself to itself, in the nature of attribute and substrate, there is the possibility of (itself) being the defined and the definition. That has been said: 'There are attributes *viz.*, bliss, experience of objects and eternality; though non-distinct from consciousness, they appear as if different (*Pañcapādikā*, p. 4).'

8. What is called definition *per accidens* is only that which serves to distinguish while not enduring throughout the same time as the defined (endures); *e.g.*, possession of odour as the definition of earth, since in the primal atoms at the time of the final deluge, and in pot etc., at the moment of (their) production, there is no odour.[64]

9. And in the present context causality in respect of the origination etc. of the world (is a definition *per accidens*).

10. Here what is intended by the word 'world' is the host of products; and 'causality' means

११. कर्तृत्वञ्च तत्तदुपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वम् ।

१२. ईश्वरस्य तावदुपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानसद्भावे च "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्, यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः, तस्मात् एतद् ब्रह्म नाम रूपमन्नं च जायते" इत्यादिश्रुतिर्मानम्; तादृशचिकीर्षासद्भावे च "सोऽकामायत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय" इत्यादि श्रुतिर्मानम्; तादृशकृतौ च "तन्मनोऽकुरुत" इत्यादिवाक्यम् ।

१३. ज्ञानेच्छाद्यन्यतमगर्भलक्षणत्रितयं विवक्षितम्, अन्यथा

agency; hence there is no over-pervasion in respect of nescience etc.

11. And agency consists in the possession of immediate knowledge, the desire to act, and volition, whose sphere is the appropriate material cause.

12. And the evidence, in respect of the existence of Īs'vara's immediate knowledge whose sphere is the material cause, is such s'ruti as: 'He who knows all (generally), he who knows all (in their specific nature), he whose austerity consists in knowledge, from him originates this Brahma, name, form and food (earth)" (*Muṇḍ.*, I, i, 9); and in respect of the existence of that kind of desire to act the evidence is such s'ruti as 'He desired, may I become many (*Taitt.*, II, vi);' and in respect of that kind of volition, (the evidence is) such a text as 'That created manas.'

13. What is intended is a three-fold definition, (each) comprising any one (of the three) knowledge, desire, etc., as otherwise there is the contingence of

व्यर्थविशेषणत्वापत्तेः । अत एव जन्मस्थितिध्वंसानामन्यतमस्यैव लक्षणे प्रवेशः । एवञ्च लक्षणानि नव सम्पद्यन्ते ।

१४. ब्रह्मणो जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वे च "यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत् प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति" इत्यादिश्रुतिर्मानम् ।

१५. यद्वा निखिलजगदुपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणो लक्षणम् ; उपादानत्वञ्च जगदध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वम्, जगदाकारेण परिणममानमायाधिष्ठानत्वं वा ।

१६. एतादृशमेवोपादानत्वमभिप्रेत्य "इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा" "सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्," "बहु स्यां प्रजायेय" इत्यादिश्रुतिषु ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोः

futility of the qualification.[65] Hence too there enters into the definition only one (of the three) origination, sustentation and destruction. And thus there result nine definitions.

14. And in respect of Brahman being the cause of the world's origination etc., the evidence is such s'ruti as 'That, verily, whence these beings are born, that whereby, being born, they live, that into which at dissolution they enter (*Taitt.*, III, i)' etc.

15. Or else, the definition of Brahman is material causality in respect of the entire universe; and material causality consists in being either the substrate of the super-imposition of the universe or the substrate of māyā that is transformed in the form of the universe.

16. It is only with such material causality in view, that there is designation of identity between Brahman and the world, in such s'ruti texts as 'That which is all this is this self (*Bṛh.*, II, iv, 6)', 'That

तादात्म्यव्यपदेशः । 'घटः सन्', 'घटो भाति', 'घट इष्टः' इत्यादि-लौकिकव्यपदेशोऽपि सच्चिदानन्दरूपब्रह्मैक्याध्यासात् ।

१७. ननु आनन्दात्मकचिदध्यासात् घटादेरिष्टत्वव्यवहारे दुःखस्यापि तत्राध्यासात् तस्यापीष्टत्वादिव्यवहारापत्तिः ।

१८. इति चेत्, न । आरोपे सति निमित्तानुसरणम्, न तु निमित्तमस्तीत्यारोप इत्यभ्युपगमेन दुःखादौ सच्चिदंशाध्यासेऽपि आनन्दांशाध्यासाभावात् ।

became *sat* and *tyat* (the movable and the immovable) (*Taitt.*, II, vi)', 'May I become many.' Even such worldy designation as 'pot is real', 'pot appears', 'pot is desirable', is because of super-imposition of identity with Brahman, which is of the nature of reality, consciousness, bliss.

17. 'Now, if, because of super-imposition of (identity with) consciousness that is of the nature of bliss, there be the empirical usage of pot etc., being desirable, then, because of misery too being superimposed thereon, there is the contingence of that also being desirable.'

18. If this be said, no. For, it being admitted that, when there is super-imposition there is conformity to (its due) cause, not that because there is a cause there is super-imposition, in the case of misery etc., though there is super-imposition of the aspects of reality and consciousness, there is no super-imposition of the aspect of bliss.

१९. जगति नामरूपांशद्वयव्यवहारस्तु अविद्यापरिणामात्मकनामरूपसम्बन्धात् । तदुक्तम्—

"अस्ति भाति प्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्यंशपञ्चकम् ।
आद्यं त्रयं ब्रह्मरूपं जगद्रूपं ततो द्वयम् ॥ ' इति ।

२०. अथ जगतो जन्मक्रमो निरूप्यते ।

२१. तत्र सर्गाद्यकाले परमेश्वरः सृज्यमानप्रपञ्चवैचित्र्यहेतुप्राणिकर्मसहकृतोऽपरिमितानिरूपितशक्तिविशेषविशिष्टमायासहितः सन्नामरूपात्मकनिखिलप्रपञ्चं प्रथमं बुद्धौ आकलय्य, 'इदं करिष्यामि' इति सङ्कल्प-

19. As for the empirical usage of the two aspects, name and form, in respect of the world, that is because of being related to name and form which are of the nature of transformations of nescience. That has been said: 'There are five aspects (of reality) as *exists*, *is manifest*, *is desirable*, *form* and *name*; the first three are of the nature of Brahman; the remaining two are of the nature of the world' (*Drg-drs'ya-viveka*, verse 20).

20. Now is set forth the sequence of the origination of the world.

21. Here, at the original time of creation, the supreme Lord, being associated with (1) the karmas of creatures, the causes of the diversity of the world to be created, and (2) māyā qualified by unlimited and undefined special potencies (s'aktis), first conceives in his intellect the entire world of name and form, and resolves 'I shall make this'; for there are such s'ruti

यति; "तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय", "सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय" इत्यादिश्रुतेः।

२२. तत आकाशादीनि पञ्चभूतानि अपञ्चीकृतानि तन्मात्रपद-प्रतिपाद्यानि उत्पद्यन्ते। तत्र आकाशस्य शब्दो गुणः; वायोस्तु शब्द-स्पर्शौ; तेजसस्तु शब्दस्पर्शरूपाणि; अपान्तु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसाः; पृथिव्यास्तु शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धाः। न तु शब्दस्य आकाशमात्रगुणत्वम्, वाय्वादावपि तदुपलम्भात्। न चासौ भ्रमः, बाधकाभावात्।

२३. इमानि भूतानि त्रिगुणमायाकार्याणि त्रिगुणानि। गुणाः सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि।

texts as 'That saw "may I become many" (*Chānd.*, VI, ii, 3),' 'He desired "may I become many" (*Taitt.*, II, vi)' etc.

22. Thence arise the five elements, ether etc., which are unquintuplicated and are denoted by the word tanmātra (subtle element). Of these, for ether, the quality is sound; as for air, (the qualities are) sound and touch; as for fire, sound, touch and colour; as for water, sound, touch, colour, and taste; as for earth, sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. Sound, however, is not exclusively the quality of ether, because it is cognised even in air etc. Nor is this a delusion, since there is no sublater.

23. These elements, the products of māyā of three guṇas, are (themselves) of three guṇas. The guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas.[66]

२४. एतैश्च सत्त्वगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैः व्यस्तैर्यथाक्रमं श्रोत्रत्वक्चक्षूरसनघ्राणाख्यानि पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।

२५. एतैरेव सत्त्वगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैः मिलितैः मनोबुद्ध्यहङ्कारचित्तानि जायन्ते ।

२६. श्रोत्रादीनां पञ्चानां क्रमेण दिग्वातार्कवरुणाश्विनोऽधिष्ठातृदेवताः । मनआदीनां क्रमेण चन्द्रचतुर्मुखशङ्कराच्युता अधिष्ठातृदेवताः ।

२७. एतैरेव रजोगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैर्यथाक्रमं वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाख्यानि कर्मेन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते । तेषाञ्च क्रमेण वह्नीन्द्रोपेन्द्रमृत्युप्रजापतयोऽधिष्ठातृदेवताः ।

24. And from these five elements, as associated with the sattva-guṇa and taken separately, there arise the five indriyas (sense-organs), called respectively sense of hearing, sense of touch, sense of sight, sense of taste, and sense of smell.

25. From these same sattva-guna-associated five elements, in combination, there arise manas, buddhi ahaṅkāra and citta.

26. The respective presiding deities of the sense of hearing etc. are Dik, the Wind, the Sun, Varuṇa and the As'vins. Of manas etc., the presiding deities are respectively Candra, the four-faced (Brahmā), S'aṅkara and Acyuta.

27. From these same five elements, (but as) rajoguṇa-associated, there arise in sequence the (five) organs of action, the organ of speech, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation. And of these the presiding deities are respectively Fire, Indra, Upendra (Viṣṇu), Mṛtyu (Death) and Prajāpati.

२८. रजोगुणोपेतैः पञ्चभूतैः मिलितैः पञ्च वायवः प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानाख्या जायन्ते । तत्र प्राग्गमनवान् वायुः प्राणो नासादिस्थानवर्ती ; अर्वाग्गमनवानपानः पाय्वादिस्थानवर्ती ; विष्वग्गमनवान् व्यानोऽखिलशरीरवर्ती ; ऊर्द्ध्वगमनवान् उत्क्रमणवायुरुदानः कण्ठस्थानवर्ती ; अशितपीतान्नादिसमीकरणकरः समानो नाभिस्थानवर्ती ।

२९. तैश्च तमोगुणोपेतैरपञ्चीकृतभूतैः पञ्चीकृतानि भूतानि जायन्ते ; "तासां च त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणि" इति श्रुतेः पञ्चीकरणोपलक्षणार्थत्वात् ।

३०. पञ्चीकरणप्रकारश्च इत्थम् । आकाशमादौ द्विधा विभज्य

28. From the rajo-guṇa-associated five elements, in combination, arise the five vital airs, called prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna. Of these, prāṇa is the vital air that moves up and resides in regions like the nose; apāna is what moves downwards and resides in regions like the organ of excretion; vyāna is what moves everywhere and resides in the entire body; udāna is the vital air that moves upwards in departing (from this body)[67] and resides in the region of the throat; samāna, which assimilates the food etc., eaten and drunk, resides in the region of the navel.

29. And from the unquintuplicated elements (as) tamo-guṇa-associated arise the quintuplicated elements; for, the s'ruti text 'And of these three as *triplicated*, I shall make each (gross) element' (*Chānd.*, VI, iii, 3), has the implied (synecdochic) sense of quintuplication.

30. And the mode of quintuplication is thus. First dividing ether into two, then re-dividing one part

तयोरेकं भागं पुनश्चतुर्धा विभज्य तेषां तु चतुर्णामंशानां वाय्वादिषु संयोजनम् । एवं वायुं द्विधा विभज्य तयोरेकं भागं पुनः चतुर्धा विभज्य तेषां चतुर्णामंशानामाकाशादिषु संयोजनम् । एवं तेजआदीनामपि । तदेवमेकैकभूतस्यार्द्धं स्वांशात्मकम्, अर्द्धान्तरं चतुर्विधभूतमयम्; इति पृथिव्यादिषु स्वांशाधिक्यात् पृथिव्यादिव्यवहारः । तदुक्तम् "वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः" इति ।

३१. एतैश्चापञ्चीकृतभूतैर्लिङ्गशरीरं परलोकयात्रानिर्वाहकं मोक्षपर्यन्तं स्थायि मनोबुद्धिभ्यामुपेतम् ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चककर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकप्राणादिपञ्चकसंयुक्तं जायते । तदुक्तम्—

of it into four, there is the combination of each of these fourths with air etc. Similarly dividing air into two and re-dividing one of these parts into four, there is the combination of each of these fourths with ether etc. Similarly in the case of fire etc., also. Thus, one half of each (gross) element is of its own nature, while the other half is made up of the four (other) kinds of (subtle) elements; hence, there is the appellation 'earth' etc., in respect of (gross) earth etc., because of the predominance of parts with the respective natures. That has been said: 'Because of distinctiveness (*i.e.* predominance) there is that appellation (as earth etc.), there is that appellation (*Brahma-Sūtras*, II, iv, 22).'

31. And from these unquintuplicated elements arises the liṅgas'arīra, that makes possible the going to another world, that subsists until release, that is associated with manas and buddhi, and is conjoined with the five-fold sense-organs, the five-fold motor organs

"पञ्चप्राणमनोबुद्धिदशेन्द्रियसमन्वितम् ।
अपञ्चीकृतभूतोत्थं सूक्ष्माङ्गं भोगसाधनम्" इति ।

३२. तच्च द्विविधम्, परम्, अपरञ्चेति । परम् हिरण्यगर्भलिङ्गशरीरम्; अपरम् अस्मदादिलिङ्गशरीरम् । तत्र हिरण्यगर्भलिङ्गशरीरं महत्तत्त्वम्, अस्मदादिलिङ्गशरीरं अहङ्कारः इत्याख्यायते ।

३३. एवं तमोगुणयुक्तेभ्यः पञ्चीकृतभूतेभ्यो भूम्यन्तरिक्षस्वर्गमहर्जनस्तपःसत्याख्यस्य ऊर्ध्वलोकसप्तकस्य, अतलपातालवितलसुतलतलातलरसातलमहातलाख्यस्य अधोलोकसप्तकस्य, ब्रह्माण्डस्य जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जाख्यानां चतुर्विधस्थूलशरीराणाञ्च उत्पत्तिः ।

and the five-fold vital airs. That has been said: 'The subtle body, the instrument of enjoyment, arises from the unquintuplicated elements and is associated with the five prāṇas, manas, buddhi and the ten indriyas.'

32. And this (subtle body) is of two kinds, as superior and inferior. The superior is the subtle body of Hiraṇyagarbha; the inferior is the subtle body of those like us. Of these, Hiraṇyagarbha's subtle body is spoken of as mahat-tattva, and the subtle body of those like us as ahaṅkāra.

33. Similarly, from tamo-guṇa-associated quintuplicated elements, there is the origination (1) of the cosmic sphere comprising (*a*) the seven higher worlds, called earth, antarikṣa, svarga, mahaḥ, janaḥ, tapaḥ and satya, and (*b*) the seven lower worlds called atala, pātāla, vitala, sutala, talātala, rasātala, mahātala, and (2) of the four kinds of gross bodies called womb-born

३४. तत्र जरायुजानि जरायुभ्यो जातानि मनुष्यपश्वादीनि शरीराणि; अण्डजानि अण्डेभ्यो जातानि पक्षिपन्नगादिशरीराणि; स्वेदजानि तु स्वेदात् जातानि यूकामशकादीनि; उद्भिज्जानि तु भूमिमुद्भिद्य जातानि वृक्षादीनि। वृक्षादीनामपि पापफलभोगायतनत्वेन शरीरत्वम्।

३५. अत्र च परमेश्वरस्य पञ्चतन्मात्राद्युत्पत्तौ, सप्तदशावयवोपेत-लिङ्गशरीरोत्पत्तौ, हिरण्यगर्भस्थूलशरीरोत्पत्तौ च, साक्षात्कर्तृत्वम्।

३६. इतरनिखिलप्रपञ्चोत्पत्तौ हिरण्यगर्भादिद्वारा; "हन्ताहमि-

(jarāyuja), egg-born (aṇḍaja), sweat-born (svedaja), and sprout-born (udbhijja).

34. Of these, the jarāyujas are bodies like (those of) men, beasts, etc., born of wombs; aṇḍajas are bodies like (those of) birds, snakes, etc., born of eggs; svedajas are lice, mosquitoes etc., born of perspiration; as for udbhijjas, they are trees etc., which are born cleaving the earth. The quality of being a body belongs even to trees etc., because of their being loci for the experience of the fruit of demerit (pāpa).

35. And here, in respect of (1) the origination of the five subtle elements etc., (2) the origination of the subtle body associated with seventeen members, and (3) the origination of Hiraṇyagarbha's gross body, there is direct agency for the Supreme Lord (Parames'vara).

36. In respect of the origination of the rest of the entire world, (there is agency) through the channel of Hiraṇyagarbha; (this is) on the evidence of the

मास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि" इति श्रुतेः ।

३७. हिरण्यगर्भो नाम मूर्तित्रयादन्यः प्रथमो जीवः; "स वै शरीरी प्रथमः स वै पुरुष उच्यते । आदिकर्ता स भूतानां ब्रह्माग्रे समवर्तत", "हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । एवं भूतभौतिकसृष्टिर्निरूपिता ।

३८. इदानीं प्रलयो निरूप्यते । प्रलयो नाम त्रैलोक्यविनाशः । स च चतुर्विधः, नित्यः प्राकृतो नैमित्तिक आत्यन्तिकश्चेति ।

३९. तत्र नित्यः प्रलयः सुषुप्तिः, तस्याः सकलकार्यप्रलय-

s'ruti 'Lo, entering into these three deities as their jīva-self, I shall create name and form (*Chānd.*, VI, iii, 2).'

37. What is called Hiraṇyagarbha is the first jīva, other than the three mūrtis (Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra); for there are such s'ruti texts as 'He verily is the first embodied one; he verily is called puruṣa; the first creator of (all) beings, Brahmā, existed at first', 'Hiraṇyagarbha existed at first', etc. Thus has been explained the creation of the elements and elementals.

38. Now, dissolution is expounded. What is called dissolution is the destruction of the three worlds. And that is four-fold—nitya, prākṛta, naimittika, and ātyantika.

39. Of these, the nitya (daily) dissolution is (deep) sleep, since it is of the form of the dissolution

रूपत्वात् । धर्माधर्मपूर्वसंस्काराणाञ्च तदा कारणात्मनावस्थानम् । तेन सुप्तोत्थितस्य न सुखदुःखाद्यनुपपत्तिः ; न वा स्मरणानुपपत्तिः ।

४०. न च सुषुप्तौ अन्तःकरणस्य विनाशेन तदधीनप्राणादि-क्रियानुपपत्तिः ; वस्तुतः श्वासाद्यभावेऽपि तदुपलब्धेः पुरुषान्तरविभ्रममात्रत्वात् , सुषुप्तशरीरोपलम्भवत् ।

४१. न चैवं सुप्तस्य परेतादविशेषः ; सुप्तस्य हि लिङ्गशरीरं संस्कारात्मनात्रैव वर्तते, परेतस्य तु लोकान्तर इति वैलक्षण्यात् ।

(merger) of all products. And of merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and residual impression of former (experience), there is persistence then in the causal (subtle) condition. Hence, for him who has awakened from sleep there is no unintelligibility of pleasure, pain etc.; nor is there unintelligibility of recollection.

40. Nor is it that because of the destruction of the internal organ in (deep) sleep, there is unintelligibility of what is dependent thereon, the functioning of the vital air etc.; for, even though there is no respiration etc., in reality, the cognition thereof is merely a delusion for the other (cognising) person, like the cognition of the sleeper's body.

41. Nor thus is there a non-distinction of the sleeper from the dead one; for there is the distinction, that in the case of the sleeper the subtle body exists even here, in the form of residual impressions, while for the dead one, (it exists) in another world.

४२. यद्वा अन्तःकरणस्य द्वे शक्ती ज्ञानशक्तिः क्रियाशक्तिश्चेति। तत्र ज्ञानशक्तिविशिष्टान्तःकरणस्य सुषुप्तौ विनाशः, न तु क्रियाशक्तिविशिष्टस्य; इति प्राणाद्यवस्थानमविरुद्धम्।

४३. "यदा सुप्तः स्वप्नं न कञ्चन पश्यति, अथास्मिन् प्राणे एकधा भवति; अथैनं वाक् सर्वैर्नामभिः सहाप्येति", "सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति स्वमपीतो भवति" इत्यादिश्रुतिरुक्तसुषुप्तौ मानम्।

४४. प्राकृतप्रलयस्तु कार्यब्रह्मविनाशनिमित्तकः सकलकार्यनाशः। यदा तु प्रागेवोत्पन्नब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य कार्यब्रह्मणो ब्रह्माण्डाधिकारलक्षणप्रारब्ध-

42. Or else, for the internal organ there are two faculties, the cognitive and the conative. Of these, there is in sleep destruction of the internal organ as qualified by the cognitive faculty, not of it as qualified by the conative faculty; hence the persistence of respiration etc., is uncontradicted.

43. In respect of the sleep afore-said, the evidence is such s'ruti as 'When the sleeper sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with the vital spirit (prāṇa); then speech together with all names goes to it (*Kauṣītaki*, III, 3),' and 'Then, dear one, he has attained reality, he has gone to his own (*Chānd*. VI, vii, 1).'

44. As for prākṛta dissolution, that is the destruction of all products, caused by the destruction of the effected Brahmā. When, however, for the effected Brahmā for whom there has already arisen Brahman-intuition, there is, on the termination of prārabdha-karma, consisting in authority over the cosmic sphere,

कर्मसमाप्तौ विदेहकैवल्यात्मिका परममुक्तिः, तदा तल्लोकवासिनामप्युत्पन्न-ब्रह्मसाक्षात्काराणां ब्रह्मणा सह विदेहकैवल्यम् ;

"ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे सम्प्राप्ते प्रतिसञ्चरे ।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्तिः परं पदम् ॥" इति श्रुतेः ।

४५. एवं स्वलोकवासिभिः सह कार्यब्रह्मणि मुच्यमाने तदधिष्ठित-ब्रह्माण्डान्तर्वर्ति-निखिललोक-तदन्तर्वर्तिस्थावरादीनां भौतिकानां भूतानाञ्च प्रकृतौ मायायां लयः, न तु ब्रह्मणि ; बाधरूपविनाशस्यैव ब्रह्मनिष्ठत्वात् ; अतः प्राकृतलयः इति उच्यते ।

final release of the nature of release from the body, then, along with Brahmā, even for those residents in his world, for whom Brahman-intuition has arisen, there is release from the body ; for there is the s'ruti 'When dissolution arrives at the end of the parā (Brahma's period), all those realised selves, together with Brahmā, enter the supreme abode (*i.e.* are finally released'.

45. When thus the effected Brahmā is released, along with the dwellers in his world, of all the worlds included in the cosmic sphere controlled by him, and of all the elements and elementals, *i.e.*, the immovables etc., existing in those (worlds), there is dissolution (merger) in (their) material cause (prakṛti), *i.e.*, māyā, but not in Brahman ; for only that destruction which is of the nature of sublation, abides in Brahman ; hence, this is called prākṛta-dissolution.

४६. कार्यब्रह्मणो दिवसावसाननिमित्तकः त्रैलोक्यमात्रप्रलयो नैमित्तिकप्रलयः। ब्रह्मदिवसः चतुर्युगसहस्रपरिमितकालः, "चतुर्युगसहस्राणि ब्रह्मणो दिनमुच्यते" इति वचनात्। प्रलयकालो दिवसकालपरिमितः, रात्रिकालस्य दिवसतुल्यत्वात्।

४७. प्राकृतप्रलये नैमित्तिकप्रलये च पुराणवचनानि प्रमाणानि।

"द्विपरार्द्धे त्वतिक्रान्ते ब्रह्मणः परमेष्ठिनः।
तत्र प्रकृतयः सप्त कल्प्यन्ते प्रलयाय हि।
एष प्राकृतिको राजन्! प्रलयो यत्र लीयते॥"

इति वचनं प्राकृतप्रलये मानम्।

46. The dissolution of the three worlds alone, due to the termination of a day of the effected Brahmā, is naimittika dissolution. A day of Brahmā is a period that extends to a thousand four-yuga cycles, on the evidence of the saying 'A thousand of four-yuga cycles is called a day of Brahmā'. The period of dissolution is of the same extent as the period of day, since the period of night is equal to that of the day.

47. In respect of prākṛta dissolution and naimittika dissolution, the evidence consists of statements from the Purāṇas. 'When two parārdhas of Brahmā, the Parameṣṭhin, have elapsed, then the seven prakṛtis become fit for merger; when there is this dissolution, O king, it is prākṛtika dissolution'—this statement is

"एष नैमित्तिकः प्रोक्तः प्रलयो यत्र विश्वसृक् ।
शेतेऽनन्तासने नित्यमात्मसात्कृत्य चाखिलम् ॥"

इति वचनं नैमित्तिकप्रलये मानम् ।

४८. तुरीयप्रलयस्तु ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारनिमित्तकः सर्वमोक्षः । स च एकजीववादे युगपदेव; नानाजीववादे क्रमेण; "सर्व एकीभवन्ति" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

४९. तत्र आद्याः त्रयोऽपि प्रलयाः कर्मोपरमनिमित्ताः, तुरीयस्तु ज्ञानोदयनिमित्तोऽज्ञानेन सहैव; इति विशेषः । एवं चतुर्विधः प्रलयो निरूपितः ।

evidence for prākṛta dissolution. 'That is called naimittika dissolution, where the creator of the universe sleeps on the serpent-couch, after having reduced everything to himself'—this statement is the evidence for naimittika dissolution.

48. As for the fourth dissolution, that is the release (destruction) of all (products), caused by Brahman-intuition. That, on the view of the jīva as one, is certainly immediate; (it is) by steps, on the view of the jīvas as many; for there is such s'ruti as 'All become one' etc.

49. Of these (four forms of dissolution), all the three earlier are caused (only) by the cessation of karma, while the fourth is caused by the rise of knowledge and is (both of the world and) of nescience as well; this is the distinction. Thus has been explained the four-fold dissolution.

५०. तस्येदानीं क्रमो निरूप्यते । भूतानां भौतिकानाञ्च न कारणलयक्रमेण लयः; कारणलयसमये कार्याणामाश्रयमन्तरेणावस्थानानुपपत्तेः; किन्तु सृष्टिक्रमविपरीतक्रमेण; तत्तत्कार्यनाशे तत्तज्जनकादृष्टनाशस्यैव प्रयोजकतयोपादाननाशस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्; अन्यथा न्यायमतेऽपि महाप्रलये पृथिवीपरमाणुगतरूपरसादेरविनाशापत्तेः ।

५१. तथा च पृथिव्या अप्सु, अपां तेजसि, तेजसो वायौ, वायोराकाशे, आकाशस्य जीवाहङ्कारे, तस्य हिरण्यगर्भाहङ्कारे, तस्य चाविद्यायाम्, इत्येवंरूप एव प्रलयः । तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराणे—

50. The sequence thereof is now explained. Of the elements and elementals the dissolution is not in sequence to the dissolution of the causes; for at the time of the dissolution of the causes, the persistence of the effects, in the absence of any other loci, is unintelligible; but it is in a sequence contrary to the sequence of creation; for the determinant, in respect of the destruction of each product, being only the destruction of the adṛṣṭa that produces it, the destruction of the material cause is not the determinant; otherwise, even in the Nyāya system, there is, at the time of the final dissolution, the contingence of the non-destruction of the colour, smell, taste etc., present in the earth-primal atoms.[68]

51. And thus dissolution is only in this form—of earth in waters, of waters in fire, of fire in air, of air in ether, of ether in the jīva's egoity, of this in Hiraṇyagarbha's egoity, and of this (last) in nescience.

"जगत्प्रतिष्ठा देवर्षे! पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयते ।
तेजस्यापः प्रलीयन्ते तेजो वायौ प्रलीयते ॥
वायुश्च लीयते व्योम्नि तच्चाव्यक्ते प्रलीयते ।
अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्! निष्कले च प्रलीयते ।"

इति । एवंविधप्रलयकारणत्वं तत्पदार्थस्य ब्रह्मणस्तटस्थलक्षणम् ।

५२. ननु वेदान्तैर्ब्रह्मणि जगत्कारणत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यमाने सति सप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म स्यात्, अन्यथा सृष्टिवाक्यानामप्रामाण्यापत्तेः ।

५३. इति चेत्, न । न हि सृष्टिवाक्यानां सृष्टौ तात्पर्यम्, किन्त्वद्वये ब्रह्मण्येव ।

That has been said in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*: 'O Divine Sage, the earth in which the world is established is merged in the waters; the waters are merged in fire, fire is merged in air, and air is merged in ether; and that is merged in the non-manifest; and the non-manifest, O brāhmaṇa, is merged in the partless puruṣa.' Causality in respect of this kind of dissolution is the definition *per accidens* of Brahman, the denotation of the word 'That'.

52. 'Now, Brahman being declared by Vedāntas to be the cause of the world, Brahman would be related to the universe, as otherwise there is the contingence of invalidity for the creational texts.'

53. If this be said, no. For, the purport of the creational texts is not in respect of creation, but only in respect of the non-dual Brahman.

५४. तत्प्रतिपत्तौ कथं सृष्टेरुपयोगः ?

५५. इत्थम्—यदि सृष्टिमनुपन्यस्य प्रपञ्चस्य निषेधो ब्रह्मणि प्रतिपाद्येत, तदा ब्रह्मणि प्रतिषिद्धस्य प्रपञ्चस्य वायौ प्रतिषिद्धस्य रूपस्येव ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्रावस्थानशङ्कायां न निर्विचिकित्समद्वितीयत्वं प्रतिपादितं स्यात् । ततः सृष्टिवाक्यात् ब्रह्मोपादेयत्वज्ञाने सत्युपादानं विना कार्यस्यान्यत्र सद्भावशङ्कायाः निरस्ततया "नेति नेति" इत्यादिना ब्रह्मण्यपि तस्यासत्त्वोपपादने प्रपञ्चस्य तुच्छत्वावगमे निरस्तनिखिलद्वैतविभ्रममखण्डसच्चिदानन्दैकरसं ब्रह्म सिद्ध्यति ; इति परम्परया सृष्टिवाक्यानामद्वितीये ब्रह्मण्येव तात्पर्यम् ।

54. 'In knowing the latter, how is there utility for (the declaration of) creation ?'

55. Thus (it is). If without introducing creation there had been declared the negation of the world in Brahman, then there being the doubt that, as in the case of colour negated in relation to air, for the world negated in relation to Brahman, there may be validity elsewhere than in Brahman, indubitable non-duality would not have been declared. Therefore, when, because of the creational text, there is the cognition of being a product of Brahman as the material cause, the doubt as to the existence of the product elsewhere than in the material cause is refuted ; when by texts like 'Not this, not this (*Bṛh.*, II, iii, 6)' its non-reality even in Brahman is declared, the unreality of the world is known ; thence results Brahman, that is free from all delusions of duality and is of the one homogeneous essence of the impartite reality, consciousness, bliss ; hence indirectly there is for the creational texts purport only in respect of the non-dual Brahman.

५६. उपासनाप्रकरणपठितसगुणब्रह्मवाक्यानां उपासनाविध्यपेक्षितगुणारोपमात्रपरत्वं न गुणपरत्वम् ।

५७. निर्गुणप्रकरणपठितानां सगुणवाक्यानान्तु निषेधवाक्यापेक्षितनिषेध्यसम्पादकत्वेन विनियोगः । इति न किञ्चिदपि वाक्यमद्वितीयब्रह्मप्रतिपादनेन विरुध्यते ।

५८. तदेवं स्वरूपतटस्थलक्षणलक्षितं तत्पदवाच्यमीश्वरचैतन्यं मायाप्रतिबिम्बितमिति केचित् । तेषामयमाशयः । जीवपरमेश्वरसाधारणचैतन्यमात्रं बिम्बम्; तस्यैव बिम्बस्याविद्यात्मिकायां मायायां प्रतिबिम्ब-

56. For the texts about saguṇa Brahman occurring in contexts relating to meditation (upāsanā), there is purport only in respect of the super-imposition of the qualities needed by the injunctions of contemplation, but no purport in respect of the qualities (as themselves real).

57. As for the saguṇa texts occurring in contexts relating to the nirguṇa, there is application as making available the negated, which is required by the negative statements. Thus there is no text whatsoever which conflicts with the declaration of the non-dual Brahman.

58. That the Īs'vara-caitanya, the denotation of the word 'That' defined thus by definitions *per proprium* and *per accidens*, is māyā-reflected, say some. This is their idea. That consciousness alone which is common both to the jīva and to Paramesvara is the prototype; of this same prototype the reflection in māyā, of the

मीश्वरचैतन्यम् ; अन्तःकरणेषु प्रतिबिम्बं जीवचैतन्यम् ; "कार्योपाधिरयं जीवः कारणोपाधिरीश्वरः" इति श्रुतेः ।

५९. एतन्मते जलाशयगतशरावजलगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्बयोरिव जीवपरमेश्वरयोर्भेदः । अविद्यात्मकोपाधेर्व्यापकतया तदुपाधिकेश्वरस्यापि व्यापकत्वम् ; अन्तःकरणस्य परिच्छिन्नतया तदुपाधिकजीवस्यापि परिच्छिन्नत्वम् ।

६०. एतन्मते अविद्याकृतदोषा जीवे इव परमेश्वरेऽपि स्युः, उपाधेः प्रतिबिम्बपक्षपातित्वात् ।

६१. इत्यस्वरसात् बिम्बात्मकमीश्वरचैतन्यमिति अपरे । तेषा-

nature of nescience, is Īs'vara-caitanya ; the reflection in internal organs is jīva-caitanya ; for there is the s'ruti 'This jīva has the product for (his) adjunct, Īs'vara has the cause (māyā) for adjunct.'

59. On this view, the difference between jīva and Parames'vara is like that between two reflections of the sun in a sheet of water and in a basin. Because of the pervasiveness of the adjunct, of the nature of nescience, there is pervasiveness even for Īs'vara limited thereby ; because of the finitude of the internal organ, there is finitude of the jīva too limited thereby.[69]

60. On this view, the defects due to nescience would, as in the jīva, be present in Īs'vara too, because of the adjunct having a leaning to the reflection (*i..e*, affecting the reflection).

61. Because of this unsuitability, others hold that Īs'vara-caitanya is of the nature of the prototype.

मयमाशयः । एकमेव चैतन्यं बिम्बत्वाक्रान्तमीश्वरचैतन्यं, प्रतिबिम्बत्वाक्रान्तं जीवचैतन्यम् । बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बकल्पनोपाधिश्च एकजीववादेऽविद्या, अनेकजीववादे अन्तःकरणान्येव ।

६२. अविद्यान्तःकरणरूपोपाधिप्रयुक्तो जीवपरभेदः ; उपाधिकृतदोषाश्च प्रतिबिम्बे जीव एव वर्तन्ते, न तु बिम्बे परमेश्वरे, उपाधेः प्रतिबिम्बपक्षपातित्वात् । एतन्मते च गगनसूर्यस्य जलादौ भासमानप्रतिबिम्बसूर्यस्येव जीवपरयोः भेदः ।

६३. ननु ग्रीवास्थमुखस्यदर्पणप्रदेश इव बिम्बचैतन्यस्य परमेश्वरस्य जीवप्रदेशेऽभावात् तस्य सर्वान्तर्यामित्वं न स्यात् ।

This is their idea. One and the same consciousness possessed by prototype nature is the Īs'vara-caitanya, and possessed by reflection-nature is the jīva-caitanya. And the adjunct for positing prototype and reflection is nescience, on the view of the jīva as one, and the internal organs alone, on the view of the jīvas as many.[70]

62. The difference between the jīva and the Supreme is occasioned by (difference in) the adjuncts, *viz.*, nescience or the internal organ; and the defects caused by the adjuncts exist only in the reflection, the jīva, but not in the prototype, Parames'vara, since the adjunct has a leaning to (*i.e.*, affects) the reflection (alone). And on this view the difference between the jīva and the Supreme is like that between the sun in the sky and the solar reflections appearing in water etc.

63. 'Now, since there is not for the prototype consciousness, Parames'vara, existence in the locality of the jīva, as (there is not) for the face on one's (own) neck (existence) in the locality of the mirror, there

६४. इति चेत्, न; साभ्रनक्षत्रस्याकाशस्य जलादौ प्रतिबिम्बितत्वे बिम्बभूतमहाकाशस्यापि जलादिप्रवेशसम्बन्धदर्शनेन परिच्छिन्नबिम्बस्य प्रतिबिम्बदेशासम्बन्धेऽप्यपरिच्छिन्नब्रह्मबिम्बस्य प्रतिबिम्बप्रदेशसम्बन्धाविरोधात्।

६५. न च रूपहीनस्य ब्रह्मणो न प्रतिबिम्बसम्भवः, रूपवत एव तथात्वदर्शनादिति वाच्यम्; नीरूपस्यापि रूपस्य प्रतिबिम्बदर्शनात्।

६६. न च नीरूपस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रतिबिम्बाभावनियमः; आत्मनो द्रव्यत्वाभावस्योक्तत्वात्।

would not be for that (Parames'vara) internal rulership in respect of all.'

64. If this be said, no; for, even when of the ether (sky) together with the clouds and stars there is reflection in water etc., there being seen for the prototype too, ether at large, (inasmuch as it is pervasive) relation to the locality of water etc. (the reflecting medium), (it follows that) though for a finite prototype there is no relation to the locality of the reflection, there is no conflict in there being for the infinite prototype, Brahman, relation to the locality of the reflection.[71]

65. Nor may it be said that of Brahman, which is colourless, reflection is impossible, since that nature (of being reflected) is seen only in the case of what has colour; for, reflection is seen of colour, though it possesses no colour.

66. Nor (may there be urged) a rule that for a colourless *substance* (unlike colour, which is a *quality*) there is no reflection; for, it has been (already) said that there is no substance-ness for the self.

६७. "एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्", "यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वान् अपो भिन्ना बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन्" इत्यादिवाक्येन ब्रह्मप्रतिबिम्बाभावानुमानस्य बाधितत्वाच्च।

६८. तदेवं तत्पदार्थो निरूपितः। इदानीं त्वम्पदार्थो निरूप्यते। एकजीववादेऽविद्याप्रतिबिम्बो जीवः; अनेकजीववादे तु अन्तःकरणप्रतिबिम्बः।

६९. स च जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिरूपावस्थात्रयवान्।

७०. तत्र जाग्रद्दशा नाम इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानावस्था; अवस्थान्तरे इन्द्रियाभावात्, नातिव्याप्तिः। इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानञ्चान्तःकरणवृत्तिः; स्वरूपज्ञानस्यानादित्वात्।

67. Further, the inference of non-existence of reflection of Brahman is sublated by such (s'ruti) texts as 'It is seen as one and as many like the moon reflected in water', 'Just as this single Vivasvān, the resplendent being, recurs in different waters as different (reflections)' etc.

68. Thus then the sense of the word 'That' has been expounded. Now, the sense of the word 'Thou' is expounded. On the view of a single jīva, the jīva is the reflection in nescience; on the view of many jīvas, however, he is the reflection in the internal organ.

69. And he possesses three states, waking, dream and sleep.

70. Of these, what is called the waking state is the state of sense-generated cognition; since in other states, there is no (functioning of) sense, there is no over-pervasion. And sense-generated cognition is a psychosis of the internal organ; for the knowledge that is one's (own) nature is beginningless (and ungenerated).

७१. सा चान्तःकरणवृत्तिरावरणाभिभवार्थत्येकं मतम्। तथा हि—अविद्योपहितचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वपक्षे घटाद्यधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य जीवरूपतया जीवस्य सर्वदा घटादिभानप्रसक्तौ घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरकमज्ञानं मूलाविद्यापरतन्त्रमवस्थापदवाच्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्; एवं सति न सर्वदा घटादेर्भानप्रसङ्गः, अनावृतचैतन्यस्यैव भानप्रयोजकत्वात्। तस्य चावरणस्य सदातनत्वे कदाचिदपि घटादिभानं न स्यादिति तद्भङ्गे वक्तव्ये तद्भङ्गजनकं चैतन्यमात्रम् न, तद्भासकस्य तदनिवर्त्तकत्वात्; नापि वृत्त्युपहितं चैतन्यम्,

71. And this psychosis of the internal organ is for the purpose of dispelling obscuration: this is one view. It is thus: One the view that the Jīva is consciousness qualified *per accidens* by nescience, the consciousness, which is the substrate of pot etc., being of the nature of the jīva (too), there is the contingence of pot etc., being constantly manifest to the jīva; hence there has to be admitted a nescience, which veils consciousness as defined by pot etc., is dependent on primal nescience and is called a mode (of nescience); this being the case, there is not the contingence of constant manifestation of pot etc., inasmuch as only unobscured consciousness is the determinant of manifestation. And since, if this obscuration were permanent, there would never be manifestation of pot etc., its removal has to be stated; the cause of its removal is not bare consciousness, since what manifests that (obscuration) cannot be (also) what removes it; nor can it be consciousness qualified *per accidens* by psychosis, because of the contingence of that removal even in a case of mediate

परोक्षस्थलेऽपि तन्निवृत्त्यापत्तेः; इति परोक्षव्यावृत्तवृत्तिविशेषस्य तदुपहित-चैतन्यस्य वा आवरणभङ्गजनकत्वम्; इति आवरणाभिभवार्था वृत्तिरित्युच्यते ।

७२. सम्बन्धार्था वृत्तिरित्यपरं मतम् । तत्राप्यविद्योपाधिकोऽपरिच्छिन्नो जीवः । स च घटादिप्रदेशे विद्यमानोऽपि घटाद्याकारापरोक्षवृत्ति-विरहदशायां न घटादिकमवभासयति, घटादिना सम्बन्धाभावात्; तत्तदा-कारवृत्तिदशायां तु भासयति, तदा सम्बन्धसत्त्वात् ।

७३. नन्वविद्योपाधिकस्यापरिच्छिन्नजीवस्य स्वत एव समस्तवस्तु-सम्बद्धस्य वृत्तिविरहदशायां सम्बन्धाभावाभिधानमसङ्गतम्; असङ्गत्वदृष्ट्या च सम्बन्धाभावाभिधाने वृत्त्यनन्तरमपि सम्बन्धो न स्यात् ।

cognition; hence the capacity to cause removal of that obcuration belongs to a psychosis other than mediate or to consciousness qualified *per accidens* by such (psychosis); hence it is said that the psychosis is for the purpose of dispelling obcuration.

72. The psychosis is for the sake of (establishing) relation: this is another view. Here too, the jīva is nescience-conditioned and infinite (consciousness). And this, though present in the locality of pot etc., does not manifest pot etc., in the state of absence of immediate psychoses with the form of pot etc., since there is no relation to pot etc.; it does, however, manifest in the stage of (the presence of) psychoses with the respective forms, since relation exists then.

73. 'Now, in the case of the nescience-conditioned, infinite jīva, which of its own nature is related to all things, it is absurd to declare unrelatedness in the stage of absence of psychoses; and if non-relatedness be stated in the view of (the self) being non-attached,

७४. इति चेत्, उच्यते; न हि वृत्तिविरहदशायां जीवस्य घटादिना सह सम्बन्धसामान्यं निषेधामहे। किं तर्हि? घटभानप्रयोजकं सम्बन्धविशेषम्।

७५. स च सम्बन्धविशेषो विषयस्य जीवचैतन्यस्य च व्यङ्ग्य-व्यञ्जकभावलक्षणः कादाचित्कस्तदाकारवृत्तिनिबन्धनः। तथा हि—तैजसमन्तःकरणं स्वच्छद्रव्यत्वात् स्वत एव जीवचैतन्याभिव्यञ्जनसमर्थम्; घटादिकन्तु न तथा, अस्वच्छद्रव्यत्वात्; स्वाकारवृत्तिसंयोगदशायान्तु वृत्त्यभिभूतजाड्यधर्मकतया वृत्त्युत्पादितचैतन्याभिव्यञ्जनयोग्यताश्रयतया च वृत्त्यु-

there would be no relation, even subsequent to the psychosis.[72]

74. If this be said, it is said (in reply): we do not indeed deny of the jīva relation in general to pot etc., in the stage of absence of psychoses. What then? (We do deny) a particular (variety of) relation that is the determinant of pot-manifestation.

75. And that particular relation between the content and the jīva-consciousness is of the nature of the manifested-and-manifester, is occasional (non-permanent), and is conditioned by a psychosis with the form of that (content). It is thus: the luminous internal organ, being a pure substance, is of itself capable of manifesting the jīva's consciousness; but pot etc., are not so, being impure substances; when, however, in conjunction with psychoses having the form of (those objects) themselves, then, as possessed of the attribute of psychosis-over-powered inertness and as the locus of a psychosis-generated capacity to manifest

दयानन्तरं चैतन्यमभिव्यनक्ति। तदुक्तं विवरणे "अन्तःकरणं हि स्वस्मिन्निव स्वसंसर्गिण्यपि घटादौ चैतन्याभिव्यक्तियोग्यतामापादयति" इति; दृष्टञ्चास्वच्छद्रव्यस्यापि स्वच्छद्रव्यसम्बन्धदशायां प्रतिबिम्बग्राहित्वम्; यथा कुड्यादेर्जलादिसंयोगदशायां मुखादिप्रतिबिम्बग्राहिता। घटादेरभिव्यञ्जकत्वञ्च तत्प्रतिबिम्बग्राहित्वम्; चैतन्याभिव्यक्तत्वञ्च तत्र प्रतिबिम्बितत्वम्। एवंविधाभिव्यञ्जकत्वसिद्ध्यर्थमेव वृत्तेरपरोक्षस्थले बहिर्निर्गमनाङ्गीकारः; परोक्षस्थले तु वह्न्यादेर्वृत्तिसंयोगाभावेन चैतन्यानभिव्यञ्जकतया नापरो-

consciousness, it does manifest consciousness immediately after the rise of a psychosis. That has been said in the *Vivaraṇa* (p. 70): 'The internal organ indeed, brings about even in what is in conjunction with it, the capacity, such as (exists) in itself, to manifest consciousness;' and it is seen even of an impure substance, when in conjunction with a pure substance, that there is capacity to take on a reflection; *e.g.*, the capacity of a wall etc., when in conjunction with water etc., to take on the reflection of (*i.e.*, to reflect) face etc. The manifesting capacity of pot etc., consists in taking on the reflection of that (consciousness); and the manifestedness of consciousness consists in being reflected in those (pot etc). It is only for securing this kind of manifesting capacity that of the psychosis in the case of immediate cognition (perception) there is admitted a going forth; in the case of the mediate cognition, however, there being no conjunction of the fire etc., with the psychosis, there is no manifestation of consciousness (and consequently) no immediacy. On this view, it is

क्षत्वम् । तन्मते विषयाणामपरोक्षत्वं चैतन्याभिव्यञ्जकत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम् । एवं जीस्यापरिच्छिन्नत्वेऽपि वृत्तेः सम्बन्धार्थत्वं निरूपितम् ।

७६. इदानीं परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे सम्बन्धार्थत्वं निरूप्यते । तथा हि । अन्तःकरणोपाधिको जीवः । तस्य च न घटाद्युपादानता, घटादिदेशासम्बन्धात् । किन्तु ब्रह्मैव घटाद्युपादानम्, तस्य मायोपहितचैतन्यस्य सकलघटाद्यन्वयित्वात् । अत एव ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञता । तथा च जीवस्य घटाद्यधिष्ठानब्रह्मचैतन्याभेदमन्तरेण घटाद्यवभासासम्भवे प्राप्ते तदवभासाय घटाद्यधिष्ठानब्रह्मचैतन्याभेदसिद्ध्यर्थं घटाद्याकारवृत्तिरिष्यते ।

to be understood that the immediacy of objects consists in (their) manifesting consciousness. Thus has been demonstrated the psychosis being for the sake of relation, even if the jīva is unlimited.

76. Now is demonstrated its being for the sake of relation, on the view of (the jīva's) finitude. It is thus. The jīva is what has the internal organ for a limiting adjunct. And he is not the material cause of pot etc., because of being unrelated to the locality of pot etc. Rather is Brahman itself the material cause of pot etc., since for this consciousness qualified *per accidens* by māyā, there is relation to all, pot etc. For the same reason there is Brahman's omniscience. And thus, since for the jīva, in the absence of non-difference from the Brahman-consciousness, the substrate of pot etc., there results the impossibility to manifest pot etc., in order to secure, for the sake of that manifestation, non-difference from Brahman-consciousness, the substrate of pot etc., there is acknowledged psychosis with the form of pot etc.

७७. ननु वृत्त्यापि कथं प्रमातृविषयचैतन्ययोरभेदः सम्पाद्यते घटान्तःकरणरूपोपाधिभेदेन तदवच्छिन्नचैतन्ययोरभेदासम्भवात् ?

७८. इति चेन्न; वृत्तेर्बहिर्देशनिर्गमनाङ्गीकारेण वृत्त्यन्तःकरणविषयाणामेकदेशस्थत्वेनोपधेयभेदाभावस्योक्तत्वात् । एवमपरोक्षस्थले मतभेदेन वृत्तेर्विनियोग उपपादितः ।

७९. इन्द्रियाजन्यविषयगोचरापरोक्षान्तःकरणवृत्त्यवस्था स्वप्नावस्था । जाग्रदवस्थाव्यावृत्त्यर्थमिन्द्रियाजन्येति ; अविद्यावृत्तिमत्यां सुषुप्तावतिव्याप्तिवारणायान्तःकरणेति ।

77. 'Now, even by the psychosis, how is there brought about the non-difference of the cogniser-consciousness and the content-consciousness, inasmuch as, because of the difference in the adjuncts, *viz.*, pot and internal organ, non-difference is impossible (even) between the consciousnesses defined by these ?'

78. If this be said, no ; for, it has been said that, inasmuch as, by the admission of a going forth of the psychosis, a common location results for the psychosis, the internal organ and the content, there is no difference in what is qualified (by these *per accidens*). Thus has been explained the utility of the psychosis in immediate cognition, according to different views.

79. The dream-state is a state of such immediate psychosis of the internal organ, as has for its sphere not-sense-generated content. The (words) 'not-sense-generated' are for the sake of excluding the waking state ; the (words) 'internal organ' are for the sake of avoiding over-pervasion of the sleep-state which has psychoses (transformations) of nescience.

८०. सुषुप्तिर्नामाविद्यागोचराविद्यावृत्त्यवस्था। जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरविद्याकारवृत्तेरन्तःकरणवृत्तित्वान्न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः।

८१. अत्र केचित् मरणमूर्च्छयोरवस्थान्तरत्वमाहुः; अपरे सुषुप्तावेव तयोरन्तर्भावमाहुः। तत्र तयोरवस्थात्रयान्तर्भावबहिर्भावयोस्त्वम्पदार्थनिरूपणे उपयोगाभावान्न तत्र यत्यते।

८२. तस्य मायोपाध्यपेक्षयैकत्वम्, अन्तःकरणोपाध्यपेक्षया नानात्वं व्यवह्रियते।

८३. एतेन जीवस्याणुत्वं प्रत्युक्तम्; "बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव

80. What is called sleep is a state of nescience psychosis (transformation) having nescience (constant blissfulness of sleep) for its sphere.[73] Since the psychoses of waking and dream, which have the form of nescience, are psychoses (transformations) of the internal organ (primarily, and of nescience, only indirectly), there is no over-pervasion of these.

81. Here some declare of death and swoon that they are distinct states; others declare their inclusion even under sleep. Since (the consideration of) this inclusion or non-inclusion in the three is of no utility in the exposition of the sense of the word 'Thou', no effort is (here) made in connection with that.[74]

82. Of this (denotation of 'Thou') there is mention of unity in the view of māyā as the adjunct, and of multiplicity in the view of the internal organ as the adjunct.

83. Hereby is refuted the atomicity of the jīva; for, in texts like 'Through the quality of the buddhi and

ह्याराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्टः" इत्यादौ जीवस्य बुद्धिशब्दवाच्यान्तःकरण-परिमाणोपाधिकस्य परमाणुत्वाश्रवणात् ।

८४. स च जीवः स्वयंप्रकाशः, स्वप्नावस्थामधिकृत्य "अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिः" इतिश्रुतेः । अनुभवरूपश्च, "प्रज्ञानघन एव" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । 'अनुभवामि' इति व्यवहारस्तु वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यमादायोपपद्यते । एवं त्वम्पदार्थो निरूपितः ।

८५. अधुना तत्त्वम्पदार्थयोरैक्यं महावाक्यप्रतिपाद्यमभिधीयते ।

८६. ननु 'नाहमीश्वरः' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षेण, किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञ-

through the quality of the self, the lower (self) is seen as of the size of the point of an awl (*S'vet.*, V, 8)' etc., what is declared (even) of the jīva, whose adjunct is of the size of the internal organ denoted by the word 'buddhi', is not the size of a primal atom (but the medium size of the internal organ).[75]

84. And this jīva is self-luminous, because of the s'ruti text 'Here this person is himself light (*Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 9)' in the consideration of the dream-state. And he is also of the nature of experience, because of texts like 'He is but a mass of consciousness (*Bṛh.*, IV, v, 13)'. As for the verbal usage 'I experience', that is intelligible in relation to consciousness as reflected in the psychosis. Thus has been expounded the sense of the word 'Thou'.

85. Now is declared that identity of the denotations of 'That' and 'Thou', which is declared by the major (Upaniṣadic) text.

86. Now, the difference of jīva from the Supreme is known, through such perceptual cognition as 'I am

त्वविरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वादिलिङ्गेन, "द्वा सुपर्णा" इत्यादिश्रुत्या, "द्वाविमौ पुरुषो लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च। क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते" इत्यादिस्मृत्या च जीवपरभेदस्यावगतत्वेन तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं "आदित्यो यूपः", "यजमानः प्रस्तरः" इत्यादिवाक्यवदुपचरितार्थमेव।

८७. इति चेन्न; भेदप्रत्यक्षस्य सम्भावितकरणदोषस्यासम्भावितदोषवेदजन्यज्ञानेन बाध्यमानत्वात्; अन्यथा चन्द्रगताधिकपरिमाणग्राहिज्योतिःशास्त्रस्य चन्द्रप्रादेशग्राहिप्रत्यक्षेण बाधापत्तेः।

८८. पाकरक्ते घटे 'रक्तोऽयं न श्यामः' इतिवत् सविशेषणे हीति न्यायेन जीवपरभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षस्य विशेषणीभूतधर्मभेदविषयत्वाच्च।

not Īs'vara', through *probans* like being the loci of such conflicting attributes as parviscience and omniscience, through such s'ruti texts as 'Two birds (*Muṇḍ.*, III, i, 1)' etc., and through such smṛti texts as 'There are these two persons in the world, the kṣara and the akṣara; all living beings are kṣara; the immutable is called akṣara (*Gīta*, XV, 16);' hence texts like 'That thou art' have but a figurative sense like 'The stake is the sun', 'The strew is the sacrificer' etc.[76]

87. If this be said, no; for, the perception of difference, wherein defects are possible, is sublated by Veda-generated cognition, wherein defects are not possible; else for astronomical science which apprehends the moon as big in size, there would be contingence of sublation by perception apprehending the moon as of the size of a span.[77]

88. Further, as in (the cognition) 'This is red, not black' with reference to a pot that has become red by baking, so, on the principle that '(Affirmation

८९. अत एव नानुमानमपि प्रमाणम्, आगमविरोधात्, मेरुपाषाणमयत्वानुमानवत्।

९०. नाप्यागमान्तरविरोधः; तत्परातत्परवाक्ययोस्तत्परवाक्यस्य बलवत्त्वेन लोकसिद्धभेदानुवादिद्वासुपर्णादिवाक्यापेक्षया उपक्रमोसंहाराद्यवगताद्वैततात्पर्यविशिष्टस्य तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यस्य प्रबलत्वात्।

९१. न च जीवपरैक्ये विरुद्धधर्माश्रयत्वानुपपत्तिः; शीतस्यैव

and negation applying) to what has a qualification, (will, when there is sublation in respect of the substrate qualified, attach to the qualification)', the perception apprehending the difference of the jīva from the Supreme has for content the attributes which are the qualifications (of the two, not the substrates, which are identical).

89. For the same reason, not even inference is valid (to establish difference), because of conflict with revelation, like the inference that Mount Meru consists of stones.

90. Nor is there conflict with other revelation; for as between a text having (a certain sense as) purport and a text not having (such sense as) purport, the text having that as purport is of greater force; hence in comparison with a text like 'Two birds (*Muṇḍ.*, III, i, 1)' restating difference found in experience, a text like 'That thou art' qualified by (having for) purport non-duality, known from the (harmony of) introductory and concluding passages etc., is of greater force.

91. Nor, if the jīva and the Supreme be one, is there the unintelligibility of (their) being substrates of conflicting attributes; for, just as for water which is

जलस्यौपाधिकौष्ण्याश्रयत्ववत् स्वभावतो निर्गुणस्यैव तस्यान्तःकरणाद्युपाधिककर्तृत्वाद्याश्रयत्वप्रतिभासोपपत्तेः । यदि च जलादावौष्ण्यमारोपितम्, तदा प्रकृतेऽपि तुल्यम् ।

९२. न च 'सिद्धान्ते कर्तृत्वस्य क्वचिदप्यभावादारोप्यप्रमाहितसंस्काराभावे कथमारोपः ?' इति वाच्यम् ।

९३. लाघवेनारोप्यविषयकसंस्कारत्वेनैव तस्य हेतुत्वात् ।

९४. न च प्राथमिकारोपे का गतिः ? कर्तृत्वाद्यध्यासप्रवाहस्यानादित्वात् ।

but cool, there is the quality of being the locus of heat through an *accidens*, similarly in the case of that (Brahman) which is but quality-less, presentation as the locus of agency etc., is intelligible, through *accidens* like the internal organ. And if heat be (considered) superimposed on water etc., then there is parity (of that) in the present case too.

92. Nor may it be asked 'Since in (your) final position, there is not agency anywhere, there being no residual impression caused by valid cognition of the (agency etc.) superimposed, how can there be superimposition ?'

93. For, by parsimony, the causality of that (residual impression) is only as residual impression of that (cognition) which has the superimposed for content (not as residual impression of *valid* cognition).

94. Nor (may it be asked) 'What is the explanation of the first superimposition ?'; for the stream of superimposition of agency etc., is beginningless.

९५. तत्त्वम्पदवाच्ययोर्विशिष्टयोरैक्यायोग्यत्वेऽपि लक्ष्यस्वरूपयोरैक्यमुपपादितमेव। अत एव तत्प्रतिपादकतत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानामखण्डार्थत्वम्, सोऽयमित्यादिवाक्यवत्।

९६. न च कार्यपराणामेव प्रामाण्यम्; 'चैत्र पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यादौ सिद्धेऽपि सङ्गतिग्रहात्।

९७. एवं सर्वप्रमाणाविरुद्धं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणप्रतिपाद्यं जीवपरैक्यं वेदान्तशास्त्रस्य विषय इति सिद्धम्।

इति विषयपरिच्छेदः॥

95. Though identity as between the qualified, which are the expressed denotations of 'That' and 'Thou' is impossible, the identity of the implied entities has already been explained.[78] Hence it is that for texts declaring it, like 'That thou art', there is impartite sense, as in sentences like 'This is that (Devadatta)'.

96. Nor is there validity for such (sentences) alone as have kārya (what is to be done or accomplished) for purport; for, relation (to sense) is apprehended, even in respect of an existent, in 'Caitra! a son is born to you' etc.

97. Thus it is established that the content of the Vedānta-s'āstra is the identity of the jīva and the Supreme, which is not opposed to any pramāṇa, and is declared by s'ruti, smṛti, itihāsa and purāṇa.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON OBJECTS

नवमः परिच्छेदः

प्रयोजनम्

१. इदानीं प्रयोजनं निरूप्यते। यदवगतं सत् स्ववृत्तितयेष्यते तत् प्रयोजनम्।

२. तच्च द्विविधम्—मुख्यं गौणञ्चेति। तत्र सुखदुःखाभावौ मुख्ये प्रयोजने; तदन्यतरसाधनं गौणं प्रयोजनम्।

३. सुखञ्च द्विविधं सातिशयं निरतिशयञ्चेति।

CHAPTER IX

THE FRUIT

1. Now, the fruit is expounded. That which, when known as in (relation to) oneself, is desired (in that same form) is the fruit.[79]

2. And that is of two kinds—principal and secondary. Of these, happiness and non-existence of misery are principal fruits; the means to either of these is a secondary fruit.

3. And happiness is of two kinds—the surpassable and the unsurpassable.

४. तत्र सातिशयं सुखं विषयानुषङ्गजनितान्तःकरणवृत्तितारतम्यकृतानन्दलेशाविर्भावविशेषः ; "एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति" इतिश्रुतेः ।

५. निरतिशयं सुखञ्च ब्रह्मैव, "आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्", "विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

६. आनन्दात्मकब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्च मोक्षः ; शोकनिवृत्तिश्च ; "ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति", "तरति शोकमात्मवित्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

७. न तु लोकान्तरावाप्तिः तज्जन्यवैषयिकानन्दो वा मोक्षः ; तस्य कृतकत्वेनानित्यत्वे मुक्तस्य पुनरावृत्त्यापत्तेः ।

4. Of these, the surpassable is a particular manifestation, of a fragment of bliss, effected by grades of internal-organ-psychosis generated by contact with objects ; for there is the s'ruti text 'Other beings subsist in dependence on but a fraction of this same (Brahman-) bliss (*Bṛh.*, IV, iii, 32)'.

5. And unsurpassable happiness is Brahman itself, because of such s'ruti texts as 'He knew bliss to be Brahman (*Taitt.*, III, 6)', 'Brahman is knowledge, bliss (*Bṛh.*, III, ix, 28)' etc.

6. Release is the attainment of Brahman, of the nature of bliss ; (it is) also the removal of sorrow ; for there are such s'ruti texts as 'The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman itself (cp. *Muṇḍ.*, III, ii, 9)', 'The knower of the self passes beyond sorrow (*Chānd.*, VII, i, 3)' etc.

7. Release is not, however, the attainment of some other world or some object-generated bliss produced there ; for, that being non-eternal, as something

८. ननु त्वन्मतेऽप्यानन्दावाप्तेरनर्थनिवृत्तेश्च सादित्वे तुल्यो दोषः ; अनादित्वे मोक्षमुद्दिश्य श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः ।

९. इति चेत्, न ; सिद्धस्यैव ब्रह्मरूपस्य मोक्षस्यासिद्धत्वभ्रमेण तत्साधने प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः । अनर्थनिवृत्तिरप्यधिष्ठानभूतब्रह्मस्वरूपतया सिद्धैव ।

१०. लोकेऽपि प्राप्तप्राप्तिपरिहृतपरिहारयोः प्रयोजनत्वं दृष्टमेव । यथा हस्तगतविस्मृतसुवर्णादौ 'तव हस्ते सुवर्णम्' इत्याप्तोपदेशादप्राप्तमिव

generated, there is the contingence of fresh return (to saṃsāra) for the released one.

8. 'Now, in your view too, for the attainment of bliss and the removal of misery, if they have a beginning, there is parity of (the above) defect ; if beginningless, there is unintelligibility of appetence in respect of hearing (study of the Vedānta)' etc.

9. If this be said, no ; for, in the case of release, which is certainly already existent and of the nature of Brahman, there being the delusion of non-existence, appetence for bringing about its existence is intelligible. Even the removal of misery, being of the nature of Brahman, that is its substrate, is certainly already existent.

10. Even in ordinary experience, the nature of being the fruit is certainly seen in respect of the attainment of the attained and the removal of the removed. *E.g.*, in respect of gold etc., present in one's hand but forgotten, one attains, as it were, the unattained, when apprised by a trustworthy person 'the gold is in your

प्राप्नोति ; यथा वा वलयितचरणायां स्रजि सर्पत्वभ्रमवतः पुंसो 'नायं सर्पः' इत्याप्तवाक्यात् परिहृतस्यैव सर्पस्य परिहारः प्रसिद्धः । एवं प्राप्तस्याप्यानन्दस्य प्राप्तिः, परिहृतस्याप्यनर्थस्य निवृत्तिर्मोक्षः प्रयोजनम् ।

११. स च ज्ञानैकसाध्यः, "तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति । नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय" इतिश्रुतेः ; अज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्ज्ञानैकसाध्यत्वनियमाच्च ।

१२. तच्च ज्ञानं ब्रह्मात्मैक्यगोचरम् ; "अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि", "तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इतिश्रुतेश्च ; "तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थं ज्ञानं मोक्षस्य साधनम्" इतिनारदीयवचनाच्च ।

hand'; or else, in the case of a person, who in respect of a garland entangling his feet has the delusion that it is a snake, there is well-known the removal of the already removed by the statement of a trustworthy person 'that is not a serpent'. Similarly, the attainment even of the already attained bliss and the removal even of the already removed misery constitute the fruit, *viz.*, release.

11. And this is achievable by knowledge alone, beause of the s'ruti text 'Knowing that alone, one passes beyond death; no other path exists to go by (*S'vet.*, III, 8)'; also because of the restrictive rule that removal of nescience is accomplishable solely by knowledge.

12. And this knowledge has for its sphere the identity of Brahman and the self; because of the s'ruti text 'Thou hast attained fearlessness, O Janaka (*Bṛh.*, IV, ii, 4)', 'Then he knew the self alone in the form "I am Brahman" (*Bṛh.*, I, iv, 10)'; also because of Nārada's statement 'The knowledge rising out of texts like "That thou art" is instrumental to release'.

१३. तच्च ज्ञानमपरोक्षरूपम् , परोक्षत्वे अपरोक्षभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तेः । तच्चापरोक्षज्ञानं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यादिति केचित् ; मनननिदिध्यासनसंस्कृतान्तःकरणादेवेत्यपरे ।

१४. तत्र पूर्वाचार्याणामयमाशयः—संविदापरोक्ष्यं न करणविशेषोत्पत्तिनिबन्धनम् ; किन्तु प्रमेयविशेषनिबन्धनम् ; इत्युपपादितम् ।

१५. तथा च ब्रह्मणः प्रमातृजीवाभिन्नतया तद्गोचरं शब्दजन्यं ज्ञानमप्यपरोक्षम् । अत एव प्रतर्दनाधिकरणे प्रतर्दनं प्रति "प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामायुरमृतमुपास्व" इतीन्द्रवाक्ये प्राणशब्दस्य ब्रह्मपरत्वे

13. And this knowledge is immediate in character, since, if it were mediate, the removal (by it) of delusion, which is immediate, would be unintelligible. And this immediate knowledge, some say, results (directly) from texts life 'That thou art'; others hold that it results only through the internal organ as purified by reflection and contemplation (of the sense of such texts).

14. In this (matter) the view of earlier preceptors is thus: the immediacy of cognition is not conditioned by origination through a particular instrument; rather is it conditioned by the particular object of cognition; this has been explained.

15. And thus, Brahman being non-different from the cognising jīva, in respect of that as sphere, even word-generated cognition is immediate. Hence it is that, in the section on Pratardana (*Br. Sū.*, I, i, 28-30), in the sentence addressed to Pratardana by Indra, *viz.*, 'I am prāṇa, the conscious self, contemplate

निश्चिते सति, "मामुपास्व" इत्यस्मच्छब्दानुपपत्तिमाशङ्क्य तदुत्तरत्वेन प्रवृत्ते "शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्" इत्यत्र सूत्रे शास्त्रीया दृष्टिः शास्त्रदृष्टिरिति तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्यम् "अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इति ज्ञानं शास्त्रदृष्टिशब्देनोक्तमिति ।

१६. अन्येषान्त्वेवमाशयः—करणविशेषनिबन्धनमेव ज्ञानानां प्रत्यक्षत्वम्; न विषयविशेषनिबन्धनम्; एकस्मिन्नेव सूक्ष्मवस्तुनि पटुकरणापटुकरणयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यवहारदर्शनात् ।

१७. तथा च संवित्साक्षात्त्वे इन्द्रियजन्यत्वस्यैव प्रयोजकतया न

me as that life, immortality (*Kauṣītaki*, III, 2)', it being settled that the word 'Prāṇa' has Brahman for purport, there arises the doubt as to the unintelligibility of the word 'me' in 'contemplate me'; and in the aphorism set out to answer this, *viz.*, 'But that teaching (about himself) is through the s'āstra-(accomplished) intuition, as in the case of Vāmadeva', by the word 's'astra-dṛṣṭi' is denoted the cognition 'I am Brahman' generated by texts like 'That thou art', because (of the etymology) s'āstra-dṛṣṭi is s'āstra-accomplished intuition.

16. The view of the others, however, is thus: the perceptuality of cognitions is solely conditioned by the instrument; it is not conditioned by the particular content; for, in respect of one and the same subtle object, there is seen the empirical usage of perceptibility and imperceptibility respectively, for those with sensitive and non-sensitive instruments (of cognition).

17. And thus, in respect of the directness (immediacy) of cognition, sense-generation being the sole

शब्दजन्यज्ञानस्यापरोक्षत्वम् । ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारेऽपि मनननिदिध्यासनसंस्कृतं मन एव करणम् ; "मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

१८. मनोऽगम्यत्वश्रुतिश्चासंस्कृतमनोविषया । न चैवं ब्रह्मण औपनिषदत्वानुपपत्तिः ; अस्मदुक्तमनसो वेदजन्यज्ञानानन्तरमेव प्रवृत्ततया वेदोपजीवित्वात् ; वेदानुपजीविमानान्तरगम्यत्वस्यैव वेदगम्यत्वविरोधात् ।

१९. शास्त्रदृष्टिसूत्रमपि ब्रह्मविषयमानसप्रत्यक्षस्य शास्त्रप्रयोज्य-

determinant, there is no immediacy for the word-generated cognition. Even for Brahman-intuition, the instrument is but the manas, purified by reflection and contemplation; because of texts like 'It is to be seen by the manas alone (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 19)' etc.

18. And the s'ruti text, about not being known by the manas, relates to the non-purified mind.[80] Nor thus is there the unintelligibility of Brahman being 'aupaniṣada (knowable solely through the Upaniṣads)' (*Bṛh.*, III, ix, 26); for the manas mentioned by us, inasmuch as it is active only in succession to the Veda-generated cognition, is certainly dependent on the Veda (inclusive of the Vedānta); there is conflict with being known through the Veda, only for the being known through some other means of cognition, as is not dependent on the Veda.

19. Even the aphorism about s'āstra-dṛṣṭi is intelligible, since the mānasic perception, whose content is Brahman, is brought about by the s'āstra. That has

त्वादुपपद्यते । तदुक्तम् "अपि संराधने सूत्राच्छास्त्रार्थध्यानजा प्रमा । शास्त्रदृष्टिर्मता तान्तु वेत्ति वाचस्पतिः परम्" इति ।

२०. तच्च ज्ञानं पापक्षयात् भवति, स च कर्मानुष्ठानात् ; इति परम्परया कर्मणां विनियोगः । अत एव "तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन" इत्यादिश्रुतिः, "कषाये कर्मभिः पक्के ततो ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते" इत्यादिस्मृतिश्च सङ्गच्छते ।

२१. एवं श्रवणमननिदिध्यासनान्यपि ज्ञानसाधनानि ; मैत्रेयी-ब्राह्मणे "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" इति दर्शनमनूद्य तत्साधनत्वेन

been said (in the *Kalpataru*, p. 218) : 'Because of the aphorism "Even in (periods of) devotion etc., (there is Brahman-realisation)" etc., s'āstra-dṛṣṭi is held to be such valid knowlege as arises from contemplation of the sense of the s'āstra ; that (*i. e.*, such valid knowledge) is, however, known only to Vācaspati'.

20. And this knowledge results from consumption of sin (pāpa-kṣaya), while this (in turn) results from observance of (obligatory) rites ; there is thus indirect utility for rites.[81] Hence it is that there fit in s'ruti texts like 'This (self) the brāhmaṇas desire to know, through study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through gifts, through the austerity of not eating (*Bṛh.*, IV, v, 22)', and smṛti texts like 'Demerit being brought to maturity (for destruction) by rites, knowledge sets in thereafter.'

21. Similarly, even hearing (Vedānta-study), reflection and contemplation are instruments of cognition ; for, in the Maitreyī-Brāhmaṇa, after restating intuition, in the words 'The self, verily, is to be seen (*Bṛh.*, II,

"श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः" इति श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनानां विधानात् ।

२२. तत्र श्रवणं नाम वेदान्तानामद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यावधारणानुकूलमानसी क्रिया ।

२३. मननं नाम शब्दावधारितेऽर्थे मानान्तरविरोधशङ्कायां तन्निराकरणानुकूलतर्कात्मकज्ञानजनको मानसव्यापारः ।

२४. निदिध्यासनं नाम अनादिदुर्वासनया विषयेष्वाकृष्यमाणस्य चित्तस्य विषयेभ्योऽपकृष्यात्मविषयकस्थैर्यानुकूलो मानसव्यापारः ।

iv, 5)', there is in the words 'It is to be heard, reflected on, contemplated' the (restrictive) injunction of hearing, reflection and contemplation as instruments of that (intuition).

22. What is called 'hearing' is that mental act which is helpful to the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedāntas in respect of the non-dual Brahman.

23. What is called 'reflection' is that mental operation, which, when in respect of the word-ascertained sense there is doubt of conflict with other pramāṇas, causes cognition, of the nature of tarka (*reductio ad absurdum*), helpful to remove that (doubt).

24. What is called 'contemplation' is that mental operation, which, in the case of the mind (citta) attracted to (external) objects by beginningless evil associations, is helpful to turn it away from (external) objects and secure firmness (for it) in respect of the self (alone) as object.

२५. तत्र निदिध्यासनं ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारे साक्षात्कारणम्, "ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन् देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम्" इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

२६. निदिध्यासने च मननं हेतुः, अकृतमननस्यार्थदार्ढ्या-भावेन तद्विषयनिदिध्यासनायोगात् ।

२७. मनने च श्रवणं हेतुः, श्रवणाभावे तात्पर्यानिश्चयेन शाब्द-ज्ञानाभावेन श्रुतार्थविषयकयुक्तत्वायुक्तत्वनिश्चयानुकूलमननायोगात् ।

२८. एतानि त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ कारणानीति केचिदाचार्या ऊचिरे ।

25. Of these, contemplation is the direct (principal) cause in respect of Brahman-intuition, because of such s'ruti texts as 'They, associated with the yoga of contemplation, saw the divine-self-energy, veiled by its own guṇas (*S'vet.*, I, 3).'

26. And, in respect of contemplation, reflection is the cause, since for him who has not reflected, there being no firm establishment of sense, contemplation of that content is impossible.

27. And, in respect of reflection, hearing is the cause, since, in the absence of hearing, there being non-ascertainment of purport and no word-generated knowledge, there is no possibility of reflection, helpful to ascertain the intelligibility or unintelligibility in respect of a heard sense as content.

28. That all these three are causes in respect of the generation of cognition, say some preceptors.

२९. अपरे तु श्रवणं प्रधानम्, मनननिदिध्यासनयोस्तु श्रवणात् पराचीनयोरपि श्रवणफलब्रह्मदर्शननिर्वर्तकतया आरादुपकारकतयाङ्गत्वं इत्याहुः ।

३०. तदप्यङ्गत्वं न तार्तीयशेषत्वरूपम्; तस्य श्रुत्याद्यन्यतमप्रमाणगम्यस्य प्रकृते श्रुत्याद्यभावेऽसम्भवात् ।

३१. तथा हि। न "व्रीहिभिर्यजेत", "दध्ना जुहोति" इत्यादाविव मनननिदिध्यासनयोरङ्गत्वे काचित् तृतीयाश्रुतिरस्ति । नापि "बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि" इत्यादिमन्त्राणां बर्हिःखण्डनप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यवत्

29. Others, however, say that hearing is principal, while reflection and contemplation, though subsequent to hearing, are auxiliaries as helpful to accomplish the fruit of hearing, *i.e.*, Brahman-intuition, (and) as (thus) remote auxiliaries.

30. This auxiliariness too is not of the nature of the subsidiariness (s'eṣatva) established in the third chapter (of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras*) ; for, this, which is to be known by one of the pramāṇas, s'ruti (express statement) etc., is impossible in the present context, there being no s'ruti[82] etc.

31. It is thus. In respect of the subsidiariness of reflection and contemplation, there is not any *express* third case *suffix* as in 'He is to sacrifice with rice-grains', 'He oblates with curds' etc. Nor is there any *capacity* (of the expressed) (liṅga), like the capacity of mantras like 'I give barhis (-grass) as the seat of the gods (*Maitrāyaṇīya Saṃhitā*, I, i, 2)' to make known the cutting of the barhis (-grass, to spread as a seat).

किञ्चिल्लिङ्गमस्ति । नापि प्रदेशान्तरपठितप्रवर्ग्यस्य "अग्निष्टोमे प्रवृणक्ति" इतिवाक्यवत् श्रवणानुवादेन मनननिदिध्यासनविनियोजकं किञ्चिद्वाक्यमस्ति । नापि "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इति वाक्यावगतफलसाधनताकदर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे प्रयाजादीनामिव फलसाधनत्वेनावगतस्य श्रवणस्य प्रकरणे मनननिदिध्यासनयोराम्नानम् ।

३२. ननु "द्रष्टव्यः" इति दर्शनानुवादेन श्रवणे विहिते सति फलवत्तया श्रवणप्रकरणे तत्सन्निधावाम्नातयोर्मनननिदिध्यासनयोः प्रयाजन्यायेन प्रकरणादेवाङ्गता ।

Nor is there any *text* (vākya), which restates hearing and applies reflection and contemplation (thereto), as does the text 'In the agniṣṭoma one should perform the pravargya (rite),' in respect of the pravargya, mentioned in some other context (other than agniṣṭoma). Nor is there the declaration of reflection and contemplation, under the *topic* (prakaraṇa) of hearing, known to be instrumental to fruit, just as (there is) of the fore-sacrifices etc., in the topic of the dars'apūrṇamāsa, which is instrumental to fruit, as known from the text 'He who desires heaven (svarga) is to sacrifice with the dars'a and the pūrṇamāsā'.

32. 'Now, when hearing is enjoined by restatement of intuition, in the form "It is to be seen", that being fruitful, for reflection and contemplation, declared in the topic of hearing, in proximity thereto, there is subsidiariness even because of the *topic* (prakaraṇa), on the principle of the (subsidiariness of) fore-sacrifices.'

३३. इति चेन्न; "ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन्" इत्यादिश्रुत्यन्तरे ध्यानस्य दर्शनसाधनत्वेनावगतस्याङ्गाकाङ्क्षायां प्रयाजन्यायेन श्रवणमननयोरेवाङ्गत्वापत्तेः ।

३४. क्रमसमाख्ये च दूरनिरस्ते ।

३५. किञ्च प्रयाजादिष्वङ्गत्वविचारः सप्रयोजनः, पूर्वपक्षे विकृतिषु न प्रयाजानुष्ठानम्, सिद्धान्ते तु तत्रापि तदनुष्ठानमिति । प्रकृते तु श्रवणं न कस्यचित् प्रकृतिः, येन मनननिदिध्यासनयोस्तत्राप्यनुष्ठानमङ्गत्वविचारफलं भवेत् ।

33. If this be said, no; for, when for contemplation, understood as the means to intuition, in another s'ruti text 'They, associated with the yoga of contemplation, saw (*S'vet.*, I, 3),' there is the expectancy of subsidiaries, there is the contingence of subsidiariness solely for hearing and reflection, on the principle of the fore-sacrifices.

34. And (the principles of) *sequence* and *name* are refuted as too remote.

35. Further, the consideration of subsidiariness, in the case of fore-sacrifices etc., is fruitful, since, in the *prima facie* view, there is to be no observance of fore-sacrifices in the modelled rites, while in the final view there is the observance of these even there. In the present context, however, hearing is not the model for anything, in which case the observance of reflection and contemplation in that too (which is so modelled) would be the fruit of the consideration of subsidiariness.

३६. तस्मान्न तार्त्तीयशेषत्वं मनननिदिध्यासनयोः । किन्तु यथा घटादिकार्ये मृत्पिण्डादीनां प्रधानकारणता चक्रादीनां सहकारिकारणतेति प्राधान्याप्राधान्यव्यपदेशः, तथा श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनानामपीति मन्तव्यम् ।

३७. सूचितश्चैतद्विवरणाचार्यैः—" शक्तितात्पर्यविशिष्टशब्दावधारणं प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानेन कारणं भवति, प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयावगमं प्रत्यव्यवधानात् ; मनननिदिध्यासने तु चित्तस्य प्रत्यगात्मप्रवणसंस्कारपरिनिष्पन्नतदेकाग्रवृत्तिकार्यद्वारेण ब्रह्मानुभवहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यते ; इति फलं

36. Hence, for reflection and contemplation, there is not such subsidiariness as of the third chapter (of the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*). But, just as in the production of pot etc., there being principal causality for lump of clay etc., and auxiliary causality for the wheel etc., there is mention of the character of principal and non-principal, similarly is it to be understood even in the case of hearing, reflection and contemplation.

37. And this has been indicated thus by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* (p. 104) : ' The ascertainment of the word qualified by capacity and purport is the proximate cause in respect of the apprehension of the object of knowledge, since the pramāṇa is proximate in respect of the apprehension of the prameya ; reflection and contemplation, however, attain causality in respect of Brahman-experience, through the channel of producing for the mind (citta) a concentrated psychosis, generated by the purification of (its) being turned (solely) towards

प्रत्यव्यवहितकारणस्य तात्पर्यविशिष्टशब्दावधारणस्य व्यवहिते मनननिदिध्यासने तदङ्गे अङ्गीक्रियेते" इति ।

३८. श्रवणादिषु च मुमुक्षूणामधिकारः, काम्ये कर्मणि फलकामस्याधिकारित्वात् ।

३९. मुमुक्षायाश्च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्येहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागस्य शमदमोपरतितितिक्षासमाधानश्रद्धानां च विनियोगः ।

४०. अन्तरिन्द्रियनिग्रहः शमः; बहिरिन्द्रियनिग्रहो दमः; विक्षेपाभाव उपरतिः; शीतोष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहनं तितिक्षा; चित्तैकाग्र्यं समाधानम्; गुरुवेदान्तवाक्यविश्वासः श्रद्धा ।

the inner self; hence, in respect of the proximate (non-remote) cause of the fruit, *i.e.*, the ascertainment of the word qualified by purport, those which are remote, *viz.*, reflection and contemplation, are admitted as auxiliaries thereto.'

38. And, in respect of hearing etc., the eligibility is for those who desire release, since in respect of optional acts, eligibility belongs to him who desires the fruit.

39. And, in respect of (securing) desire for release, there is the serviceability (viniyoga) of the discrimination of the eternal and non-eternal, of non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter, and of s'ama, dama, uparati, titikṣā, samādhāna and s'raddhā.

40. Control of the internal sense is s'ama; restraint of the external senses is dama; non-existence of distraction is uparati; endurance of pairs (of opposites) like heat and cold is titikṣā; concentration of mind is samādhāna; faith in the words of the preceptor (guru) and of the Vedānta is s'raddhā.[83]

४१. अत्रोपरमशब्देन संन्यासोऽभिधीयते, तथा च संन्यासिनामेव श्रवणेऽधिकार इति केचित् ; अन्ये तूपरमशब्दस्य संन्यासवाचकत्वाभावात् विक्षेपाभावमात्रस्य गृहस्थेष्वपि सम्भवाज्जनकादेरपि ब्रह्मविचारस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात् सर्वाश्रमसाधारणं श्रवणादिविधानमित्याहुः ।

४२. सगुणोपासनमपि चित्तैकाग्र्यद्वारा निर्विशेषब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारहेतुः । तदुक्तम्—

" निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः ।
ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकम्प्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः ॥

41. Some say that, by the word 'uparama' here, renunciation is denoted, and that thus eligibility for 'hearing' exists for saṃnyāsins alone; others, however, say that since the word 'uparama' has no express capacity in respect of renunciation (saṃnyāsa), since the mere absence of distraction is possible even in the case of householders, and since Brahman-inquiry is declared by s'ruti even in the case of Janaka etc., the injunction of 'hearing' etc., is common to all stages of life.[84]

42. Even the meditation on the saguṇa is, through the channel of mental concentration, the cause of intuition of the distinctionless Brahman. This has been said (by the author of the *Kalpataru*, p. 192): 'Those of dull wit, who are not capable of intuiting the supreme, distinctionless, Brahman, they are helped, out of

वशीकृते मनस्येषां सगुणब्रह्मशीलनात् ।
तदेवाविर्भवेत् साक्षादपेतोपाधिकल्पनम् ॥" इति ।

४३. सगुणोपासकानाञ्च अर्चिरादिमार्गेण ब्रह्मलोकं गतानां तत्रैव श्रवणादुत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्काराणां ब्रह्मणा सह मोक्षः ।

४४. कर्मवतां धूममार्गेण पितृलोकं गतानामुपभोगेन कर्मक्षये सति पूर्वकृतसुकृतदुष्कृतानुसारेण ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु पुनरुत्पत्तिः । तथा च श्रुतिः "रमणीयचरणा रमणीयां योनिमापद्यन्ते कपूयचरणाः कपूयां योनिम्" इति ।

sympathy, through the exposition of the savis'eṣa (Brahman); when their minds have been controlled (and concentrated) by the pursuit of saguṇa Brahman, (Brahman) itself will directly manifest itself free from the assumption of all adjuncts.'

43. And for saguṇa devotees, who have gone up to Brahma-loka by the path of light etc., and have had the intuition of the truth produced by 'hearing' while even there, there is release along with Brahmā (the presiding deity of that loka).

44. For those who have performed karma and have gone to the world of the Fathers, by the path of smoke etc., when there is consumption of karma by enjoyment (of fruit), there is re-birth in (the scale of creation from) Brahmā down to the immovable, in conformity with the previously acquired merit or demerit. And thus says s'ruti: 'Those of good conduct attain good birth, those of evil conduct attain evil birth (*Chānd.*, V, x, 7)' etc.

४५. प्रतिषिद्धानुष्ठायिनान्तु रौरवादिनरकविशेषेषु तत्तत्पापोचितं तीव्रदु:खमनुभूय सूकरादिषु तिर्यग्योनिषु स्थावरादिषु चोत्पत्तिः। इत्यलं प्रसङ्गागतप्रपञ्चेनेति।

४६. निर्गुणब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारवतस्तु न लोकान्तरगमनम्; "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इति श्रुतेः। किन्तु यावत् प्रारब्धक्षयं सुखदु:खे अनुभूय स पश्चादपवृज्यते।

४७. ननु "क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे" इत्यादिश्रुत्या "ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात् कुरुतेऽर्जुन" इतिस्मृत्या

45. As for those who follow the prohibited (ways), there is, after experiencing in special hells like Raurava the extreme suffering brought about by their respective demerits, rebirth among animals like swine, and among immovables etc. Enough of this elaboration of what is incidental.

46. For him, however, who has intuited nirguṇa Brahman, there is no departure to another world; because of the s'ruti text 'His prāṇas do not go up (*Bṛh.*, IV, iv, 6).' Rather does he experience happiness and misery till the consumption of prārabdha and is then released.

47. 'Now, when it is acertained of jñāna, on the strength of s'ruti texts like "And his karmas are consumed, when that has been seen, which is higher and lower (*Muṇḍ.*, II, ii, 8)" and the smṛti text "so does the fire of jñāna reduce all karmas to ashes

च ज्ञानस्य सकलकर्मनाशहेतुत्वनिश्चये सति प्रारब्धकर्मावस्थानमनुपपन्नम् ।

४८. इति चेन्न । "तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पत्स्ये" इत्यादिश्रुत्या "नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म" इत्यादिस्मृत्या चोत्पादितकार्यकर्मव्यतिरिक्तानां सञ्चितकर्मणामेव ज्ञानविनाश्यत्वावगमात् । सञ्चितं द्विविधं सुकृतं दुष्कृतञ्चेति । तथा च श्रुतिः "तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्तः पापकृत्याम्" इति ।

४९. ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानान्मूलाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ तत्कार्यप्रारब्धकर्मणोऽपि निवृत्तेः, कथं ज्ञानिनो देहधारणमुपपद्यते ?

(*Gīta*, IV, 37)" that it is the cause of destruction of all karmas, the persistence of prārabdha-karma is unintelligible '.

48. If this be said, no. For, on the strength of s'ruti texts like ' For him there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he attains (release) (*Chānd*., VI, xiv, 2) ', and smṛti texts like 'Karma is not consumed without (its fruit) being experienced ', destructibility by jñāna is understood only of that accumulated (sañcita) karma, which is other than karma that has originated its fruit (*i.e.*, the present embodiment). Sañcita is of two kinds, meritorious and demeritorious. And thus says s'ruti : ' His sons take his wealth, friends the meritorious (accumulation of) acts, enemies the demeritorious acts.'

49. ' Now, since, when primal nescience has been removed by Brahman-knowledge, prārabdha karma too, the product of that (nescience), is removed, how is the possession of a body by the enlightened intelligible ? '

५०. इति चेन्न; अप्रतिबद्धज्ञानस्यैवाज्ञाननिवर्तकतया प्रारब्धकर्मरूपप्रतिबन्धकदशायामज्ञाननिवृत्तेरनङ्गीकारात् ।

५१. नन्वेवमपि तत्त्वज्ञानादेकस्य मुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तिः स्यात्, अविद्याया एकत्वेन तन्निवृत्तौ क्वचिदपि संसारायोगात् ।

५२. इति चेन्न, इष्टापत्तेः, इत्येके ।

५३. अपरे तु एतद्दोषपरिहारायैव "इन्द्रो मायाभिः" इति बहुवचनश्रुत्यनुगृहीतमविद्यानानात्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याहुः ।

५४. अन्ये तु एकैवाविद्या; तस्या एवाविद्याया जीवभेदेन

50. If this be asked, no; for, unhindered knowledge alone being the remover of nescience, there is not admitted the removal of nescience at the stage when there is a hindrance, in the nature of prārabdha-karma.[85]

51. 'Now, even thus, when (some) one is released by knowledge of truth, there will be release of all; for, nescience being one, when that is removed, there can be no bondage (saṃsāra) anywhere'.

52. If this be said, (that is) no (objection), say some, since it is a contingence of the acceptable.[86]

53. Others, however, say that it is only to remedy this defect, there should be admitted the multiplicity of nesciences, (a position) supported by the express use of the plural in the text 'Indra through māyās (took on many forms)' (*Bṛh.*, II, v, 19) etc.

54. Yet others, however, (hold thus): there is but one nescience; of this single nescience, there are, because of differences of jīvas, diverse capacities that veil

ब्रह्मस्वरूपावरणशक्तयो नाना ; तथा च यस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं तस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपावरणशक्तिविशिष्टाविद्यानाशः ; न त्वन्यं प्रति ब्रह्मस्वरूपावरणशक्तिविशिष्टाविद्यानाशः ; इत्यभ्युपगमान्नैकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तिः ।

५५. अत एव च "यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम्" इत्यस्मिन्नधिकरणे अधिकारिपुरुषाणामुत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानानामिन्द्रादीनां देहधारणानुपपत्तिमाशङ्क्य अधिकारापादकप्रारब्धकर्मसमाप्त्यनन्तरं विदेहकैवल्यमिति सिद्धान्तितम् । तदुक्तमाचार्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रैः "उपासनादिसंसिद्धितोषितेश्वरचोदितम् । अधिकारं समाप्यैते प्रविशन्ति परं पदम्" इति ।

the nature of Brahman ; and thus, when there is Brahman-knowledge for one, for him there is destruction of nescience as qualified[87] by the capacity to veil Brahman-nature ; but not for another is there the destruction of nescience as qualified by the capacity to veil Brahman ; because of this admission, there is not the release of all, on the release of one.

55. Hence it is that, in the section (of the *Brahma Sūtras*, III, iii, 32) 'Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts,' a doubt being raised as to the unintelligibility of persons in office, like Indra etc., for whom true knowledge has arisen, continuing to be embodied, it is established as the final view that there is release from embodiment (only) after the exhaustion of the prārabdha-karma that brings about the office. That has been said by Ācārya Vācaspati-Mis'ra (in the same section, p. 816) : 'Those for whom has terminated the office willed by Īs'vara, pleased with (their) perfection through meditation (upāsanā) etc.,[88] they enter the supreme state (of

एतच्चैकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तिरिति पक्षे नोपपद्यते । तस्मादेकाविद्यापक्षेऽपि प्रतिजीवमावरणभेदोपगमेन व्यवस्थोपपादनीया ।

५६. तदेवं ब्रह्मज्ञानान्मोक्षः ; स चानर्थनिवृत्तिर्निरतिशयब्रह्मानन्दावाप्तिश्च ; इति सिद्धं प्रयोजनम् ।

इति प्रयोजनपरिच्छेदः ॥

॥ समाप्तोऽयं ग्रन्थः ॥

release).' And this is not intelligible on the view that, on the release of one, there is release of all. Therefore, even on the view of a single nescience, distinction (of release at different times) can be justified by the admission of different obscurations for different jivas.[89]

56. Thus, therefore, release results from Brahman-knowledge ; and that (release) consists in the removal of evil and the attainment of the unsurpassable Brahman-bliss ; hence is established the fruit.

HERE ENDS THE CHAPTER ON THE FRUIT

HERE ENDS THIS WORK

NOTES

1. Indian philosophers are divided in their views as to whether recollection (smṛti) is a case of valid knowledge. It results, not from a distinct cause of cognition, but from the residual impression of a prior cognition; hence there seems to be little need to recognize it as independent knowledge. It may be valid in respect of its content, but the validity rests in the last resort on the conditions of production, not of itself, but of the original cognition; *e.g.*, if the original cognition, say, visual perception, of an object had resulted from adequate contact of the object with a normally functioning sense of sight, the resultant recollection too would be valid, provided, of course, the manas had not lost some of the impressions and overlaid others with extraneous associations; *per contra*, an invalid original cognition cannot lead to any but an invalid recollection. It seems best, therefore, to leave smṛti out of the class of pramāṇas. The Prābhākaras, however, treat it as valid knowledge; but, according to these, all knowledge is valid, and is classifiable either as anubhava or as smṛti. There is only confusion in conduct, according to these philosophers, never an error in cognition. The author of the present treatise defines prāmāṇya in two ways, so as to provide for the exclusion or the inclusion of smṛti. Non-sublatability is common to both definitions, while novelty comes in, only where smṛti is desired to be ruled out.

2. If novelty is insisted on for prāmāṇya, a difficulty arises when there is continuous cognition of one and the same object; the instants of cognition other than the first would be invalid; and that

is unacceptable, since all the causes of the original adequate cognition persist. The difficulty is met in more ways than one. One answer objects to the cutting up of a single cognition into discrete instants; another accepts the dissection, but admits a different temporal content for each instant, so that novelty is still secured. On this view, time is treated as *perceptible*.

3. This couplet together with a few more lines is quoted by S'aṅkara at the close of his bhāṣya on *Brahma Sūtrā*, I, i, 4. The author has been identified by Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri as Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya: see *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, I, 5 ff.

4. While the sense-organs make other objects known, they are not themselves objects of sense. Of course, they are not to be identified with anatomical parts or their physiological functions; for certain sense-functionings seem to occur even in the absence of the appropriate physiological counter-parts; *e.g.*, snakes are said to hear and trees to see. The existence and functioning of sense organs is known, therefore, only mediately through inference or valid verbal testimony. On this subject see the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, 4th Varṇaka, para XVIII (Andhra University Edition). As for the example given in refutation of the authority of the *Gītā* text, about 'The senses with manas as the sixth', this is its meaning; the sacrificial remains of the puroḍās'a cake are called iḍā after the name of the deity; these are to be eaten, from the one vessel, by five persons, the master of the sacrifice (yajamāna) and four priests (ṛtviks), *viz.*, the adhvaryu, the āgnīdhṛ, the brahmā and the hotṛ; when in a section about the ṛtviks, it is said that, with the yajamāna as the fifth, they partake of the iḍā, the ordinary implication would be that the fifth person is also a ṛtvik; but that is absurd, since the yajamāna (master) is one who employs priests and not himself an officiating priest. In the same way, what is enumerated as the sixth, in the *Gītā* text, along with the indriyas, need not itself be an indriya. For the citation compare *Āpastamba S'rautāsūtra*, III, ii, 11.

5. For the pleasure-psychosis and the smṛti-psychosis are both in the same locality, one's own body. The reply points out the need for concurrence in time, in addition to coincidence in space.

6. Merit and demerit are knowable solely through the s'āstra; yet the present definition of perceptibility would apply to them, there being concurrence as well as coincidence of psychoses; hence the definition is too wide, and has to be narrowed by specifying competency of the content.

7. The Indian Logician distinguishes jāti from upādhi; any kind of common nature may be an upādhi, but not a jāti, not a truly generic nature. A true genus must admit, for instance, of more than one differentiation; where, therefore, the particular is but one and the same, its nature cannot be generic; ākās'atva is not a jāti, since there is only one ākās'a. Similarly, jāti must be pervasive of each of its particulars (vyaktis); if a vyakti may be partly of one nature and partly of another, neither can be a jāti; since the cognition "The bill is fiery" is partly mediate and partly immediate, neither character can be generic. The reply points out that the distinction between jāti and upādhi is but a fabrication of the Logicians, without any evidence or value.

8. Inference can prove, of a subject, only such predicate (*probandum*) as is established somewhere else; posession of fire, being known elsewhere, may be inferentially established, may be proved, of the hill; the wholly unknown (aprasiddha), however, cannot be proved. The advaitin contends that generic nature (jāti) is aprasiddha; for those who maintain this category claim that it is eternal and inherent in its particulars; eternality, we deny, except in the case of Brahman; as for inherence, we do not admit such a special kind of relation. The Logicians recognise two kinds of relation, conjunction (saṃyoga) and inherence (samavāya); the former is external to the relata, while the latter is organic to them; inherence may be found as between jāti and particulars, or even as between conjunction and the conjunct; for an external relation

calls for another relation between itself and the relata ; and this other relation is inherence. The advaitin points out, among other things, that even inherence is only a relation, which has to choose between the alternatives of being merged in the relata, or standing outside of them, requiring another relation *ad infinitum* ; the difficulties faced by the concept of saṃyoga are not resolved, but only added to, by the concept of samavāya. Hence, samavāya cannot be recognised ; as a consequence the category of jāti has also to go ; and the notion of general nature (upādhi) is in no better position.

9. No phenomenon has any reality other than that of the substrate, *viz.*, consciousness. This, however, will not of itself distinguish the perceptible from the inferable content. Hence it is that, in the former case, consciousness is specified as cogniser-defined. As has been explained above, this consciousness flows out, in cases of perception, and pervades the object, so that there is no difference between content-defined consciousness and cogniser-defined consciousness. Not so, however, in the case of inferable contents, where there is no flowing out and pervasion ; the reality of the content here is other than the reality of the cogniser. Nor does bare location in the cogniser-defined consciousness constitute perceptibility ; for, as stated presently, competency too is a necessary condition ; and it seems to exclude dharma, adharma etc., which are never perceptible.

10. When I perceive the pot, it is through a psychosis ; but I have also the experience 'I perceive the pot' ; is this latter due to another psychosis (vṛtti) ? While the Logician admits two cognitions, a primary and a reflective, called vyavasāya and anuvyavasāya, the advaitin does not countenance this, since, if we admit a fresh vṛtti for the cognition of the primary vṛtti, for the cognition of that other, another vṛtti would be needed, thus involving an infinite regress. But we do have the experience 'I perceive the pot' ; we also recollect having perceived the pot, and recollection is impossible, except as caused by the residual impression of a

vṛtti. How are these possible? Because, says the advaitin, the initial psychosis has itself too for content. Nor is this unintelligible; for, the anuvyavasāya admitted by the Logicians has itself for content, without requiring another vṛtti; and when they infer that all cognition is a quality, that inferential cognition is taken to apply to itself as well. The category of 'knowability' provides another example; it applies to all things and applies to itself as well. Nor may it be argued that in that case the vṛtti would be self-manifest (svaprakās'a), while, according to the sidddhānta, the self alone is svaprakās'a; for the self is consciousness and hence svaprakās'a, while the psychoses are inert; having oneself for content will not of itself suffice as *probans* to establish self-luminosity.

11. "The followers of tradition" are Saravajñātman etc. For the *Vivaraṇa* reference, see p. 55 (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series edition): "Only as defined by a psychosis with the form 'I' does the internal organ come to be the content of consciousness; and the determinant of the experience of recollection (thereof) is the internal organ defined by the recollection caused by the residual impression of that psychosis; hence the intelligibility of recollection (in spite of the permanence of the witness-consciousness which manifests ahaṅkāra)."

12. Cognition is consciousness; and consciousness is non-generated; what then is the function of the contact between sense-organ and object? It is to generate the psychosis (vṛtti) which manifests consciousness, *i.e.*, removes the nescience which veils the jīva, or manifests non-difference of the jīva considered finite from the object-defined consciousness, or establishes a relation between the object and the jīva, which, though infinite, is not the material cause of objects and hence, unlike Brahman, is not in identity with them. See *Siddhāntales'a-saṅgraha*, I: 5. 1. Though the advaitin does not recognise samavāya, he admits an approximation to it in tādātmya, which is a partly internal relation, being one of identity-in-difference; the notion is taken from the Bhāṭṭas and the

admission is purely for empirical (vyavahāra) purposes. Thus, we have saṃyukta-tādātmya and saṃyuktābhinnatādātmya, while the Logician speaks of saṃyuktasamavāya and saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya.

13. A stock example is that of a father asking his beloved son to 'drink poison'. The word-senses can come together to make a sense, but that is not the sense of the statement, as no father would wish his son to act upon the statement and die. The context is one where the son desires to do something detrimental to himself, like making friends with an enemy or eating in his house; the father's counsel to drink poison is only intended to indicate the harmful nature of the course the son proposes to pursue; this is the purport of the father's words, not the actual consumption of poison, though the latter is what is conveyed by the word-senses in conjunction. The marks by which purport may be determined are (1) harmony with the introductory and concluding statements, (2) repetition, (3) novelty of what is stated, (4) fruitfulness, (5) statements elsewhere, praising what is signified here, or condemning the opposite, and (6) intelligibility in the light of reason.

14. See Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā*, p. 109.

15. Because ether, which is all-pervasive, cannot be really limited; the qualification has no syntactical relation with the predicate. This apparent limitation is, however, not separable from the predicate in question, here, the sense of hearing; but in another variety of the qualification *per accidens* (which is not mentioned in this text, and is called upalakṣaṇa) there is not this inseparability; *e.g.*, a crow sitting on a house-top will serve to mark out that house as Devadatta's, though the crow may fly off the next instant, long before the enquirer reaches the house. The upalakṣaṇa would correspond to a separable *accidens*, while the upādhi proper would be an inseparable *accidens*.

16. The Logicians admit a supernormal variety of perception, the contact (sannikarṣa) with the object being established in a supernormal (alaukika) manner, either by cognition of generic nature

(sāmānya) or by prior cognition (jñāna) of what is now extraordinarily perceived; the contact in either case is called a pratyāsatti.* The inferential cognition, say, of fire on a hill is made possible, they say, only because of the knowledge of pervasion as between all smokes and all fires; such knowledge arises, even when we see a single fire and smoke in our kitchen, as the apprehension of the generic comes with the apprehension of the particular, and, though there is not normal sense-contact with all smokes and fires, contact is established through the apprehended generic nature; thence results knowledge of pervasion and the inferential cognition of fire. Similarly, when we have the experience 'I *see* the fragrant sandal-wood', the fragrance is *perceptual*, though there is no contact for it with the sense of sight and the object is too distant for contact with the sense of smoke; supernormal contact with fragrance is now established even by the prior cognition of fragrance in the piece of wood; jñāna is the pratyāsatti. Our author takes for granted the dismissal of sāmānya as pratyāsatti and here deals with that claim for jñāna. The main point of criticism in either case is the absence of evidence (pramāṇa). Inference depends on the cognition of invariable concomitance between the nature of smoke and the nature of fire, not as between all smokes and all fires; indeed, it may be said that, if the latter cognition existed, inference would be otiose, the existence of fire on the hill too being known through this extraordinary perception. As for contact being established by cognition, there is no doubt that cognitions do bring up associated cognitions, but if an associated cognition is to be treated as perceptual, where is the process to stop? Inference too is a case of association; should it then be classed as perception? Further, we do admit, says the advaitin, the possibility of a complicated perceptual cognition, not all of whose elements need be in sense-contact; *e.g.*, in recognition, there is the apprehension of an entity, of which the *here* and *now*

* There is a third variety too of alaukika perception, that generated by yogic powers.

aspects alone are in sense-contact, while the *there* and *then* aspects are not, though the whole is a case of perception. There is no need to assume a super-normal sense-contact with those aspects too. No doubt, the aspects of mediacy and immediacy seem to be opposed; and it is apparently difficult to think of both these characteristics as co-existent in a single cognition; but do we not have to predicate the same or similar characteristics of many other cognitions? The cognition of the hill as possessing fire is immediate in respect of the hill-aspect, but mediate in respect of the fire-aspect; the perception of this rope as a snake is valid in respect of the *this-aspect*, but invalid in respect of the *snake-aspect*. Indeed, unless we consider a pure sensation (which is a pure myth, according to some psychologists), there is no possibility of avoiding the intrusion of some non-immediate elements into the immediate cognition. What, then, is the distinction between perception and inference etc.? It has been said "that there cannot be an absolute line of demarcation between perception and inference" (Dr. S. C. Chatterjee in *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 247). Admitting the force of a great deal that Dr. Chatterjee says, we may yet maintain that there is a fundamental difference, which consists, not in the absence of associated elements, but in their apprehension *in* association as distinguished from *through* association; in the latter case, we have inference, valid where the association is a genuine pervasion; in the former, we have perception; we have not a sight of sandal-wood calling up a 'presentation' of the fragrance, but a presentation of a whole of fragrant sandal-wood, wherein we later dissociate a sensible aspect; what is presented is not the colour alone or form alone, but a whole, a *Gestalt*, which is split up on subsequent analysis. This, we urge, is a more fruitful way of looking at the problem; and from this point of view, even recognition is not a compound of two aspects, but a whole wherein aspects are distinguishable and later distinguished. The statement of Advaita may stand to gain by an approach from the *Gestalt* point of view, one foreshadowed, however dimly, by those advaitins

like Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana Miśra, who upheld the doctrine of sphoṭa.

17. When shell is perceived, albeit delusively, as silver, the silver-content can be neither unreal nor what is elsewhere real, *e.g.*, in the shop or treasury; for, such a content would be imperceptible, no contact therewith being possible. Nor can it be real, as, then, no sublating cognition can arise in the form "This is not silver, but nacre". Hence, there has to be admitted a content which, being in contact, is not unreal, and yet, being sublatable, is not real; it is novel, indeterminable and produced in the shell substrate, even in the absence of the silver-atoms; the production is brought about by nescience, defect (in the sense of sight or in the manas or in both), and residual impression (saṃskāra) of former veridical experiences of silver. The non-existence of silver atoms is disputed by those who, like Rāmānuja, maintain that *all* cognition is of the real; the world, they say, is made up of five elements not in isolation, but in close combination, according to the formula of quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa, explained in the chapter on *Objects* in the present work); what we call earth is not mere earth, but consists one half of earth, the other half being made up of equal parts of water, fire, air and ether; thus everything corporeal contains in it, in infinitesimal proportions, the components of everything else; even in the shell there are silver particles, though in negligible quantities; it is these particles that are perceived in the silver-delusion, which has thus a real, not an indeterminable, content. It is worth noting, however, that what is delusively perceived is silver, of the size and shape of the shell, not infinitesimal silver; in the latter case, appetition (reaching out for the object) etc., would not be induced at all. And we have still our old difficulty, in a slightly different form, as to how infinitesimal silver appears as silver capable of being seen or worth grasping. If the value were unreal, it could not cause appetition; if the value were real, it could not be sublated; thus, once again we get what is not determinable as solely real or as solely unreal. If

indeterminability is thus unavoidable for the value or the relation between the existent form and form seen, is it not simpler to say that the silver itself is indeterminable? The material cause of this, as of empirical silver, is but nescience; in the latter transformation, however, defect does not enter as a contributory cause.

18. Vivarta is a transformation, which is neither real nor unreal, like that of rope into snake, say, by a magician; to distinguish it from such transformation as that of milk into curds, it is called transfiguration (a term suggested Mm. S. Kuppuswamy Sastriar). It should be kept in mind, however, that Brahman's appearance as the world is strictly not even *trans*-figuration, but just figuration; for, it is the formless appearing as if having forms, not one form appearing as if another.

19. Because pleasure etc., are qualities of the self (ātman), not of other substances according to that system: buddhyādayaḥ aṣṭau ātmamātravis'eṣaguṇāḥ (*Tarkasaṅgraha*). But since pleasure etc., are located in the self, only as defined by a body, such quality is said to be present in the *definiens*, the body itself.

20. The relation is not bare conjunction, but tādātmya, identity-in-difference.

21. Superimposition takes place on that consciousness, which is the content of the nescience that is transformed into the superimposition; for example, when nacre is seen as silver, the silver-superimposition is a transformation of that nescience whose content is nacre; hence it is superimposed on nacre-defined consciousness. All empirically real finite experiences, however, whether pot etc., or pleasure etc., are transformations of that nescience whose content is the infinite, illimitable, non-dual, pure consciousness; hence these are super-imposed on pure consciousness itself, not on consciousness as defined in some way. When I judge that I am happy or miserable, I make a mistake about the self, not about the ego; hence these experiences derive their form, not from their location in the egoity-defined consciousness, but, as explained in paras

92 and 93, by the form of the residual impressions (saṃskāras) associated with the nescience.

22. It was said earlier that nescience undergoes transformation into silver etc., as well as silver-cognition etc. Why should there be this latter transformation, when the silver is directly in relation to the witness? To the witness, even because of its nature as such, nothing is veiled; and even because of the manifestation thus established, vyavahāra too is possible; why then a distinct silver-psychosis? The answer is that, according to the stated definition of perceptibility, the silver to be perceptible should have no reality other than that of consciousness, as defined *per accidens* by a psychosis of which that (silver) is the content; hence the need of the psychosis, in order to secure immediacy.

23. The Guru is Prabhākara, so called traditionally, whether out of respect or derision, it is not quite certain. In his view, there are two cognitions, a perception of 'this' and a recollection of 'silver' etc., without any complication of each by the other; hence there is no erroneous *cognition*, though there is mistaken *conduct*, consequent on non-discrimination between the two cognitions, the recollection having somehow lost its character of *recollectedness*. For a detailed statement and criticism of the view, see *Vivaraṇa-prameyasaṅgraha* (Andhra) 1st Varṇaka, paras XLVII—LIII; also *Bhāmatī Catussūtrī* (TPH), pp. 28-32. The reply makes out that in spite of differences of vṛtti, there is a single consciousness, which is reflected in both and apprehends a relation of 'the true and the illusory'; no such unitary cognition is acceptable to the Prābhākara. It is this 'coupling, as it were, of the true with the untrue' that is the advaitin's doctrine of superimposition.

24. Even the hard-boiled realist has to admit scales of value (in terms of temporal existence) though not scales of reality; in spite of all entities being real, some are more durable than others; this must be set down to the very nature of things; in the same way, asks the advaitin, why may it not be that despite the non-reality of all phenomena, some (like the silver in the shop) last longer than

others (like the delusive silver) and have to be ranked higher? Like all *tu quoque* arguments, this is not very strong; hence the alternative explanation given in para 101.

25. The author holds that the self-luminosity of consciousness as substrate extends only to its reality-aspect, since all presentations, whether in waking or in dream, come as existents, *e.g.*, 'The pot exists', 'The chariot exists' etc. The consciousness and bliss aspects are veiled and have to be discovered only by study of and inquiry into the s'āstra; see the *S'ikhāmaṇi*, p. 142. This is a rather strange view; for, whatever is self-manifest must be manifest as cit (consciousness); and, as Vācaspati says, even 'bliss, eternality, pervasiveness, etc., are not, indeed, different from its nature as intelligence, such that they are not apprehended along with the apprehension of that (aspect)' (*Bhāmatī Catussūtrī*, p. 40.) There is, of course, the question how inert objects can be superimposed on consciousness, if apprehended. The answer must be not that consciousness is not *apprehended*, but that it is not *realised*: gṛhitā eva tu kalpitena bhedena na vivecitā (*Ibid.*) Other advaitins are prepared to recognise consciousness as the substrate, but as psychosis-manifested, though the psychosis does not go out of the body and consequently does not require the functioning of any indriyas; see *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, 1st Varṇaka, paras LXVIII, LXIX; the same writer treats the substrate as consciousness defined by egoity (*per accidens*, not *per proprium*): hence is avoided the contingence of such dream-forms as 'I am an elephant' instead of 'I see an elephant'. On the whole subject see *Siddhāntales'a* (Madras University), II: 3. 541—3. 543.

26. We are familiar with negations like 'The pot is not cloth'; the counter-correlate of negation is 'cloth' and what determines its being the counter-correlate is 'cloth-ness'. It is possible to say, however, that the pot is not even pot, though the apparent nonsense has to be redeemed by another, perhaps equally ridiculous, supposition that pot may be defined by cloth-ness; pot is

pot-as-defined-by-potness, but pot is not pot-as-defined-by-clothness; the determinant of counter-correlateness in such a case is not an attribute of the counter-correlate (pot), but an incompatible attribute present in some other locus (cloth). This fantastic view of negation was acceptable to some Naiyāyikas, but it proved a 'treacherous device' exploited by the advaitins: see *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 56, 57.

27. Where the content apprehended is in sense-contact, though in another locus than that to which it is ascribed, error is explicable on the ground of illegitimate transference, without postulating the creation of a novel content. Thus, where a crystal appears red, because of a proximate rose, the redness is in sense-contact, though located in the rose, not in the crystal; the delusion consists in its transference to the crystal, not in its being created *ad hoc*; a needless postulation offends against parsimony. It must be remembered, however, that this acceptance of anyathākhyāti is partial and provisional, the advaitin's basic position being anirvacanīya-khyāti. Hence says the author of the *Kalpataru*:

> svarupeṇa maricy-ambho mṛṣā vācaspater matam |
> anyathākhyāṭir iṣṭa 'sye 'ty anyathā jagṛhur janāḥ ||

28. The Naiyāyikas treat the sense of hearing as nothing but the ether, defined by the ear-cavity; and since ether is pervasive, then can be for it no motion or reaching out to the object; the sound is propagated from the object to the ear, in the form of successive waves or ripples carried on the air. The advaitin does not accept this position, since hearing, in his view, being a product of ether (itself a product), is finite; and we have to do violence to parsimony twice over by postulating a large number of sounds and treating as delusive the cognition that what is actually heard is a sound in the locality of the drum etc.

The problem does not appear so simple to the modern reader. A favourite instance mentioned in the books is the visual perception of the pole-star (dhruva). The sense of sight can travel to it

and return very quickly, because it is of the nature of light, which can cover the distance instantaneously. This sounds convincing. But science tells us that some stars are so far away that their light takes some years to reach us; so that, even if a star be now seen, we cannot be certain of its present existence; it may have perished, though the perishing will be known only some years later. In such a case, how can we say that our sight reaches to the star? We can say neither that our sense of sight has reached the object nor that the object has not perished or will not perish until the reaching thereto is effected. Might it not be simpler to say that colour comes to sight rather than that sight goes to colour?

The problem of sound is even more complicated; for we are now familiar with radio waves convertible from and into sound waves. A listener in Madras can hear Big Ben more quickly than a passer-by on London Bridge, as the electric waves travel with the speed of light, while sound-waves are far slower. Does the sense of hearing function in the same way in both cases, by reaching to the original locality of the sound? If so, why this absurd result that the Madrassi's sense of hearing functions more quickly than the Londoner's? If it be said that, since a receiving apparatus in necessary, the sound is what is produced therein, though ultimately caused by Big Ben, is it not true that some auditory apparatus too is necessary? May it not be that the sound heard is what is produced in or near the ear-cavity, though ultimately caused at a distance? And in the case of Big Ben and London Bridge, the sound is heard by all listeners in between, at varying intervals and with varying degrees of loudness; is it not less cumbrous to assume a single impulse of propagation in successive waves, rather than innumerable acts of rushing forth on the part of the auditory senses of the various individuals? Again, we hear at the same time sounds both near and far, some more faintly than others. The ticking of a clock, the talk next door, the noise of clothes washed in the back-yard are all heard at the same time. Does the sense of hearing split itself into different parts and reach to the different localities?

Would it not be truer to say that impulses from the different localities reach the ear and are there interpreted in terms of direction and distance? Seated midway between two sources of different sounds, one hears both; but seated midway between two radio sets of the same power and receiving the same programme, one hears only one set of sounds. Why should this happen, if the sense of hearing travels to both sources, whether simultaneously or in succession? These difficulties are not conclusive of any position; but they do throw considerable doubt on the view that any sense-organ functions by reaching out to the object (is a prāpya-kārī).

29. According to the advaitin, liṅga-parāmarś'a has no part to play in inferential cognition. What is effective is the cognition of the *probans* (sādhana) as pervaded by the *probandum* (sādhya); this cognition, like any other cognition, may give rise to a reflective cognition about itself, in the form 'I know that I cognised pervasion'; in such a case, however, it functions only in respect of its formal nature, its content, pervasion, playing no part; where pervasion too takes a hand, we have inferential cognition; over and above this, there is no need to interpolate a stage when we are aware of the subject as possessing *probandum-pervaded-probans*. While the advaitin has the principle of parsimony in his favour, it is open to doubt whether the Naiyāyika's is not the more correct psychology. Is it not correct to recognise an intermediate awareness of 'Socrates-man-mortal' before that of 'Socrates-mortal'? And if such awareness be admitted would it be possible to deny all causality (kāraṇatva) though distinctive causality (karaṇatva) may not be conceded? The authority of an eminent logician like Bradley would seem to favour the recognition of tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarś'a; but the matter can hardly be concluded by authority; see further *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 252-255, Chatterjee's *Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 285-288, and Datta's *Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 207.

30. The superfluity of the complex or synthetic cognition (parāmarś'a-jñāna) has already been considered (note 29). The

other question relates to the functioning of the residual impression (saṃskāra) produced by the original experience of pervasion (vyāpty-anubhava); in the usual course, the saṃskāra would recall its own cause, the cognition; is this recollection of vyāpti the cause of anumiti? No, says the advaitin; the residual impression, when awakened, *may* lead to the recall (smaraṇa) of the pervasion; but even without this recall, it may, as aided by pakṣadharmatājñāna (cognition of *probans* as present in the subject), lead straight to inferential cognition; even when it does give rise to recollection, the saṃskāra is not destroyed therewith; for we sometimes see it as effectuating a memory-stream; in the same way, it may, with the aid of the auxiliary afore-mentioned, cause inferential cognition without detriment to its normal function of causing smṛti (remembrance) in due course.

31. A relation of invariable or universal concomitance has to be made known in experience; but experience, being finite, cannot guarantee universality. All that we can seek is positive experience coupled with the absence of experience or doubt of the opposite, *i.e.*, inconstancy of the suggested pervasion. Any apparent exception must be shown to be only apparent and doubts should be resolved by *reductio ad absurdum*. Beyond this, it is idle to ask for repeated experience (bhūyodars'anam) since no repetition can stand in the face of a genuine exception, while a genuine pervasion may be made known even in a single experience. See *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 263, 264. It is because of the insistence on experience as the cause of vyāpti-jñāna that the advaitin refuses to recognise pervasion of bare co-absence (kevala-vyatireki) or even co-presence *cum* co-absence (anvaya-vyatireki).

32. The Nyāya syllogism recognised five members: pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana. This five-membered syllogism is used only in inference for others (parārtha anumāna). The advaitin contends, however, that three members are sufficient, even here, the first two or the last two being considered superfluous. The follower of the Nyāya is not without a reasonable

explanation of the five members; they correspond to distinct psychological stages in the process of carrying conviction to an outsider who has to know what the inference is about, on what grounds it proceeds, the nature of the pervasion between the ground and the consequent, the present application of the pervasion, and the conclusion. As already noted, the question is psychological and there seems to be something to be said in favour of the Nyāya view, though psychological analysis may easily lead to positing too many members, as in the very early Nyāya view of ten members; see Chatterjee, *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 297-305.

33. Among the objections that may be urged against the syllogism to prove illusoriness, two are singled out as important and answered. One is that there is no admitted example of illusoriness (mithyātva). The example of nacre-silver is not unknown to the opponent; what he denies is its so-called illusory character, neither its existence nor its deceptive nature. He is prepared to admit that the deceptive is wholly unreal (asat) or is real (sat) though not real enough for practical purposes (vyavahāra); he will not admit what the advaitin claims for it, a character neither real nor unreal, but indeterminable (anirvācya) as exclusively either. This he establishes by dialectics based on the character of delusive contents, that, since they are immediately experienced they cannot be unreal (asat), and since they are sublated, they cannot be real (sat). Until some one can offer a better explanation of illusion, the advaitin has a right to claim that some experiences at least are indeterminable and mithyā, characterisable as neither sat nor tuccha; and with these delusive experiences as indisputable illustrations, he may proceed to exhibit the mithyātva of the world.

It may be objected, however, that even granting the indeterminability of nacre-silver etc., that follows from some other reason, *e.g.*, its being nacre-silver, not from its being other than Brahman; this latter is not the determinant, the prayojaka; hence the doubt of apryojakatā. When, however, indeterminability (mithyātva) has to be admitted of a variety of presentations like nacre-silver,

snake-rope, and the like, we have to look for the determinant in what is common, not what is peculiar; and parsimony takes us on to what is common to all such experiences, *viz.*, their being other than Brahman; and this, unless sublated, is not to be set aside in favour of any other determinant.

34. Syllogisms like these seem to be a *tour-de-force* of formal logic. *Prima facie*, it sounds absurd to argue that this cloth does not exist in these threads, on the analogy of another cloth which is non-existent here. But the Indian Logician has the right to throw out syllogisms with the challenge to the opponent to prove them defective by showing up the presence of an upādhi in the pervasion, and so on. The last quarter of the couplet suggests that similar inferences may be urged as against the reality of guṇas, karma, sāmānya, vis'eṣa and samavāya. It may thus be said: this colour (say, blue, of the cloth before me) is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads, since it is colour, like another colour (say, red); this motion (say, waving of the flag) is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads, since it is motion, like some other motion (say, of the stick); thread-ness (as a generic quality) is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in the threads, since it is a generic quality, like pot-ness; samavāya is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads, since it is samavāya, like that between clay and pot. The categories of guṇa and samavāya being thus disposed of, ultimate reality can be neither the locus of qualities nor an inherent cause; it is therefore not a substance (dravya). This is a point of some importance worthy of the attention of critics of Advaita; to these the notion of a quality-less substance appears nonsensical; and so it is, undoubtedly; but Brahman is neither substance nor attribute, but the self, wherein are discriminated substrates and attributes; it is neither relation nor relatum, but the supra-relational, within which relations are distinguished. For some detailed criticism of the notion of inherence, see *Brahma Sūtras* (S'aṅkarabhāṣya), II, ii, 17.

35. Up to this has been maintained the view that reality is one and admits of no degrees, and that, when we apparently grasp the reality of some finite entity, what we really apprehend is Brahman itself. It seems rather a tall order, however, to say that in every apprehension whether of desk or chair, crown or footstool, the reality apprehended is Brahman alone, as this appears to militate against successful practical usage; it would be simpler to say that when we cognise pot we are aware of its reality too: such reality however, is not absolute, in the case of anything which is short of the infinite and comes as dṛs'ya (an object of cognition); absolute reality belongs only to the infinite dṛk; even in the dṛs'ya we may distinguish between two grades of reality, according to the nature of the cause and the quickness of the sublation; where avidyā alone is the cause and there is no sublation short of Brahman-intuition, we have empirical reality; where other defects co-operate with avidyā and sublation comes even within the sphere of the experience of duality, there is phenomenal reality. This doctrine of three grades of reality is more acceptable to the less radical among advaitins. Sublation denies not all reality, but only the claim to a higher grade of reality.

36. In the text cited, the doubt is whether the cream and the whey are to be offered to different deities or both should be offered to the Vis'vedevas either jointly or optionally: though it is said that the whey should go to the Vājins, it is possible to take this word to denote Vis'vedevas, on the etymology 'those for whom there is Vāja (food), *i.e.*, cream'. The final position is that the cream alone is for the Vis'vedevas; for the cream is so characterised by the taddhita form, Vais'vadevī; when the expectancy of material for the rite is thus satisfied by express statement (s'ruti), any interpretation based on the occurrence of 'whey' in the same text (vākya) is uncalled for. No doubt, whey too is suitable material for an offering; that will not of itself, however, establish expectancy; when through the sentence there is already cognised the relation of the rite to a suitable material, any subsequently mentioned material,

however suitable, cannot have expectancy; here 'cream' is mentioned immediately after the Vais'vadeva rite (sā vais'vedevy āmikṣā); and in the absence of mention of any other material, it relates to that rite; the 'whey' however finds mention later, subsequent to the syntactical relation of what is of the same class, *i.e.*, suitable material; hence it must go to the Vājins, not to the Vis'vedevas. See the balābalādhikaraṇa, *PM*, III, iii, 14.

37. Other examples are provided by the relative inferiority in the order of mention of s'ruti (express statement), liṅga (significant capacity), vākya (sentence), prakaraṇa (context), sthāna (sequence), and sāmākhyā (name). An example may be given: the text 'aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhet' indicates that the upasthāna for the gārhapatya fire is to be performed with Indramantra; the word aindryā (with Indra-mantra) would by its significant capacity (liṅga) imply that the reverential salutation is to be to Indra; the text itself, however, says expressly that the salutation is to the gārhapatya fire; hence there is no expectancy (as to who is to be reverenced) to be satisfied by the function of liṅga; thus is exemplified the precedence of s'ruti over liṅga; similar examples are to be understood in the case of the relative precedence of the other pramāṇas; each of the later ones functions by positing the preceding; thus, vākya (sentence) posits liṅga and s'ruti; on the whole subject, see the *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakās'a* (Edgerton, paras 88-181). See also paras 31-34 of Chapter IX.

38. In the āgneya rite occur the words 'agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi'. The question is whether in the offering to sūrya etc., modelled on the āgneya as archetype, the words used should be the same or whether suitable changes should be made to signify the change of deity. The *prima facie* view is that no change is necessary, just as there is no change of the mantra 'devasya tvā savituḥ prasave' etc. The final view, however, shows that the word 'agnaye' is intimately connected with the āgneya rite and hence would make nonsense if introduced without change into a rite for some other deity like sūrya; hence in these other vikṛti (modelled) rites, it is

necessary to substitute words like 'sūryāya' for 'agnaye'; see *PM*, IX, i, 38, 39.

39. The import of words is a vexed question in all philosophy, Eastern as well as Western. Students of Western Logic will be familiar with the discussions as to connotation and denotation and the existence of any terms which do not possess either connotation or denotation. The discussion is in some ways parallel to the Indian discussion as to whether the express sense is the generic or the particular or both. Neither aspect of significance can be wholly denied, as language will otherwise fail of its purpose; the only question is as to which, if either, is primary. The difficulty in the case of particulars is that they are infinite; if the significance of a word is to be known before it can be used and if the significance is infinite it would follow that no word can be used (at least with an assurance of validity). Hence it seems better to treat the generic as the express sense; since, however, the use of language will still require the application of the words to the respective particulars, this application is sought to be secured in one of several ways; they are given in the same cognition as the generic which alone is the express sense; or the s'akti of the word extends to particulars too, with this difference, that in this case it functions by its very existence, while in the case of the generic the s'akti functions as itself known; the difficulty as to the infinite number of particulars is thus got over; or else, the particulars are signified secondarily, not primarily at all. The Naiyāyika holds that the particular (vyakti), the generic (jāti) and configuration (ākṛti) are all alike the sense of the word. He too has to admit that the s'akti functions only as existent, not as known, in the case of the relation (anvaya) between the generic (jāti) and the particular (vyakti); the particular is signified as qualified by the generic; the relation of qualification (anvaya between jāti and vyakti) is necessarily within the province of s'akti, but not of s'akti as known. It is questionable whether the Vedāntin has derived any substantial benefit from his rejection of this relatively simple doctrine. Even

an abstract universal (such as jāti is) depends on the particulars, as it may be more tenuous the larger the number of particulars considered ; it is therefore rather a vain hope that the generic has a degree of fixity and certitude lacking in the particular. Words, like other finite entities, are essentially defective ; we can find only certain grades of perfection in their use, and it will be fruitless to search for a higher grade of perfection through the suppression or subordination of a necessary aspect of significance. From the advaitin's point of view, the most perfect word would be that which is and signifies the unique, above distinctions of generic and particular ; this is, however, a view which he occasionaly loses his hold on, possibly because of his alliance with the Bhāṭṭā Mīmāṃsaka. See further Chatterjee, *Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 358-362.

40. It is not quite clear why our another is at such pains to discard the generally accepted view as to the secondary implication of 'That' and 'thou' in 'That thou art'. The idea would seem to be this. Where any predication is made, if the predicate holds good only of the subject, but not of the subject as qualified in a particular way or of the qualification, we take the predication as true of the bare subject without resorting to secondary implication. Thus 'pot-ness' is part of the significance of 'pot' and is a qualification thereof ; where non-eternality is predicated of 'pot', it holds good of the substrate alone, not of pot-ness ; but we do not, therefore, say that 'pot is non-eternal' should be interpreted secondarily; we treat the qualification 'pot-ness' as irrelevant and hold the statement to be true, in its principal sense, of the substrate 'pot'. The rejection of the irrelevant does not as such constitute the resort to secondary implication ; else even statements like 'bring the pot' would have to be interpreted by lakṣaṇā, since pot-ness, which cannot be brought, has to be discarded. Where, however, we say 'the pot is eternal' and the predicate holds good only of pot-ness, which is a qualification not apprehended as a subject entering into relation with a predicate, and what has to be rejected is that which appears as the subject, there is resort to

lakṣaṇā. The distinction appears intelligible on the face of it. It is difficult, however, to sustain it, in the light of the advaitin's doctrine that the express sense of a word is the jāti; if, therefore, the word 'pot' has 'pot-ness' for its s'akyārtha, and that has to be rejected where non-eternality is predicated, does this not amount to the adoption of a sense other than the s'akyārtha, *i.e.*, of lakṣyārtha? Is there not at least one view which holds that the particular is always known by lakṣaṇā? Our author seems to have ignored this difficulty and no commentators give any help.

Mm. N. S. Anantakrishna Sastri has a suggestion to make, which is more ingenious than convincing. Only the previously known can be secondarily implied, like the river-bank by the word 'river', but not the wholy unknown. If the words 'That' and 'thou' should be taken to be secondarily implicative of pure consciousness, how is this consciousness known? *Per contra*, if it be known, how could there be saṃsāra? It may be maintained with some difficulty that pure consciousness is apprehended in what is called a asamprajñātasamādhi. Even if this be granted, the statement 'That thou art' is not meaningless for those who have not attained to such samādhi; Yoga is not the only path to realisation; and s'ruti texts are meaningful even to the followers of other paths. Hence it is desirable to interpret texts like 'That thou art' without resort to laksaṇā. (See his 2nd edition of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 206, 207). The difficulty as to how pure consciousness is known does not disappear, however, even on the alternative explanation. From what appears as parviscient or omniscient we have to remove such qualifications and stop with pure consciousness. But how do we know what to remove, how much to remove and when to stop? The abstraction from qualifications would seem to require a prior apprehension of the substrate and its distinction from the qualifications, just as much as secondary implication requires a prior apprehension of the implied. The only available explanation is that knowledge of the substrate (vis'eṣya) is involved in a knowledge of the

qualified (vis'iṣṭa); and this answer is available even to the advocate of bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā.

The real difficulty about the resort to lakṣaṇā is the contingence of the resultant sense being treated as non-principal (amukhya) and valueless. This contingence has to be guarded against, as it is by Madhusūdana Sarasvati (see *Advaitasiddhi*, Advaita-mañjari edition, p. 34). The opponent there maintains that the apposition between 'That' and 'thou' being opposed to perception, and perception being of greater force as a pramāṇa, lakṣaṇā is resorted to by the advaitin for the interpretation of such texts. The reply is that the interpretation through lakṣaṇā is necessitated not by perception, but by the need to sustain the appositional relation revealed by the sixfold criteria as the purport of the texts; nor is this secondary sense non-principal; for the non-principal should be either a sense other than what is cognised or a sense other than the s'akya. It is not the former, since apposition is what is cognised and is also what is sustained; it is not the latter either, since, though part of the express sense is abandoned, another part remains and enter into syntactical relation; what is meant by lakṣaṇā here (unlike the case of jahallakṣaṇā) is the syntactical relation of the substrate alone to the exclusion of the qualification. And he quotes Vācaspati Mis'ra to show that lakṣaṇā in such cases does not lead to a non-principal sense, since the purported sense stands on its own without subserving any other, unlike such texts as 'The strew is the sacrificer,' where there is subservience to the eulogy of the strew and consequently lakṣaṇā involves a non-principal sense. Thus, though Madhusūdana recognises the procedure here as syntactical relation of the substrate to the exclusion of the qualification (vis'eṣaṇa-bādhena vis'eṣya-mātrā-'nvayaḥ), he does not shrink from treating it as lakṣaṇā, all that he is interested to show being that the resultant sense is not non-principal (amukhya). This position is more intelligible than that of Dharmarāja, who, however, agrees with Brahmānanda; in the latter's *Laghucandrikā* on the relevant passage from the *Advaitasiddhi*, the word 'vypades'aḥ' is

explained as 'upacāraḥ (figurative usage).' Madhusūdana's own meaning is quite clear, when he says: 'anyārtha-tātparyakatvāc cā 'mukhyā-'rthatvam, na lākṣaṇikatva-mātram' (p. 35). It may be noted, however, that in those cases where Dharamarāja does recognise jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā, there is not merely an abandonment of the expressed, but also an acceptance of the non-expressed; there is an excess as well as a defect, both being justified by the context. Even on this basis, we may claim bhāga-tyāga-lakṣaṇā in texts like 'Tat tvam asi'; for, if we merely abandoned omniscience, parviscience and the like, we should be left with the knower or the agent, not with that which transcends knower and known, agent and act; hence in truth we not merely abstract from the *prima facie* sense, but also fill out what remains; we pass on to the knower and thence to knowledge; we pass on to the agent and thence to bliss; there is not mere abstraction, but also supplementation and fulfilment in the impartite.

41. Secondary implication is said by the Logicians to consist in a relation to the express sense (s'akya); what is thus related is the lakṣyārtha. This is intelligible in the case of words, since they have s'akti, and a sense allied to the s'akya may be conceived of. Where, however, we have a word-combination, the sense of this combination (what we may call sentence-sense, in short) is not the s'akyārtha of the words; hence there can be no lakṣyārtha either, in the sense of what is related to the s'akyārtha. It is held by some thinkers that words convey their own senses not in isolation, but as in a syntactical relation, however indefinite; their view is called the signification of the related (anvitā-'bhidhāna). There is, however, another, a more common, view that words signify their own senses primarily and that the relation supervenes; on this view of the relation of the signified (abhihitānvaya), the sentence-sense does not form part of the s'akti of the word, though it does on the other view. Even the advocate of the abhihitānvaya view (*e.g.* the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka, the follower of the *Bhāmatī* school of Advaita, and so on) holds that the word does not stop short with

signifying its own sense, but *does lead up* to the sentence-sense, the first function being a necessary intermediary in the fulfilment of the second, like the flame of the fuel in cooking. He therefore, recognises lakṣaṇā of the sentence-sense, not as what is related to the s'akya, but as what is related to that which is made known indirectly by the s'akya; the plain sentence-sense is what is thus led up to by the words; and what is related thereto is the lakṣyārtha of the word-combination; hence the statement in the text 'what is made known by the relation of the express capacity of the word (whether directly or indirectly), the relation to this is secondary implication'. It is worth noting that the word 'relation (sambandha)' is used in two different senses; in the first case it means the relation of word to sense (pada-padārtha-saṃsarga); in the second case, it means any conjunction, as in 's'akya-sambandhaḥ'.

42. S'ruti contains statements like 'Vāyu is the swiftest deity' and 'He howled'. Since the study (adhyayana) of s'ruti is undertaken in obedience to an injunction of study, it cannot be that any part of it is fruitless, as these statements of qualities or events appear to be. To ward off their apparent futility, they are interpreted secondarily as eulogistic or condemnatory. The first of these is meant as a praise of Vāyu and the rite in which he figures; the second is a condemnation of the giving of silver as sacrificial dakṣiṇā, since silver represents the tears of Rudra who howled. Even in statements which appear to be syntactically complete in themselves, there is yet secondary implication, in respect of eulogy or condemnation, because of the contingence of futility otherwise. This lakṣaṇā is derived, not from any one of the words, but from the word-group; otherwise, the other words in the combination would be purposeless; if 'Vāyu' could itself cause the significance, *viz.*, 'praise of Vāyu', there would be no need to say 'is the swiftest deity.'

43. The eulogy or condemnation secondarily derived is purposeful only as in syntactical relation to an injunction, *e.g.*, the performance of a certain rite, the offering of dakṣiṇā, the non-offering of silver etc. What is the nature of this relation? Is it

that of a word to a sentence of which it forms part, or that of one sentence to another? Does the arthavāda, in other words, convey a complete sense, though it seeks syntactical relation with another, because of its own futility by itself? Or does it convey an incomplete sense like a word-sense, becoming articulate only as linked with the injunction? The ekavākyatā (syntactical harmony), is it that of a word with a sentence (padaikavākyatā) or that of a sentence with another (vākyaikavākyatā)? There is a difference of view even among the Bhāṭṭas. The author of the *Jaiminīya-nyāyamālāvistara* holds that what prompts to the rite (say, in respect of Vāyu) is not the greatness of Vāyu, but the knowledge of his greatness which results from the eulogistic statement; hence, that statement functions as a sentence conveying knowledge of greatness and then links up with the injunction of the rite; his is the view of vākyaikavākyatā. Khaṇḍadeva, however, holds that greatness (prās'astya) is itself the *modus operandi* (itikartavyatā), that the eulogistic statement attains no manner of completeness in the signification of its own sense, and that therefore it should be considered to find such syntactical relation with the injunction, as that of a word in a sentence; this view of padaikavākyatā is what is favoured by Dharmarāja. This does not, however, lead to the total rejection of vākyaikavākyatā, which is recognised by Bhaṭṭa himself; it does exist as between texts declaring one a principal rite and the other a subsidiary rite; here, each text is complete as a sentence, though there is expectancy as between principal and subsidiary; the dars'a-pūrṇamāsa enjoined in relation to the fruit, heaven, is the principal rite; the samit and other sacrifices (constituting the prayājas) being enjoined, but without mention of fruit, the texts about them are complete as sentences, but not as injunctions; they have to link up as statements of subsidiaries to the principal rite, dars'a-pūrṇamāsa; hence vākyaikavyākyatā. The quotation from Bhaṭṭapāda in para 36 is from *Tantravārtikā*, pp. 329-330. The difference between padaikavākyatā and vākyaikavākyatā is further illustrated thus in the *S'ikhāmaṇi* commentary.

The recipocal expectancy of words in a sentence is like that of the warrior who has lost his horses and him whose chariot has been burnt; neither can fight as he is, and each has need of the other's equipment. Where, however, a sentence is complete, as in 'There is a cloth', though there is no immediate expectancy, one may come into being through the question 'What colour is the cloth?' Such a contingent expectancy is what is satisfied by vākyaikavākyatā.

44. 'Āsatti' has been rendered earlier as 'proximity'. This, however, will apply to words, not to the cognition of sense, with which our author deals in this para. Hence the rather devious interpretation and translation, following Mm. N. S. Anantakrishna Sastri. This is justified further on looking at the discussion of Mahāvākyārthabodha and Avāntaravākyārthabodha, in this para; we are concerned here with immediate recall of sense, not with juxtaposition of texts.

45. That is to say, the presence or absence of the cognition of the sense of a major text is determined only by the presence or absence of the cognition of the subordinate texts, in syntactical relation thereto: there can be no understanding of the text 'That thou art' unless there is understanding of the texts teaching the senses of 'That' and 'thou'; similarly knowledge of a text enjoining a principal rite cannot be had without an understanding of the texts enjoining subsidiaries, if any. Thus is exhibited the causality of āsatti in cases of vākyaikavākyatā as well as padaikavākyatā.

46. The precise position of potency (s'akti) among the categories is a matter of dispute among the schools. The Logicians reject it altogether; of the Mīmāṃsakas, the followers of Prabhākara treat it as a distinct substance (dravya). The Bhāṭṭas (with whom the advaitins throw in their lot as a rule) treat s'akti as a quality, which has the genus, potentiality, is located in a substance, quality or action, and is known through postulation or through scriptural authority. Causality, they say, is in every case determined by potency; fire burns, because it has the potency to burn. The

Logicians who deny this, seek to find the explanation in the nature of things (svabhāva). Svabhāva, however, should be permanent, whereas fire is found sometimes not to burn, in the presence of spells or charms. No doubt these are hindrances of burning and their absence has to be reckoned as part of the cause; but a mere negation like absence can effect nothing, while what we seek is the determinant of effectuation. And, in any case, svabhāva properly understood is but another name for what we call s'akti; hence it is that for us, 'the *definiens* of causality in every case is only potency'. See further, *Mānameyodaya* (TPH) pp. 258-260.

47. The principles determining scriptural purport are (1) harmony of the initial and concluding passages, (2) repetition, (3) novelty of what is taught, (4) fruitfulness, (5) eulogy or condemnation in other passages, and (6) consistency in the light of reasoning.

48. While the Mīmāṃsakas hold that verbal statements can be purportful only as in relation to something to be done or to some transcendental result to be achieved, the Vedāntins hold that they may be purportful even in respect of existents, whether finite existents like a son born, or infinite, like Brahman. The birth of a son or the moral lapse of a daughter may involve something to be done; what the hearer or bystander understands from the words is, however, not the act to be, but the fact that is. Hence the validity of the Vedānta texts is indisputable, even though they are not concerned with a rite or its consequences. For a full discussion from the advaitin's point of view, see S'aṅkara's bhāsya on *Brahma Sūtras*, I, i, 4.

49. Though originated, the Veda has unquestionable authority; and this it derives, not from the perfection of the originator, but from the incapacity of the originator (Īs'vara) to manifest it except in the very form it had in a previous aeon; and since there is no absolute beginning of the world, there was no time when the Veda was wholly non-existent and the Lord was free to create it as He liked. One wonders if this position is sounder than that of the

Logician ; the latter, of course, cannot prove God's prefection except from scripture, whose authoritativeness is itself dependent on God's perfection. May it not be said, however, that the beginninglessness of world and the creation of the Veda in strict dependence on its prior form are also to be known only from the Veda ?

50. While the letters (varṇas) themselves are eternal, the audible sounds (dhvanis) manifesting them are not so : they come into being and pass out ; they suffer modifications as long or short ; the difference between a short and a long vowel is then a characteristic of the dhvani, not of the varṇa ; yet by superimposing these characters on the letters, we get valid differences of sense ; naga and nāga, though identical in the varṇa-aspect, signify different things, *e.g.*, a tree and an elephant. In the same way, the cognition that a varṇa is orginated may be valid, as refering to the orgination of the associated audible sound. The indirect relation is 'being manifested by dhvani, which is the locus of origination *i.e.*, is originated.'

51. The system of the Guru (Prabhākara) is most insistent on the impersonality of the Veda, such apauruṣeyatva alone being the cause of the obligatoriness of what is scripturally enjoined, not its contribution to human good, as the Bhāṭṭas would have it. Even such rigorous impersonalists would have to admit pauruṣeyatva, if human utterance be sufficient to constitute it ; for the Veda has to be propagated by human utterance, from teacher to pupil.

52. To prove the proven (siddha-sādhana) is a logical fallacy, and of this the Naiyāyika will be guilty *vis-a-vis* the Vedāntins, if all he means by pauruṣeyatva is *some* dependence on a person ; for we too admit dependence on the Lord ; where we differ is in holding that even the Lord is not independent.

53. Rites are enjoined in Scripture for the attainment of some fruit ; *e.g.*, 'He who desires heaven is to sacrifice with jyotiṣṭoma '. Sometimes, however, no fruit is stated ; in such cases, since no scripturally ordained injunction can be fruitless, a fruit has to be assumed by consideration of the context, eulogistic passages, etc.

Where, however, no such determining consideration is apparent, *e.g.*, in the injunction of the Vis'vajit sacrifice, heaven is assumed to be the fruit, since it is free from defects and is desired by all. The scriptural statement about the Vis'vajit could be purportful only with the postulation of a fruit; and ' heaven ' is the fruit that may be most suitably postulated. See *PM*, IV, iii, 15-16.

54. In the syllogism ' Earth is different from the other elements, because it possesses odour,' the pervasion is negative, in the form, ' whatever is not different from the other elements has no odour, *e.g.*, fire, air, water or ether ' ; it cannot, however, be said ' whatever has odour is different from the other elements ' since odour exists only in earth and with regard to that, since it is the subject, there is not certainty, but doubt, whether the sādhya (*probandum*) exists in it or not. And we have said already that in inference our knowledge is based on pervasion of co-presence; pervasion of co-absence, being merely negative, can give rise to no knowledge except (as pointed out in the text) through indicating an unintelligibility (see para 14) that calls for a postulation; earth could not intelligibly possess a quality not present in other elements, without being different from those elements.

55. Dr. Datta gives an illuminating exposition of the discussion as to why arthāpatti cannot be classed as anumāna (*Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 232-237). He exhibits the *petitio principii* involved in the attempted reduction to a disjunctive-categorical or a categorical syllogism; for whatever is assumed as major premise ' Devadatta who is alive must be at home or out ' or ' Any case of man who is alive not being at home is a case of his being out ' involves the very knowledge which arthāpatti seeks to establish. Yet another way of establishing the independence of arthāpatti was explained by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja in a paper before the sixteenth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress; arthāpatti is not really a process of beginning from the exhaustiveness or exclusiveness of already specified particulars; the process is more like this: it is known that Devadatta is alive; being alive is a

general notion which must be realised in some specific way; the initial presumption is that he is alive and at home; when that is negatived, a tension is created by the generality having to find out at once some other specific support; relief is given to this tension by providing a specific alternative, *viz.*, Devadatta being out. The basic thought-procedure thus is different from that of inference.

56. *E. g.*, Non-existence of merit and demerit, etc.

57. The word 'etc.' covers time, Īs'vara and other such common causes.

58. In a perceptual delusion, the content is in sense-contact and is a product of māyā. Non-existence, however, cannot be in sense-contact; nor can it be a product of nescience, which is positive (bhāva-rūpa). The reply shows that the delusive cognition of non-existence is, in spite of its perceptual character, a case of anyathākhyāti, not of anirvacanīyakhyāti; from the view-point of empirical usage pot is non-existent in the colour of the ground; this non-existence is erroneously transferred to the surface of the ground. That anyathākhyāti is acceptable to advaitins even in cases of perception has already been noted above, with reference to the redness of the crystal etc. The translation follows the *S'ikhāmaṇi*, which interprets 'sannikarṣa' as 'avabhāsa'. In the present case, colour, the locus of abhāva, is claimed to be presented with the abhāva. The alternative reply takes the bull by the horns and declares māyā to be the cause of the delusive non-existence, since similarity in all respects cannot be expected as between the material cause and its products. The second explanation may be preferable as the first leans too much to anyathākhyāti.

59. It is worth noting that the advaitin is not committed to the recognition of four varieties of non-existence; he is content with two, absolute non-existence and difference, the other two being treated as modifications of existence (bhāva-vikārāḥ); see *Siddhāntales'a*, IV: 2. 3, 2. 31.

60. Reality is not the counter-correlate or even the correlate of negation; what can be negated is the finite and the fleeting, not

the infinite and the eternal; and it is not correct to speak of Consciousness or Brahman as the substrate of negation in the way in which a particular entity is spoken of as the substrate; the latter can be removed to give place to something else, but consciousness, which is pervasive and self-luminous, cannot be so removed; rather is it that which remains over when all else is negated. It is not the correlate of negation, just as the cognition 'blue' is the correlate of the negation of red; for, such correlates are finite and inpermanent. Hence we have to say that the negation of nescience is itself knowledge, the negation of the inert is itself consciousness, the negation of the finite is itself Brahman: vidyai 'vā 'vidyā-nās'aḥ; ātmai 'vā 'vidyā-nās'aḥ; āropitapratiyogikadhvaṃsasya adhiṣṭhāne pratīyamānasya adhiṣṭhānamātratvāt.

61. The instrumentality (sādhakatva) is either for Brahman in respect of the world, or for s'ravaṇa (Vedānta-study) etc., in respect of Brahman-realisation. Neither instrumentality is real in the last resort, being posited by nescience in Brahman, like that in respect of which there is instrumentality.

62. *Hence it is etc.*: because nescience is said to be what posits difference; it could not be such (kalpaka) unless it were itself positive (bhāva-rūpa) and other than prior non-existence of cognition. The *Vivaraṇa* inference runs thus: Pramāṇa-generated cognition is preceded by some entity which is present in the same locus (as the cognition), which veils its content, and which is other than the prior non-existence of that (cognition); for, it reveals what was unrevealed before; like the light of a lamp that has just been lit in a dark place. The *Tattvapradīpikā* definition runs thus: That, which is beginningless, positive (bhāva-rūpam) and removed by knowledge, is nescience; thus do the wise declare the definition.

63. Different views have been held by various Indian schools as to whether validity is intrinsic or extrinsic, *i.e.*, whether it is generated and made known by the conditions of the cognition itself or whether some extraneous conditions are required. Some schools

treat validity and invalidity alike in this regard : both are intrinsic according to the Sāṅkhyas, while both are extrinsic according to the Naiyāyikas. The Buddhists distinguish between the cases of validity and invalidity; so do the Vedāntins (and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas ; for the Prābhākara there is no invalid cognition at all). But while the former treat invalidity alone as intrinsic, the latter treat validity alone as intrinsic. The main considerations in support of our final view are these : (*a*) In respect of generation, it is impossible to point to a single uniform and constant condition to account for the validity. We may see very little of an object, yet cognise it correctly ; we may see much of it, yet mistake it ; we may apprehend it validly even after seeing it once, whereas we may mistake it, even after seeing it repeatedly. We may argue from incorrect premises to a correct conclusion ; though the process is wrong, the conclusion continues to be valid ; and so on. Hence there is no recurrent condition to account for validity, other than the causal aggregate of the cognition itself. Invalidity, however, results from some defect interfering with the functioning of the causal aggregate. (*b*) In respect of the cognition too of validity, it is not the case that any cognition comes to us barely as such without a truth-claim, but requiring such a claim to be affirmed or denied later. The Naiyāyikas make out that every cognition is the object of another reflective (anuvyavasāya) cognition, that validity is determined by the latter, and that the determination is of the character of an inference based on the practical efficiency of the original cognition. The cognition in dispute is a valid one, since it leads to successful practical activity, like some other cognition admitted to be valid. The trouble with such a position is that in the end some cognition has to be valid intrinsically, if infinite regress is to be avoided. If the initial cognition has to be guaranteed by the inferential cognition, what is to guarantee the latter ? If the validity of the latter be self-evident, why not that of the initial cognition too ? That is why even among those who admit a reflective (anuvyavasāya) cognition, like Murāri Mis'ra and the S'aiva

Siddhāntins, validity is admitted to be intrinsic. Every cognition comes to us, not bare, but with the assertion of a truth-claim; it is liable, however, to have its claim set aside on the ground of practical failure, sublation, etc.; hence invalidity is extrinsic. See further *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, 1st varṇaka, paras CLX (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*).

64. The Logicians hold that all created things remain for one instant without any qualities, and that the qualities attach only later; hence pot etc., have no odour etc., at the moment of their production. As for dissolution, they distinguish between two kinds, the intermediate and the final (khaṇḍa- or avāntara-pralaya and mahā-pralaya); in the former, only produced things are dissolved, whereas in the latter all positive products are destroyed; but primal atoms (paramāṇus) being eternal are not destroyed; their qualities too persist as upādhis of kāla (time) during avāntara-pralaya, in order to make possible the re-creation of the world when the deluge is over; even in mahāpralaya, the qualities are eternal, except in the case of the earth paramāṇus; for their qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch are products, subject to constant change through the application of heat and constant chemical action. See Umesh Mishra, *The Conception of Matter in the Nyāya-Vais'eṣika*, pp. 66, 74, 265; also *Vais'eṣika Sūtras*, VII, i, 6; *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 226; *Primer of Indian Logic*, pp. 112, 115-116.

65. The qualification of desire by knowledge and volition, of volition by desire and knowledge, of knowledge by desire and volition, would be futile, if only a single (not a three-fold) definition were intended; for any one of these being characteristic of Brahman, the qualification offends against parsimony.

66. The expression 'guṇa', occurring in the same context as sound, colour, etc., should not be understood as quality; it does not qualify māyā, but is constitutive of it; māyā is triguṇātmika. This is, of course, the same usage of 'guṇa' as in the Sāṅkhya. But whereas, in that system, the elements results from tamas-dominant ahaṅkāra as stimulated by rajas, in Advaita, they result straight

from māyā, the dominance of one or other constituent being found only in the products of the elements, *e.g.*, the indriyas etc. Conformably to this the word 'associated' in 'sattva-guṇa-associated' etc., has to be understood in the sense of 'dominant' or 'manifested'; kārya-vis'eṣa-janane kasyacid guṇasyā 'virbhāvaḥ (*S'ikhāmaṇi*).

67. An alternative explanation of udāna is that it is the vital air which functions in eructation.

68. It has been already noticed that according to the Logicians the qualities of the earth paramāṇus are non-eternal. If, however, the destruction of the substrate or the samavāyi-kāraṇa be a necessary antecedent of the destruction of the product, the destruction of the earth paramāṇus should precede that of their qualities. This, however, is impossible, since the paramāṇus are eternal. Hence the Logicians cannot consistently maintain their view that in dissolution the destruction of the material cause precedes that of the effect.

69. There are at least two other varieties of the view which holds Īs'vara too to be a reflection. According to one, māyā is distinguished from avidyā, pure sattva being dominant in the former, not in the latter; the other holds māyā to be single, while avidyās, which are its parts, are diverse. Īs'vara is the reflection of consciousness in māyā, jīva in avidyā. The fundamental defect of any view which treats Īs'vara too as a reflection is that it widens the gulf between Him and the jīva, making Him purely transcendent with neither the capacity to sympathise nor the power to help. This defect is largely got rid of in the view that Īs'vara is the prototype whereof the jīva is a reflection. The difficulties of the reflection theory in general are noticed and met later in paras 63-67. See further *Siddhāntales'a*, Introduction, pp. 35-42 and I: 2. 311-2. 314. The view developed in the text is that of the *Saṅkṣepas'ārīraka*: see II, v. 176, v. 207.

70. As we have just noted, a plurality of jīvas may be accounted for on the basis of even a plurality of avidyās, these being

independent (as in the *Bhāmatī* view) or parts of a single māyā (as in the *Prakaṭārtha* view). Yet another possibility is to endow the single avidyā with a plurality of potencies (s'akti), this plurality accounting for the multiplicity of the jīvas; when any one jīva is released, that particular potency alone is destroyed, not avidyā as such; hence the continuance of bondage for other jīvas.

71. The difficulty raised relates to the pervasiveness and the internal rulership of Īs'vara. How can the prototype which exists outside the reflecting medium be pervasive of the medium or be immanent in the reflection therein? The reply seeks to exploit the example of the ether, which, while as sky it is reflected in water, pervades the water too, because of its natural pervasiveness. This clever answer conceals a difficulty pressed by the upholders of the avaccheda-vāda and noticed in the *Siddhāntales'a*, I: 2. 313. It is true, these say, that ether is reflected in water and also pervades water; but what is in the water is not reflected therein, any more than the face of a man under water is reflected in the water; the prototype is not that which is within, and what is within cannot be the prototype in that act of reflection. This criticism is ignored both in the text and in the commentaries.

72. The jīva as consciousness is unattached (asaṅga); but this is characteristic of him all the time, not merely prior to the psychosis; what then is the use of the psychosis? The reply indicates that even what is pervasive or unattached does attach in some localities alone; *e.g.*, the jāti, say, cowness, is generic and non-attached to particulars, except to those particulars that have a dewlap etc.; similarly, light though pervasive of objects possessing colour, taste, smell, etc., manifests the colour alone; thus does the internal organ serve to bring about relation between the jīva-caitanya and objects. See *Vivaraṇaprameysaṅgraha*, 1st Varṇaka, CXV (*a*).

73. 'The final advaita position is this: bliss is the nature of the self. While it is not clearly manifest in waking and dream, in sleep it is manifest quite clearly . . . on waking

up all the three are reflected on, bliss, the self, and nescience . . . Nescience itself is transformed in sleep in the form of the three psychoses; and it is through these that bliss, the self, and nescience are experienced. The non-existence of cognition and the non-existence of misery, however, are not *experienced* then; they are only presumptively known. The non-existence of misery is presumed because the undisturbed happiness of the period of sleep is remembered. The non-existence of cognition is presumed because nescience which is reflected on would otherwise be unintelligible.' (*Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha*, Text volume, p. 29). Bliss, nescience and the self are known immediately, while the non-existence of misery and of cognition is got mediately through arthāpatti.

74. The position of the *Sūtras* (III, ii, 10) is that swoon is an intermediate state between deep sleep and death, agreeing partially with both, but also differing from both. While consciousness is lacking as in sleep, there is also the lack of the peacefulness etc., characteristic of deep sleep; and swoon is the precursor of death, in those cases where no karma remains to be worked out in this life. Though rarely experienced, it is a genuine fifth state (as extinguished from waking, dream, sleep and death); its non-recognition generally as a fifth state may be set down 'to its being avowedly compounded of other states.'

75. Atomic size would be inconsistent with the perceptibility (dṛṣṭaḥ) declared by the self-same s'ruti; further, an atomic self could not have simultaneously divergent experiences in different parts of the body. The naturally pervasive self acquires, when adjunct-limited, the same size as the adjunct, here, the internal organ. Atomicity in the s'ruti, therefore, signifies but extreme subtlety.

76. The texts about the sacrificial stake and the strew are merely eulogistic; the stake can never *be* the sun, nor can the strew (the ceremonially spread out kus'a or other grass) *be* the sacrificer; what is meant is only a stress on the importance of each in the sacrifice.

77. The argument here proceeds by granting the adversary's assumption that perception does cognise difference. But the advaitin who elects to follow Maṇḍana's brilliant dialectic will not grant even this much. Perceptual cognition, which is a single momentaneous act, should either affirm or deny, but cannot do both. If it only affirms, there is no difference, which consists in denial or the assertion of reciprocal non-existence. It is not possible to hold that its only function is denial; for, negation presupposes the positive cognition of what is denied (the content of negation) and that in relation to which there is denial (locus of negation). If cognition can be affirmative at least in regard to these, there is no reason why it should not be so in all cases. Further, perception of diverse entities as real relates to the reality that is common and non-dual, not to the variable diversity; no doubt the non-dual is here cognised not in its purity, but as conjoined with nescience and consequent plurality; it is the removal of this conjunction that is effected by s'ruti, which is thus an auxiliary to pratyakṣa, not a pramāna at variance with it. Those interested in the further study of the topic cannot do better than go through the second chapter of Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*; see also Jñānaghana's *Tattvas'uddhi*, Ch. I.

78. Our author finds it convenient here to use the terminology of 'implication', when he speaks of the 'implied entities (lakṣya-svarūpayoḥ)', though earlier he was at considerable pains to discard the doctrine of lakṣanā in the interpretation of 'That thou art.'

79. When something is known to be in relation to oneself and is in that form the object of desire, that object in that form is also the fruit; pleasurable objects merely desired for oneself, but not known to be in relation to oneself, cannot be the fruit, *e.g.*, a beggar's desire for delicacies; and what is known to be in relation to oneself will not as such be a fruit, *e.g.*, pain or grief; hence the double qualification of being related to oneself and being desired in that form.

80. The texts about the efficacy or otherwise of manas are reconciled in yet another way by Sadānanda in the *Vedāntasāra*; manas does function in Brahman-intuition, but not in the same way

as in the perception of finite objects; in the latter case, the psychosis destroys the nescience investing the object and also reveals the object, through consciousness as reflected in itself, non-difference being exhibited as between this consciousness and object-defined consciousness. The vṛtti that is Brahman-intuition has, however, only the one function of destroying nescience; Brahman has not to be revealed by the psychosis, since Brahman is self-luminous. See *Vedāntasāra* (Oriental Book Agency) p. 11, and Hiriyanna's notes thereon (pp. 39, 40).

81. What is helpful thus is called a remote auxiliary (ārād upakāraka), while that which contributes directly to the fruit is a proximate auxiliary (sannipatya upakāraka). The s'ruti text, in the next sentence says that by sacrifices etc., the brāhmaṇas *desire to know* Brahman; hence rites are held by the *Bhāmatī* school to be the cause of the desire alone (vividiṣā) not of knowledge (vidyā) itself (see *Bhāmatī*, TPH., p. 85). The *Vivaraṇa* school, however, holds that vidyā itself is the result, the suffix indicative of desire being interpreted figuratively; *e.g.*, in 'He desires to go on horse-back' the horse-riding is a means not to the desire (though this is the meaning of the suffix and should normally be construed as primary), but to the going; in the same way, sacrifice etc., are instrumental to knowledge, not to the desire to know; see *Siddhāntales'a*, III: 1. 1, 1. 2. It should also be noted that while, according to the *Bhamatī* School, there is no injunction in respect of s'ravaṇa etc., the *Vivaraṇa* School recognises a restrictive injunction (niyama-vidhi) in respect of them; the latter is the view mentioned in para 21. See further the opening sections of the *Siddhāntales'a*, Ch. I.

82. The pramāṇas—s'ruti (express statement), liṅga (the significant capacity) etc., have been briefly noticed in note 37 under Chapter IV; reference has also been made to *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakās'a* (Edgerton), paras 88-181. The principle of *sequence* (krama or sthāna) applies where there is proximate mention of what will not otherwise he taken to be a subsidiary; thus, while

prayājas relate as subsidiaries, on the principle of prakaraṇa, whereby the not-expressly fruitful declared in the topic of the expressly fruitful (*e.g.*, the dars'apūrṇamāsa, productive of heavenly enjoyment) is construed as subsidiary to the latter, the upahomas, mentioned without fruit in proximity to the modelled rites, do not relate as subsidiaries on the same principle; for, prayājas being transferred to the modelled rites too, there is no longer any ākāṅkṣā in the latter, as to the *modus operandi* (itikartavyatā); nevertheless, the upahomas are subsidiaries, because of their mention in proximity; this principle of *sequence* posits a prakaraṇa not *prima facie* seen to exist. In the case discussed in the text, not even krama is possible, since it is shown that prakaraṇa, even if posited, may function differently, reducing s'ravaṇa and manana to subsidiaries of dhyāna. Where, of a word, the etymological sense is unsuitable for syntactical relation in the context (*e.g.*. 'ādhvaryava' in 'ādhvaryaveṇa yajeta'), such word functions as a proper *name* (sāmakhyā) of a rite, in a relation of subsidiariness to the principal, through positing krama, prakaraṇa, etc., up to s'ruti. Hence it is we are told in para 34 that these two principles are 'too remote'.


83. The *Bhāmatī* gives a slightly different account of s'ama etc. S'ama is subjugation of the internal sense; the capacity of the mind so subjugated for the investigation of truth is dama; the desire to abandon objects is titikṣā; turning away from objects is uparati; and s'raddhā is faith in the truth. And the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal means not what it seems to *prima facie*, as then inquiry would be futile, but the discrimination of eternality from non-eternality and the knowledge that what is eternal should be pursued, not the other. See *Bhāmatī* (TPH), pp. 95-97.

84. The general tendency of Advaita writers has been to stress the need for formal saṃnyāsa, making it a necessary preliminary to Vedānta-s'ravaṇa; so much so that the non-brahmin, though a dvija, was held by some to be ineligible for Vedānta-study,

since he was not eligible to renounce; others, however, held the incapacity to apply to the non-dvija alone; see *Siddhāntales'a*, III: 2. 0—2. 143.

85. The problem of liberation even while embodied is one of the vexed questions of Advaita; there are diverse pronouncements, none of which gives satisfaction. The leading views may be seen from this table.

JĪVANMUKTI



While (1) is ascribed to the *Saṅkṣepas'ārīraka*, and (3) is found in early works like the *Paramārthasāra*, (2) seems to represent the view of our text; for it says that prārabdha is not destroyed, because there is no unhindered knowledge; perfect vidyā being non-existent, there can be no release either, though there is talk of it as if actual, because there is no more effort to be made and release is imminent (āsanna); (4) and (5) are interesting in that they represent phases of the doctrine as found in S'aṅkara, Maṇḍana and Vācaspati. S'aṅkara holds that prārabdha persists; so does Vācaspati; both, however, insist on speaking of the jīvanmukta as a fully realised person, a siddha, not a sādhaka; and while

S'aṅkara is not explicit as to the conduct of the jīvanmukta, Vācaspati holds that, while prescriptions do not apply, prohibitions do; for the former require faith, conceit of agency, etc., not the latter. Maṇḍana cannot stand this mixing up of release with the persistence of karma; he says that the *Muṇḍaka*-s'ruti speaks of the destruction of karma-s advisedly in the plural, not in the singular nor in the dual; hence the annihilation has to be understood of the prārabdha as well as of the sañcita and āgāmi; if karma really persists, we have only a sādhaka, not a siddha; the *Chāndogya*-s'ruti does not have as its purport the delay until death; rather does it signify the imminence of physical decease; it may be paralleled by the expression 'I shall delay only to feed and dress'; what accounts for physical persistence for a time is not prārabdha, but its vāsanā (residual impression); unlike karma, its vāsanā cannot bind or cause further saṃsāra. (*a*) and (*c*) are views of old texts. Maṇḍana's position attempts to be more logical; but here too, we have the fundamental difficulty that with the full onset of knowledge, no nescience can be left; and the very talk of vāsanā, to say nothing of its existence, is evidence of the persistence of nescience; jīvanmukti can be only figurative even for Maṇḍana. It is legitimate to ask whether these writers are not mixing up the standpoint of the onlooker with that of the released jīva; if the latter is aware of the body as body, that awareness will have to be explained in terms of karma and vāsanā. But is it not we who perceive the body of the mukta? Does not the mukta perceive everything as Brahman and act accordingly? Does not the divergence of views come from a wrong posing of the problem? Is this not responsible even for the stress on release after death (videhamukti), a doctrine which seems strangely ill-consorted with non-dualist philosophy? See further introduction to the *Bhāmatī* (TPH).

86. If any one had been really released, all others would have been released too. As a matter of fact, however, there is only one jīva, the inquirer himself; the rest of the world, sentient as well as

insentient, is a projection of his imagination ; so too are the stories of some jīvas having found release, for there are no other jīvas ; when he himself is released, there is release of all in the sense that the rest never were and never will be. This solipsistic eka-jīva-vāda does not commend itself to many ; hence the attempts to find a solution on lines more in accord with everyday experience.

87. The destruction of nescience as qualified by one s'akti does not involve the destruction of nescience as such or as qualified by obscuring capacity in respect of another jīva ; hence the continuance of bondage for the other jīvas. Those, who cannot subscribe to the view that the qualified may be destroyed while the pure persists, prefer to adopt the doctrine of a plurality of nesciences.

88. The reading adopted and commented on in the *Kalpataru* is 'vidyā-karma-svanuṣṭhāna' meaning 'proper pursuance of meditation and ritual activities'.

89. On the whole topic of sarvamukti, see further Appayya Dīkṣita's *S'ivādvaitanirṇaya*, 3. 2351—3. 2355 ; also *Siddhānta-les'a*, IV : 4. 0—4. 2246.